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FOREWORD 
The second United States manned orbital flight has added significantly to the 
knowledge gained from the previous orbital flight. An overall analysis of the mission 
performance is presented and only the minimum necessary supporting data is included. 
General acknowledgement is made of the extensive effort on the part of the entire 
Mercury team. This team, consisting of many organizations that are external to the 
Manned Spacecraft Center, notably includes the Department of Defense, the spacecraft 
prime contractor and its subcontractors, the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center for 
the Mercury Worldwide. Network, the launch vehicle prime contractor and its subcon- 
tractors,  and, in general, the many organizations and government agencies which 
directly or indirectly made possible the success of this flight. 
The contents of this report  represent the contributions of an assigned flight 
evaluation team, which comprised system specialists and operations personnel from 
throughout the Manned Spacecraft Center, without whose analytical and documentary 
efforts a report of this technical completeness would not have been possible. 
i 
ABSTRACT 
The results and analysis of the second United 
States manned orbital flight accomplished on May 24, 
1962, as a phase of Project Mercury a r e  presented. 
Spacecraft and launch vehicle descriptions, mission 
operations, and postflight analyses a r e  included. 
Particular treatment is given to the investigations of 
spacecraft systems performance and the aeromedical 
analyses of the astronaut. 
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SECOND UNITED STATES MANNED THREE-PASS ORBITAL MISSION 
(MERCURY-ATLAS 7, SPACECRAFT 18) 
DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Edited by John H. Boynton 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The Mercury Atlas Mission 7 (MA-") was the second United States manned orbital 
flight, and all mission objectives were accomplished. A description of the mission, 
the test  objectives, and a comprehensive postlaunch evaluation are presented. 
The MA-7 mission, with Astronaut M. Scott Carpenter as pilot, experienced un- 
scheduled prelaunch holds totaling 45 minutes; and these delays were directly related 
to reduced visibility conditions and the measurement of atmospheric refraction in  the 
launch area. A low-level fog and smoke condition precluded required optical coverage 
at the planned launch time of 7:OO a. m. eastern standard time (e. s. t. ). Lift-off oc- 
curred at approximately 7:45 a. m. e. s. t., on May 24, 1962, 3 hours after the astro- 
naut entered the spacecraft. 
Launch vehicle performance was satisfactory, and all events during powered 
flight occurred as planned. Both the launch vehicle guidance system and range safety 
impact predictor computer (IP 7090) data indicated a mission- continue (r'gor') condition. 
Orbital insertion conditions were excellent, with deviations from planned values of 
space-fixed flight-path angle and velocity of 0.0004" and 2.0 ft/sec, respectively. The 
perigee and apogee of the orbit differed from the planned values by 0.09 nautical mile 
and 0. 56 nautical mile, respectively. 
Spacecraft separation and manual turnaround were accomplished satisfactorily. 
However, during the first two and one-half orbital periods, some difficulties were  ex- 
perienced in maintaining the desired suit- circuit temperature. In addition, spacecraft 
control- system fuel usage ra tes  were higher than planned during the early part of this 
period. 
The pilot tracked the expended launch vehicle tankage, checked out the spacecraft 
control system, performed planned tasks, and conducted scientific experiments. 
also took numerous photographs of the launch vehicle tankage, a tethered baloon, mete- 
orological phenomena, and general terrestrial features. 
He 
After contacting Hawaii on the third, and final, orbital pass, the pilot noted that 
the spacecraft's true attitude and indicated attitude in pitch were in disagreement and 
that the automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) control mode appeared to 
have an e r r o r  in attitude reference. Because of these problems and previous preoc- 
cupation with other observations, he was  unable to maintain the schedule established 
for  completing the pre-retrograde sequence checklist and was occupied with assessing 
the control problem until the time of retrofire. Retrorocket ignition occurred approxi- 
mately 3 seconds late, and the pitch and yaw attitudes varied during retrofire. The 
pilot noted that the sensations during this period of retrofire did not equal the pro- 
nounced effects of deceleration that he had expected. Shortly after retrofire, computed 
trajectory data indicated that an overshoot of about 250 nautical miles beyond the 
planned landing area  would occur, and subsequent tracking data confirmed the initially 
predicted coordinates of the landing point. Retropackage release and periscope retrac - 
tion occurred at near nominal times, and the events were reported by the pilot. The 
pilot also reported depletion of the manual-system fuel supply prior to the start of 
ionization blackout. * After the end of ionization blackout, the pilot received informa- 
tion regarding the computed landing coordinates and his expected retrieval time of 
1 hour after landing. The portion of the reentry through the heat pulse and deceleration 
buildup was  accomplished satisfactorily, but oscillations of the spacecraft increased 
considerably thereafter. The pilot manually deployed the drogue parachute at an alti- 
tude of about 25 000 feet to damp these oscillations. 
After landing, the pilot immediately began egress  from the spacecraft through 
the recovery compartment, deployed recovery equipment, and entered the liferaft. 
Recovery operations, which were successful, included the deployment of a para- 
rescue team into the water about 1 hour after spacecraft landing. This team inflated 
additional rafts and mounted a flotation collar around the spacecraft to provide addi- 
tional buoyancy. An HSS-2 helicopter from the U. S. S. Intrepid (aircraft car r ie r )  re- 
covered the astronaut in good condition about 3 hours after landing, and the spacecraft 
was retrieved by the U. S. S. J. R. Pierce (destroyer) about 6 hours after landing. 
*Ionization blackout is the term applied to that portion of reentry when communi- 
cation with the spacecraft is cut off by the plasma sheath surrounding the spacecraft. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
The second manned orbital flight of the Mercury pr2gram was successfully 
accomplished on May 24, 1962, from the Cape Canaveral , Florida, Miss i le  Test 
Annex. This was the fourth orbital flight of a Mercury specification spacecraft and 
the seventh of a ser ies  of Mercury flights utilizing the Atlas launch vehicle. The 
flight was therefore designated as Mercury-Atlas Mission 7 (MA- 7). 
M. Scott Carpenter, shown in figures 1 and 2, was the pilot for this mission. The 
data and information presented add to  that previously published (ref. 1) on the first 
United States manned orbital flight. 
Astronaut 
The MA-7 mission was planned for three orbital passes and was a continuation 
of a program designed to acquire operational experience and information for manned 
space flight. The objectives of the flight were to  evaluate the performance of the 
manned spacecraft system in a three-orbital-pass mission; to evaluate the effects of 
orbital space flight on another astronaut and to compare this analysis with previous 
astronaut/simulator results; to obtain the astronaut's opinions on the operational 
suitability of the spacecraft and supporting systems for manned space flight; and to 
evaluate the performance of spacecraft systems replaced or modified as a result of 
the MA-6 manned orbital mission. All of these objectives were successfully achieved. 
An analysis of the significant data has been made, and the important findings a r e  
presented in this report. Brief descriptions of the mission, the spacecraft, and the 
launch vehicle precede the performance analysis and supporting data. All significant 
events of the mission a r e  documented, beginning with delivery of the spacecraft to 
the launch site and terminating with the recovery and postflight examinations. 
Lift-off time for the MA-7 mission was 07:45:16. 57 a. m. e. s. t., and all times 
in this document a r e  given in ground elapsed time from 07:45:16.00 a. m. e. s. t. 
(range-zero time) unless otherwise noted. 
Although the graphical information in this part  of the MA-" report sufficiently 
supports the text, a complete presentation of all MA-7 time-history data has been 
compiled for technical reference purposes. 
* 
Since renamed Cape Kennedy. 
3 
Figure 1. - P r e f l i g h t  photograph of Astronauts Schi r ra  (MA-7 backup p i l o t ) ,  
Carpenter (MA-7 p i l o t ) ,  and Glenn (MA-6 p i l o t ) .  
Graham (ground crew) i s  a t  extreme r igh t .  
Spacecraft  Engineer 
Figure 2.- Astronauts Carpenter and Glenn during an informal p o s t f l i g h t  discussion. 
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SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 
The space vehicle used for the MA-7 mission consisted of a Mercury specifica- 
tion spacecraft and an Atlas-D launch vehicle. A photograph of the lift-off configura- 
tion is shown in figure 3, and a sketch of the general configuration is shown in 
figure 4. 
The spacecraft and launch vehicle used in the MA-7 orbital mission were very 
similar to those used in the previous manned orbital mission, MA-6. 
sion space vehicle is described in reference 1, and the more significant differences 
between the MA- 7 and MA- 6 vehicles are presented in the following paragraphs. 
The MA-6 mis- 
SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION 
Spacecraft 18 (shown in fig. 5) was used in the MA-7 orbital mission, and fig- 
ure  6 displays the standard reference axis system that was employed. This space- 
craft configuration was essentially identical to that of spacecraft 13 used in the 
MA-6 mission. The spacecraft 18 configuration differed from that of spacecraft 13 
in the following ways: 
1. The SOFAR bombs and radar chaff were deleted, since they were  not con- 
sidered necessary for an effective recovery. 
2. The oxygen- quantity telelight was removed because the oxygen partial- 
pressure transducer, originally located in the cabin, was relocated in the suit. 
Later the transducer was reinstalled in the cabin, but the oxygen- quantity telelight 
was  not reactivated. 
3. The earth-path indicator and oxygen partial-pressure indicator were deleted, 
since they were not necessary to accomplish the mission. 
4. The knee and chest straps were removed as a result of re-evaluation of 
their usefulness. 
5. The coolant- quantity and humidity indicators located on the instrument panel 
were deleted since their performances were considered to be marginal. 
6. The instrument-observer camera was removed because the data from this 
source were no longer considered essential. The astronaut- observer camera with a 
mi r ro r  attached performed a part  of this function. 
7. 
data, was installed in the recovery compartment. 
A 30-inch-diameter balloon, deployed in orbit to obtain drag and visibility 
8. Zero-gravity experiment equipment was incorporated for the purpose of 
obtaining data on fluid behavior in a weightless state within a specific envelope con- 
figuration. 
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9. A low-level commutator and instrumentation for temperature measurements 
were added. 
10. The low-frequency-telemetry center frequency was raised by 500 kc, f rom 
225.7 mc, to eliminate the RF interference which occurred on the MA-6 flight. 
11. The suit- circuit constant-bleed orifice was deleted. 
12. The landing-bag limit switches were rewired so that both switches had to 
close for proper indication of heat shield deployment. 
13. A "maneuver" switch was added to remove roll and yaw slaving of spacecraft 
gyros and pitch orbital precession at the astronaut's discretion. 
14. The cabin and suit- circuit %teamTt (evaporated water) vents were instru- 
mented, and a dual indicator was installed on the instrument panel to enable the astro- 
naut to evaluate cooling- system temperatures. 
15. The check valve was deleted from the inverter cold-plate water cooling sys- 
tem, since a stuck valve could cause high inverter temperatures. 
1 The -g relay was locked in after launch vehicle sustainer engine cutoff 4 
(SECO) to prevent interference with the spacecraft ASCS damping mode during 
posigrade- rocket firing. 
16. 
17. The main parachute deployment bags, reefing lines, and reefing cutters were 
modified to prevent premature cutting of the reefing lines. 
18. The Reaction Control System (RCS) 1-pound and 6-pound thruster fuel- 
distribution plates and screens were modified. 
19. The red filter was removed from the window. 
20. A barostat was added to the parachute circuitry to disarm the recovery sys- 
tem at altitudes above 11 200 feet. 
21. A semiautomatic blood-pressure measuring system was installed. 
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The weight and balance data for spacecraft 18 are summarized in the following 
table. 
- 
Mission phase 
Parameter 
.. 
Weight, lb . . . . .  
Center -of -gravity 
station, in. 
z . . . . . . . .  
x . . . . . . . .  
Y . . . . . . . .  
Moments of inertia, 
2 slug - f t 
Iz . . . . . . . .  
Ix . . . . . . . .  
I . . . . . . . .  
Y 
Launch 
. 
4,244.09 
168.40 
-. 07 
,02  
354. 60 
7,709. 50 
7,720. 70 
~~ __ 
Orbit 
.. 
2,974.56 
121.45 
-. 10 
-. 01 
288.90 
646.30 
658.80 
~~ _ _  ._ ~ _ 
Normal 
reentry 
2,663.36 
125.10 
-. 10 
. 00 
272.10 
562.20 
575.30 
.~ 
At main 
parachute 
deployment 
2,557.70 
122.51 
-. 09 
.03  
268. 50 
445.60 
458.90 
Flotation 
2,407.83 
119.89 
-. 40 
.05 
262.80 
376.10 
389.00 
LAUNCH VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 
The MA-7 launch vehicle (Atlas 107-D) was  an Atlas Series-D missile modified 
for the missions as on previous Mercury-Atlas flights. 
This 107-D launch vehicle configuration did not differ in any major respect from 
the Atlas 109-D launch vehicle utilized for the MA-6 mission (see ref. 1). The con- 
figuration of the Atlas 107-D differed from that of Atlas 109-D in the following minor 
ways : 
1. The staging time was reduced from 131.3 to 130.1 seconds after lift-off, 
and backup staging time was altered from 136 to 132.2 seconds. 
2. The propellant-utilization manometer calibration procedure was revised. 
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3. The boiloff-valve spring rate was  changed. 
4. The lox-tank pressure regulator operating range was  changed. 
5. Servomechanism stabilization was provided to eliminate the need for  
special selection of booster-engine hydraulic actuators. 
6. The propellant utilization telemetry-signal conditioning was changed. 
7. Booster engine main-oxidizer-valve material was changed from aluminum 
to stainless steel to reduce thermal expansion effects. 
8. The pneumatic regulators on the booster engines were improved. 
9. The interference between the high-pressure fuel drain fitting and the 
vehicle structure was  eliminated. 
10. The head-suppression and propellant-utilization solenoid valves were 
modified by reversing the electrical-mechanical position stops in an effort to im- 
prove reliability. 
11. The fuel tank bulkhead insulation was retained. 
8 
Figure 3.- MA-7 launch configuration at lift-off. 
9 
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Aerodynamic 
spike 
Sus ta iner  engine 
4 Escape rocket  
Tower j e tt i s on 
Escape tower 
Antenna f a i r i n g  
tage  separa t ion  
t rograde and 
s igrade rockets  
launch veh ic l  
Vernier engine 
Booster engine 
Figure 4.- Sketch showing genera l  configuration. 
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Figure 5.- MA-7 Spacecraft 18 mounted on the launch vehicle. (Preflight 
checkout photograph showing ground-support-equipment still attached.) 
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Arrows show pos i t i ve  sense. 
Y 
YAW 
Pi t ch  
P i tch  i s  defined a s  t h e  ro t a t ion  of  t h e  spacecraf t  
about i t s  X - a x i s .  The p i t ah  angle i s  0" when the  
Z-axis l ies  i n  a hor izonta l  plane. 
nau t ' s  r i g h t  s ide  a s  a reference,  pos i t i ve  p i t ch  i s  
achieved by counterclockwise ro t a t ion  f rom the  0' 
plane. The r a t e  of t h i s  ro t a t ion  i s  the  spacecraf t  
p i t ch  r a t e  and i s  pos i t i ve  i n  the  d i r ec t ion  shown. 
Yaw 
Yaw i s  defined a s  the  ro t a t ion  of  t h e  spacecraft 
about i t s  Y - s l d s .  
c r a f t  when viewed from above the  as t ronaut ,  i s  
ca l l ed  r i g h t  yaw and i s  defined a s  pos i t ive .  
Yaw angle i s  considered 0' when the  spacecraf t  
i s  i n  nonnal. o r b i t a l  pos i t i on  (b lunt  end of space- 
c r a f t  fac ing  l i n e  of  f l i g h t ) .  When the  pos i t i ve  
Z-axis of the  spacecraf t  i s  d i rec ted  along t h e  
o r b i t a l  f l i gh t  pa th  (recovery end of spacecraf t  
facing l i n e  of f l i g h t ) ,  t he  yaw angle i s  180'. 
Using t h e  a s t ro -  
Clockwise ro t a t ion  of  t he  space- 
R o l l  
Ro l l  i s  defined a s  the  ro t a t ion  of  t he  spacecraf t  
about i t s  Z - a x i s .  Clockwise ro t a t ion  of t he  space- 
c r a f t ,  a s  viewed from behind the  as t ronaut ,  i s  ca l led  
r i g h t  roll and i s  defined a s  pos i t i ve  (+). When the  
X-axis of t h e  spacecraf t  l ies  i n  a hor izonta l  plane,  
t he  roll angle i s  0" 
Accelerometer Po la r i ty  with Respect t o  Gravity 
With t h e  spacecraf t  i n  t he  launch pos i t ion ,  the  
Z-axis w i l l  be perpendicular t o  t h e  e a r t h ' s  sur- 
face  and the  Z-axis accelerometer w i l l  read +lg. 
Figure 6.- Spacecraft axis system. 
MISSION OPERATIONS 
The various ground operations required to support a Mercury orbital mission 
may be grouped according to appropriate mission phases: prelaunch, launch, orbital 
flight, and recovery. The prelaunch operations include the preparations necessary 
to bring the astronaut, spacecraft, launch vehicle, and ground-support personnel up 
to flight-ready status. The launch operations begin with the countdown, when all 
flight systems and flight-control stations are checked for readiness, and concludes 
with insertion of the spacecraft into its orbital trajectory. The orbital portion of 
the flight entails the flight monitoring and data-acquisition operations of personnel 
stationed along the Mercury Worldwide Network. The recovery operations begin 
when a landing point is predicted by appropriate network stations, and involve the 
combined efforts of thousands of Department of Defense personnel stationed at the 
various prescribed landing locations along the orbital ground track. 
PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS 
The prelaunch operations consist of the training of the astronaut for a specific 
flight, preparations conducted at the launch site for the spacecraft and the launch 
vehicle, and flight-safety reviews. Although each astronaut has received training 
since his introduction into the Mercury program, special training is required for 
the mission involved. This training primarily involves participation in a ser ies  
of mission simulations which present realistic operational situations which require 
assessment and action. These simulations a r e  often conducted in conjunction with 
the detailed checkout operations completed for the spacecraft, launch vehicle, and 
the Mercury Network. 
Program management personnel attend scheduled review meetings to evaluate 
the status of prelaunch preparations for the spacecraft and launch vehicle and to 
initiate necessary remedial action in order to maximize astronaut safety throughout 
the mission. 
tion for launch. 
The following paragraphs outline the operations required in prepara- 
Astronaut Training 
The astronaut training program for  Project Mercury can be divided into six 
basic categories which a r e  essentially dependent on the training devices used. 
These categories are academics, static training, environmental familiarization, 
dynamic training, egress  and survival training, and specific mission training. 
The first five categories a r e  discussed briefly in the report on the MA-6 mission 
(ref. 1). Specific training for the MA-7 mission is discussed as follows. 
Preflight operations schedule. - The preflight pilot activities and dates (from 
March 16, 1962, to launch date) a r e  given in table I. During the preflight prepar- 
ation period, the pilot maintained a rigid schedule of training activities in conjunc- 
tion with a large number of other demands on the pilot's time resulted in a somewhat 
crowded schedule . 
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Spacecraft checkout activities. - The pilot's participation in the spacecraft pre- 
flight checkout activities enabled him to become familiar with the MA- 7 spacecraft 
and launch-vehicle systems. Table II summarizes the checkout activities during 
which the pilot spent 31 hours 30 minutes in the spacecraft itself and many additional 
hours before and after each checkout operation in preparation, trouble shooting, ob- 
servation, and discussion. The pilot also spent 79 hours 30 minutes in the 
MA-6 spacecraft which added considerably to his knowledge of the Mercury space- 
craft and launch-vehicle systems. 
Training activities. - Table 111 is a brief summary of the training activities on 
the Langley and Cape Canaveral procedures t ra iners  and the air-lubricated free- 
att i tudetrainer (ALFA) from March 25 to May 22, 1962. During this period the 
pilot spent 70 hours 40 minutes in which he accomplished 114 turnarounds and 
92 retrofires,  and experienced 143 simulated systems failures. The main training 
emphasis during these simulations was on the practicing of specific attitude maneu- 
vers  and rehearsing inflight activities. The pilot also received training in the de- 
tection and correction of systems' failures and in mission anomalies which would 
usually result in an abort or early reentry. He participated in several  of the 
launch abort and network simulations during which the mission rules were discussed 
and rehearsed. 
Training analysis. - On the Mercury procedures t ra iners ,  the pilot achieved 
a high level of skill in performing maneuvers such as turnaround, retrofire, and 
reentry rate  damping. The pilot reported that during the flight these particular 
maneuvers seemed familiar. However, he was less well prepared for some ac- 
tivities which could not be properly simulated and practiced before flight, such as 
the gyro re-alinement and the more extensive attitude-change maneuvers. 
In addition, it should be noted that the horizon-scanner malfunction encountered 
during the flight could not be simulated on the procedures trainer,  nor could prac- 
tice be given in the analysis of instrument reference problems because of the lack 
of a system for simulating the view through the spacecraft window. These factors, 
together with the higher fly-by-wire (FBW) low-thrust levels simulated on the 
trainer,  may have contributed to the pilot's tendency to use the high torque thrusters 
excessively and thus to the resulting high rate  of fuel consumption. 
Spacecraft Prelaunch Preparations 
Prelaunch preparations for spacecraft 18 were basically the same as those for 
spacecraft 13 which was  used in the MA-6 mission. These preparations a re  de- 
scribed in the report on the MA-6 mission (ref. l). Major changes and modifica- 
tions made on spacecraft 18 prior to launch a re  presented in the Spacecraft History 
section of this report. 
Spacecraft History 
Spacecraft 18 arrived at Hangar S, Cape Canaveral, Forida, on November 1, 
1961. The preparation period in the hangar totaled 100 days, of which 40 days 
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were spent on tests. The spacecraft was transported to  the launch site on April 28, 
1962. A brief history of the spacecraft is graphically presented in figure 7. 
Major spacecraft changes and modifications prior to  launch a r e  chronologically 
listed in table IV. 
The spacecraft was  mechanically mated to the launch vehicle at the launch site 
26 days prior to launch. 
a r e  presented in table V. 
The specific activities accomplished during that period 
Launch Vehicle Preparation 
Prelaunch preparations of the Atlas 107-D launch vehicle were basically the 
same as those for the Atlas 109-D launch vehicle, which was used in the MA-6 mis- 
sion, and these preparations a r e  described in the report on the MA-6 mission 
(ref. 1). 
Flight-Safety Reviews 
A ser ies  of flight-safety review meetings were held prior to the MA-7 flight. 
The purpose of these meetings was to establish firmly the flightworthiness of the 
spacecraft and the launch vehicle. Mission review meetings were also conducted 
to ascertain readiness of all supporting elements of the mission. These meetings 
a r e  discussed briefly in the following paragraphs. 
Spacecraft. - The review meeting for spacecraft 18 was  held at 4:OO p. m. on 
May 14, 1962. The history of the spacecraft after arr ival  at Hangar S and the 
current status of all the systems were reviewed. The spacecraft w a s  approved as 
ready for flight, pending satisfactory completion of the final simulated flight test  
scheduled for May 15, 1962. The simulated flight test  was  satisfactory, and the 
spacecraft w a s  then committed ready for flight. 
Launch vehicle. - Three meetings were held for a specific review of the status 
of the MA-7 launch vehicle, and for a general review of the results of previous 
Atlas flights. The f i rs t  meeting w a s  held on the morning of May 16,1962, at which 
time a review w a s  made of the history of the launch vehicle after arr ival  at Cape 
Canaveral and the current status of the systems. The missile was approved ready 
for flight, pending a test of the telemetry system which was  scheduled for and 
successfully completed on May 17, 1962. 
The second review meeting was held in the afternoon of May 16, 1962, to brief 
NASA-MSC management on all anomalies that had occurred in the Atlas research 
and development (R&D) and operational flight programs since the MA-6 mission. 
The attempted launches and resulting failures of Atlas vehicles l l -F  and l -F were 
discussed in this meeting. 
The third meeting was  held on May 18, 1962, at 2:OO p. m. to discuss the 
latest information on the Atlas vehicles l l -F  and l -F incidents. It was agreed 
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that the information available at the time of the meeting would not affect the MA-7 
launch vehicle flight-readiness status, but that intensive investigation would continue 
and be reported upon at the Flight Safety Review Board meeting scheduled 1 day prior 
to the flight. 
Mission. - Two mission review meetings were held prior to the MA-7 mission. 
The first meeting was held at 1O:OO a. mr on May 16, 1962, and all elements for the 
flight were found to be in readiness. However, after the review meeting, a decision 
was made to install an additional barostat in the spacecraft parachute circuitry and 
to replace flight-control canisters in the Atlas launch vehicles. A decision was also 
made to reschedule the launch date to May 24, 1962. 
The second mission review meeting was held at 3:OO p. m. on May 22, 1962. 
This meeting was scheduled because of work performed on the space vehicle after 
the meeting of May 16, 1962. The spacecraft, launch vehicle, and all support sys- 
tems were found to be ready for the MA-7 mission. The Flight Safety Review Board 
met on May 23, 1962, and this board was advised that the Status Review Board which 
had met earlier that morning had found the launch vehicle and spacecraft ready for 
flight. Additional information on the Atlas l l -F  and l -F flight failures indicated 
that the differences between the E- and F-series and the Mercury D-series start 
sequences were significant enough to eliminate doubt in the performance of the 
MA-7 launch vehicle. 
LAUNCH OPERATIONS 
The launch operations discussed in the following paragraphs include the launch 
procedure, weather conditions, and photographic coverage. The launch procedure 
section presents the major events which occurred during the countdown. 
weather section includes a summary of the weather conditions reported at lift-off 
at the launch site and in the Atlantic recovery areas. The photographic section 
presents a summary of the photographic coverage committed for the mission and 
contains a discussion of the quality and usefulness of the data obtained. 
The 
Launch Procedure 
The spacecraft launch operations were planned for a 610-minute split count- 
1 down with a 17 %-hour built-in hold at T-390 minutes for spacecraft reaction con- 
t ro l  system (RCS) fuel and pyrotechnic servicing. To provide additional assurance 
that the projected launch time of 7:OO a. m. e. s. t . ,  May 24, 1962, could be met, 
a 90-minute built-in hold was scheduled at T-135 minutes. 
The second half ot the split countdown was  started at 11:OO p. m. e. s. t. on 
May 23, 1962. Launch occurred at 7:45 a. m. e. s. t. on May 24, 1962, after 
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45 minutes of unplanned holds. The following is a sequence of major events, in- 
cluding holds, which occurred in the countdown: 
T-390 min Start of second half of countdown. 
T-135 min Astronaut insertion into the spacecraft 
T-94 min Spacecraft hatch closure started. 
T-74 min Spacecraft hatch secured; shingle installation started. 
T-64 min Spacecraft shingle installation complete . 
T-47 min Service tower (gantry),. first motion. 
T-33 min Service tower stowed. 
T-32 min Lox pumping started. 
T-11 min 15-minute hold fo r  weather (launch-area smoke and ground fog). 
Hold extended for  an additional 15 minutes for weather. 
extended for  an additional 10 minutes for  evaluation of 
atmospheric -refraction data. 
5 minutes to  complete refractometer data evaluation. 
Hold 
Hold extended for an additional 
Weather Conditions 
Weather in the launch area was initially unsatisfactory for  required camera 
coverage because of ground fog and smoke conditions. By 7:30 a. m. e. s. t., con- 
ditions had improved considerably and at launch time were as follows: 
Sky cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  broken at 700 f t  
Wind, knots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 (from 240°, WSW) 
Visibility, miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
Temperature, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77 
Dewpoint, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73 
Relative humidity, percent . . . . . . . . . . . .  88 
Although the ground visibility at lift-off was limited to 1 mile, the estimated 
camera coverage through 250 000 feet was  predicted to be good at the time of 
launch. 
A plot of the launch-area wind direction and speed is shown in figure 8 for 
altitudes up to 60 000 feet. 
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Weather and sea conditions in all Atlantic recovery areas were reported to be 
satisfactory prior to launch. Weather and sea conditions in the planned landing area 
at the end of the third orbital pass a r e  given as follows. These conditions were 
reported by the U. S. S. John R. Pierce at noon e. s. t. on May 24, 1962. 
4 - scattered at 1 000 ft 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Cloud cover 
Wind, knots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 (from 096”, easterly) 
Visibility, miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Air temperature, OF . . . . . . . . . . . .  84 
Wet bulb temperature, OF . . . . . . . . . .  79 (dewpoint) 
Water temperature, O F  . . . . . . . . . . .  77 (insertion) 
Wave height, f t .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
Photographic Coverage 
Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) optical coverage, including the quantity of instru- 
mentation committed and data obtained during launch and reentry phases, is shown 
in table VI. AMR optical tracking from lift-off or  first acquisition to limits of 
visibility is shown in figure 9. The coverage t imes shown as bars  in this figure 
represent the periods during which either the spacecraft, launch vehicle, o r  the 
exhaust flame was  first visible until all three were out of sight. It is evident from 
the figure that optimal camera coverage is in the region near maximum dynamic 
pressure, and that adequate data were available had a failure occurred at this time. 
Optical data obtained at other times a re  considered marginal. At lower altitudes, 
coverage w a s  primarily limited by ground fog and haze, and, at higher altitudes, 
both ground haze and image reduction caused by slant range affected optical track- 
ing capability. 
Metric film. - Metric films were processed, and the results were tabulated by 
the AMR. However, these data were not required for evaluation by the Manned 
Spacecraft Center, since the powered flight phase was  normal. 
Engineering -_ sequential - fi lm. - Engineering sequential coverage at AMR Station 1 
during the launch phase was  generally satisfactory. This statement is qualified by 
the fact that a detailed film analysis was not required as a result of normal mission 
sequence from lift-off. The quality of fixed and tracking camera coverage w a s  poor 
because of fog and ground-haze conditions. Twelve films were reviewed, including 
16” and 35” films from three fixed cameras and nine tracking cameras. The 
quality of fixed camera coverage with respect to exposure and focus w a s  generally 
good, with the exception of one underexposed film. 
periscope retraction and umbilical-door closure, launch-vehicle ignition, and 
Lox boiloff, umbilical ejection, 
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lift-off appeared to be normal. The quality of tracking camera coverage with respect 
to exposure, focus, and tracking was generally good, with the exception of one under- 
exposed and one overexposed film. Four tracking cameras  indicated normal launch- 
vehicle staging and two tracking cameras  indicated normal tower separation. 
Documentary film. - Documentary coverage of the mission provided by available 
motion picture fi lms w a s  very good in quality but limited in quantity, particularly in 
the recovery area.  
these films presented a portion of the prelaunch activities, including astronaut prep- 
aration at Hangar s, transfer to  the launch site, and portions of the operational 
activity at the Mercury Control Center and the blockhouse. One of these two fi lms 
also presented a portion of the recovery operation, including helicopter pickup of 
the astronaut and transfer to the recovery aircraft  carr ier .  The two remaining mo- 
tion picture fi lms included views of the astronaut arriving on board the car r ie r ,  suit 
removal and physical examination, and arrival of the astronaut and debriefing per- 
sonnel at Grand Turk Island. 
to still photographs available for review exceeded that of motion picture films. 
photographs were excellent both in quality and quantity, particularly in the recovery 
area. 
of the astronaut and pararescue personnel in the water prior to helicopter pickup, 
pickup of the astronaut and transfer to the recovery aircraft  car r ie r ,  spacecraft 
retrieval from the water by the recovery destroyer, loading of the spacecraft on 
board the aircraft  for transportation to Cape Canaveral, and closeup views of the 
spacecraft after recovery. 
available showing closeup views of the spacecraft during the usual postflight inspec- 
tion at Cape Canaveral. 
Four motion picture fi lms w e r e  available for review. Two of 
Documentary coverage of the mission with respect 
These 
Still picture coverage during and after the recovery operation included views 
Numerous engineering still photographs were also 
FLIGHT CONTROL OPERATIONS 
The preparation of the flight control team and the Mercury Network followed the 
same procedure used for the MA-6 mission and the previous unmanned Mercury 
orbital flights. 
of the most important steps in the preparation of the flight controllers and the astro- 
naut for the flight. 
Simulations carr ied out prior to the flight a r e  considered to be one 
This process is absolutely essential to the safety of the flight. 
The countdown for the launch vehicle, spacecraft , and network was  satisfactory. 
There were some minor problems, but none of these resulted in the necessity for a 
hold; and the cooperation between the blockhouse and the Mercury Control Center 
was excellent. 
The powered portion of the flight w a s  completely normal, and no problems were 
experienced in achieving the proper information o r  in making the "go--no-goTT de- 
cisions at the required t imes in the flight. 
throughout the entire mission were satisfactory, although slightly inferior to those 
of the MA-6 mission. 
there was  no doubt that the proper conditions had been achieved. It was  immediately 
apparent in the early reports from the African s i tes  that the suit cooling system was 
not functioning properly and that the astronaut was  uncomfortable. 
The communications to  the astronaut 
The "go--no-gort decision at SECO was made rapidly, and 
However, the 
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suit temperature began to decrease as a result  of increased water flow in the suit 
circuit; and by the end of the first orbital pass  it was down to a satisfactory value. 
Other than a slight discomfort caused by the suit temperature, the astronaut was 
obviously in good condition and performing satisfactorily throughout the first orbital 
pass. A report  from Canton of a body temperature of 102" F, which was also 
noticed at loss  of signal at Woomera, was  of some concern until it was determined 
that the transducer had either failed or had been affected by an  inflight calibration. 
The only other problem was  the large amount of automatic system fuel. being used 
by the astronaut during the first orbital pass  and he was cautioned, while passing 
over the continental United States, against further gross  usage. 
During the second orbital pass, the suit temperature again increased to a high 
value, but showed a decreasing trend before the end of the pass. It was obvious 
that the pilot was having difficulty in achieving the proper water-flow setting for 
the suit cooling system. 
The inverter temperatures showed increases s imilar  to previous flights, but 
these temperatures caused no concern because of past experience. The cabin-air 
temperature followed trends almost identical to  the MA-6 flight, although somewhat 
higher temperatures were reached during the second orbital pass. This increase, 
however, did not cause any great concern. 
More than the normal amount of fuel was consumed during the first two orbital 
passes,  and this excessive fuel usage resulted in a number of requests to the astro- 
naut to conserve fuel on both the automatic and manual systems. As a result, when 
the astronaut reached Hawaii at the end of the third orbital pass, approximately 
40 percent of the fuel was remaining in both systems. This amount of fuel would 
normally have been ample to perform a retrofire maneuver and reentry on either 
system. 
Throughout the flight the astronaut made voice reports  regarding visual obser- 
vations and various experiments carr ied out in the flight. 
Report and the Scientific Experiments sections of this report contain discussions 
of the observations and experiments. 
The Astronaut's Flight 
Upon contact with Hawaii at the end of the third orbital pass, the astronaut was 
instructed to begin his pre-retrosequence checklist and to revert  from his present 
manual-control mode to the ASCS system in preparation for retrofire. This action 
was initiated but when the astronaut switched back to ASCS, he reported having 
trouble with this system, and, as a result, was  unable to complete the retrose- 
quence checklist properly. It was obvious from both the voice reports and the 
telemetry readouts on the ground that the astronaut was concerned over the appar- 
ent unsatisfactory operation of the automatic control system and the large amounts 
of manual and automatic fuel which were used over both the Hawaii station and prior 
to acquisition at the California station. 
The astronaut continued to  have ASCS problems, in that the pitch horizon scanner 
yielded erroneous attitudes; and he performed the retrofire maneuver by using manual 
control. The astronaut was directed by the California Capsule Communicator to 
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bypass the attitude permissive relays and to initiate retrofire manually. 
apparent, mainly from the time of retrojettison, that the retrofire had taken place 
several  seconds late. Initial reports from the astronaut indicated that the attitudes 
had been held fairly well during retrofire,  but later reports from California did 
not corroborate this report. Also, the California station reported that the measure- 
ment of the velocity decrement from the integrating accelerometer w a s  approxi- 
mately 450 feet per  second. Because of the first report on spacecraft attitudes, 
the initial radar  data from California and the resulting impact prediction were sus- 
pected to be in e r ro r .  However, as additional radar data became available from 
other s i tes  it was obvious that the data were correct and that the landing point would 
be approximately 250 nautical miles downrange from the planned location. Because 
of the small  amount of automatic fuel remaining following retrofire,  and the complete 
depletion of manual fuel, the astronaut was instructed to use as little fuel as possible 
in orienting the spacecraft to reentry attitude and to conserve the fuel for use during 
reentry. 
atmospheric reentry portion of the flight. 
It was  
He was also instructed to  use the auxiliary damping system during the 
Upon contact with Cape Canaveral just prior to communications blackout, the 
astronaut was  queried as to the position of the faceplate. He indicated it was still 
open and was therefore directed to close it. The ionization blackout occurred about 
40 seconds late, lending further evidence to the longer reentry range, and the astro- 
naut was told that his landing point would be long and at approximately 19'23' North 
latitude and 63"53' West longitude. From this point, no voice communications were 
received from the astronaut. A number of communications were made from the 
Mercury Control Center both on the command voice system and over the normal 
HF/UHF voice system during the ionization blackout. However, these transmis- 
sions were not received by the astronaut. The Atlantic Missile Range C-band radars  
at Cape Canaveral, Grand Bahama Island, and San Salvador tracked the C-band 
beacon until the spacecraft reached the local horizon, indicating that it had reentered 
satisfactorily, and these data continued to give the same landing-point prediction. 
All sources of data and methods of calculations, in fact, gave essentially the same 
impact predict ion. 
The remainder of the mission involved primarily the recovery operation, which 
is described in detail in the Recovery Operations section of this report. 
RECOVERY OPERAT IONS 
The recovery operations discussed in the following paragraphs include the re- 
covery plans, procedures, and aids. The section on recovery plans contains a de- 
scriptive and graphical presentation of recovery a reas  and forces. The section on 
recovery procedures shows in chronological order the significant events pertinent 
to  the recovery operations. The section on recovery aids summarizes the effective- 
ness  of the spacecraft equipment utilized to help the recovery forces locate the 
spacecraft after it had landed. 
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Recovery Plans 
The Atlantic recovery a reas  where ships and aircraft  were positioned at the 
time of launch are shown in figure 10. Recovery forces  were distributed to provide 
fo r  recovery within a maximum of: 6 hours in areas By D, E, and the first 610 nau- 
tical miles of a r e a  A; 9 hours in the remainder of a r e a  A; and 3 hours in area C. 
Recovery forces  were located to provide recovery within a maximum of 3 hours in 
a reas  F, G, and H at the end of orbital passes  1, 2, and 3, respectively. A total 
of 20 ships and 13 aircraft  was on station in these Atlantic recovery a reas  at launch 
time. Helicopters, amphibious surface vehicles, and small  boats were also posi- 
tioned for close recovery support in the vicinity of the launch site. 
Figure 11 shows the contingency-recovery aircraft  that were on alert at various 
staging bases in the event that a landing occurred at any place along the orbital 
ground track. These aircraft  were equipped to locate the spacecraft and to provide 
emergency on-scene assistance if required. 
Recovery Procedure 
A chronological summary of significant events pertinent to the recovery opera- 
tion is presented in table VII. 
tion available at the Mercury Control Center throughout the operation. 
This summary was  prepared primarily from informa- 
Since the landing was outside the planned landing area  (area H), contingency 
recovery procedures were followed at the Mercury Control Center. The downrange 
recovery commander aboard the aircraft  car r ie r  U. S. S. Intrepid w a s  designated 
as mission coordinator, and the Coast Guard and other U. S. Naval Commands were 
queried as to the location of merchant ships or naval vessels (other than those as- 
signed to recovery forces) near the a rea  of interest. Information from these sources 
was  evaluated and communications were established with the following three ships 
(positions shown in fig. 12): a Coast Guard cutter at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands; 
a merchant ship located approximately 31 nautical miles north of the calculated 
landing position; and the U. S. S. Farragut, a destroyer which was  located about 
75 nautical miles southwest of the calculated landing position. 
that the U. S. S. Farragut could arr ive in the landing a r e a  first, so this ship headed 
for the landing a r e a  immediately. The other two ships were notified that the de- 
stroyer had been dispatched and they then continued with their normal operations. 
It was determined 
Recovery Aids 
All  spacecraft recovery aids functioned normally, with the exception that there 
were no reports  of SEASAVE HF/DF beacon reception. 
One search aircraft  reported contact with the Super SARAH recovery beacon 
at a range of 250 nautical miles. Another search aircraft  reported receiving the 
SARAH recovery beacon at a range of 50 nautical miles. The aircraft  also re -  
ported establishing contact with the D/F mode of the UHF transceiver. 
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The flashing light w a s  reported to be functioning normally and was visible up 
to 6 miles. 
tical miles. 
The dye marker was sighted by a search aircraft  at a range of 15 nau- 
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Date 
March 16 
March 19 
March 20 
March 21  
March 22 
March 25 
March 28 
March 31 
April 2 
April 3 
April 4 
April 5 
April 6 
April 9 
April 10 
April 13 
April 15 
April 16 
~ 
TABLE I. - PILOT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION HISTORY 
[From March 16, 1962, to May 17, 19621 
L 
Friday 
Monday 
Tuesday 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
Sunday 
Wednesday 
Saturday 
Monday 
Tuesday 
We dne sda y 
Thursday 
Friday 
Monday 
Tuesday 
Friday 
Sunday 
Monday 
J 
_ _ _ _ - _ _ ~  - - ~ _ _ _  
Act ivit ya - 
Flight plan meeting 
Systems briefing (ASCS) 
Systems briefing (RCS and Electrical) 
Launch vehicle review 
Systems review (ECS and Mechanical) 
A.M. - ALFA Trainer  
P. M. - MPT no. 1 
MPT no. 2 
A.M. -.MPT no. 1 
P. M. - ALFA Trainer 
MPT no. 1 
MPT no. 1 
Trajectory briefing 
MPT no. 1 
MPT no. 1 
MPT no. 1 
MPT no. 2 
Scheduling meeting 
Systems test  
Systems test  
Activity code: a 
MPT no. 1 - (Langley) Mercury Procedures Trainer.  
MPT no. 2 - (Cape) Mercury Procedures Trainer.  
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TABLE I. - PILOT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION HISTORY - Continued 
[From March 16, 1962, to  May 17, 19621 
Date 
April 17 
April 19 
April 20 
April 21 
April 24 
April 26 
April 27 
April 28 
April 30 
May 1 
May 2 
May 3 
May 4 
May 5 
May 7 
L 
Day 
Tuesday 
Thursday 
Friday 
Saturday 
Tuesday 
Thursday 
Friday 
Saturday 
Monday 
Tuesday 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
F r iday 
Saturday 
Monday 
J 
_ _  
Activity” 
Systems test  
Survival pack training 
Zero g experiment briefing 
MPT no. 2 
MPT no. 2 
Flight plan meeting 
ALFA Trainer 
MPT no. 1 
Morehead Planetarium 
Simulated flight 
MPT no. 2 
MIT photo briefing scheduling 
MPT no. 2 
Egress  training 
Egress training 
MPT no. 2 
MPT no. 2 
RCS 
Static fire 
MPT no. 2 
b 
aActivity code: 
MPT no. 1 - (Langley) Mercury Procedures Trainer. 
MPT no. 2 - (Cape) Mercury Procedures Trainer.  
bMIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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TABLE I. - PILOT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION HISTORY - Continued 
I
May 9 
May 10 
May 11 
May 12 
I May 13 
May 14 
May 15 
May 16 
May 17 
May 18 
[From March 16, 1962, to May 17, 19621 
__ -~ - -. . .. -.-- - - . . - 
Tuesday 
W edne sda y 
Thursday 
Friday 
Saturday 
Sunday 
Monday 
Tuesday 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
Friday 
Ac tivit ya 
MPT no. 2 
Simulated flight no. 2 
Mercury Contr ol Center /Bermuda simulation 
Mission rules review 
Flight plan review 
Mercury Control Center/Bermuda 
RCS blip check 
(launch and egress)  
WX briefing 
Scheduling 
Trajectory, flight plan, and balloon experiment 
briefings 
MPT no. 2 
RCS blip test  
MPT no. 2 
MPT no. 2 
Flight plan 
MIT photo briefings 
Mission review 
Simulated flight no. 3 
Launch vehicle and mission review 
Physical examination 
Mer cur y Contr ol Center /Bermuda simulation 
b 
aActivity code: 
MPT no. 1 - (Langley) Mercury Procedures Trainer. 
MPT no. 2 - (Cape) Mercury Procedures Trainer.  
bMIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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TABLE I. - PILOT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION HISTORY - Concluded 
p r o m  March 16, 1962, t o  May 17, 19623 
Date 
May 21 
May 22 
May 23 
May 24 
. -  
Day 
Monday 
Tuesday 
We dne s day 
T hu r s day 
Activitya 
- 
MPT no. 2 
Scheduling 
MPT no. 2 
Flight plan review 
Pilot briefing 
Study 
Launch 
Activity code: a 
MPT no. 1 - (Langley) Mercury Procedures Trainer.  
MPT no. 2 - (Cape) Mercury Procedures Trainer. 
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TABLE II.- TIME PILOT SPENT IN SPACECRAFT 18 
Date, 
1962 
April 12 
April 15 
April 16 
April 17 
April 18 
April 30 
May 4 
May 5 
May 10 
May 12 
May 15 
DURING HANGAR AND PAD TESTS 
- 
~ 
Spacecraft tests 
. _  - 
Systems test (Hangar S) 
Systems test (Hangar S) 
Sequential, sec. 2 
Sequential, sec. 2 
Sequential, sec. 2 
Simulated flight no. 1 
Simulated flight no. 2 and FAC' 
RCS blip check (special test) 
Launch simulation and egress  
RCS blip check (special test) 
Simulated flight no. 3 
Approximate total time 
~ . .  __  
. -  
Approximate 
.. ~ 
duration, 
hr:min 
6:30 
3:30 
7:OO 
6:OO 
3:OO 
4:20 
0:30 
0:40 
5:OO 
l:oo 
7:30 
45 hrs  
Flight Acceptance Composite Test. a 
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TABLE IU.- SUMMARY OF PILOT TRAINING ON THE AIR LUBRICATED FREE ATTITUDE TRAINER AND PROCEDURES TRAINERS 
[Totals: failures, 143; turnaround maneuvers, 114; reentries, 49; retrofire attitude control, 921 
, I I -~ 
Number of failures and type Special 
Type of training Time, Number Of - - training 
activities 
Date, Trainer 
1962 (a) hr:min missions Sequential ' Electrical Communication Other 
system system system (b) 
ECS 
March 25 
March 25 
March 28 
March 29 
'March 31 
March 31 
April 2 
April 3 
April 5 
April 6 
April 9 
April 10 
April 20 
April 21 
April 26 
April 27 
May 1 
May 2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
, Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Attitude control 
Systems failures 
Systems failures 
Attitude control 
Systems failures 
Attitude control 
Systems failures 
Attitude control 
2-orbit mission 
Systems failures 
3-orbit mission 
aTrainer code: 
1 - Langley procedures trainer 
2 - Cape procedures trainer 
3 - ALFA trainer 
2:15 
1:35 
2:40 
1:45 
1 : l O  
2:15 
l:oo 
1:30 
1:30 
l:oo 
2:30 
1:35 
3:15 
3:15 
l:oo 
4:OO 
2:20 
5:35 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
7 
4 
8 
1 
4 
1 
I 
4 
2 !  
2 
2 
1 
- 
2 
1 
1 
6 
3 
2 
6 
2 
7 
1 
1 
bTraining activities code: 
1 - Turnaround maneuvers 
2 - Retrofire attitude control 
3 - Reentry rate control 
4 - Special attitude maneuvers 
5 - Launchaborts 
6 - Orbital emergencies 
7 - Flight plan work 
w 
0 
TABLE m. - SUMMARY OF PILOT TRAINING ON THE AIR LUBRICATED FREE ATTITUDE TRAINER AND PROCEDURES TRAINERS - Concluded 
\Totals: failures, 143; turnaround maneuvers, 114; reentries, 49; retrofire attitude control, 921 
Number of failures and type 
~~ 
Special 
training 
activities 
(b) 
Time, 
hr:min 
Number of 
missions 
Date, 
1962 
Type of training 
ECS RCS sequential system 
Electrical 
system 3ther 
Fommunication 
system 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
5 
1 
6 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
73 
- 
3 
3 
5 
1 
3 - 
1 
4 
6 
1 
4 
32 
- 
May 4 
May 5 
May 7 
May 8 
May 10 
May 12 
May 13 
May 14 
May 18 
May 21 . May 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Systems failures Systems failures Attitude control 2-orbit mission Systems failures MCC/BDA simulation MCC/BDA simulation 1-orbit mission 1-orbit mission 3-orbit mission MCC/BDA simulation 2-orbit mission Systems failures 
TOTALS 
2:oo 
3 : O O  
3:35 
1:15 
2:35 
1:05 
1:45 
1:45 
5:40 
2:45 
4:15 
0:50 
70:40 
5 
1, 2, 3, 4, ! 
7 
5, 6 
5 
5 
7 
7 
7 1 
5 
7 
5, 6 
24 11 43 I 26 I 7 
bTraining activities code: aTrainer code: 
1 - Langley procedures trainer 
2 - Cape procedures trainer 
3 - ALFA trainer 
1 - Turnaroundmaneuvers 
2 - Retrofire attitude control 
3 - Reentry rate control 
4 - Special attitude maneuvers 
5 - Launchaborts 
6 - Orbital emergencies 
7 - Flight plan work 
TABLE IV. - MODIFICATIONS MADE TO SPACECRAFT 18 
Modification 
The heat shield was  X-rayed, and the center-plug dowels 
were  acceptable. 
The auxiliary battery for the maximum-altitude sensor was 
added. 
Gyros with a silicone-base lubricant were installed 
The cabin-fan inlet duct was equipped with screens to pre- 
vent possible cabin-fan fouling by foreign material. 
The check valve was removed from the inverter cold-plate 
system. 
The oxygen partial-pressure indicator w a s  deleted. 
The suit-compressor check valves were positively 
oriented and springs were added to assist closing. 
The semiautomatic blood-pressure measuring system, 
which included the f i l l  and dump solenoids, w a s  added. 
The velocity sensor was reset  from cw-sepa + 5 seconds 
to cap-sep * 5 minutes. 
The suit-circuit constant-bleed orifice w a s  removed. 
The cabin relative -humidity indicator was removed. 
The coolant-quantity indicator w a s  deleted. 
The SOFAR bombs and radar chaff were deleted from the 
spacecraft. 
The oxygen partial-pressure transducer was removed 
from the suit circuit and located in the cabin. 
The landing-bag limit switches were rewired so that both 
switches would be required to  close for proper indication 
of bag deployment. 
The 1/4-g relay circuitry was changed to prevent dropout 
of this relay during posigrade ignition. 
Completion date 
December 7, 1961 
December 9, 1961 
December 14, 1961 
December 18, 1961 
December 20, 1961 
January 10,1962 
January 11, 1962 
January 24, 1962 
January 25, 1962 
January 31, 1962 
February 14, 1962 
February 14, 1962 
February 14, 1962 
March 2, 1962 
March 3, 1962 
March 6, 1962 
a Cap - sep : Capsule (spacecraft )/launch vehicle separation. 
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TABLE IV. - MODIFICATIONS MADE TO SPACECRAFT 18 - Concluded 
Modification 
The oxygen-flow sensor was  disabled. 
The low-frequency telemetry center frequency was  raised 
500 kc. 
A maneuver switch w a s  installed that removed roll and yaw 
slaving of gyros and pitch orbital precession. 
The hand-controller FBW switch rod w a s  changed to in- 
corporate a step to prevent travel from going over-center. 
The instrument observer camera was removed. 
A dual indicator w a s  installed for  the suit and cabin 
steam -vent temperatures. 
Modified 1- and 6-pound thrust-chamber assemblies were 
incorporated. 
A 30-inch balloon was  installed in the recovery compart- 
ment to obtain visual acuity effects and aerodynamic 
drag measurements. 
A low-level commutator and instrumentation for a temper- 
ature survey were installed. 
The oxygen emergency-rate valve and system shut-off 
valve were mechanically connected. 
A zero-gravity experimental apparatus was installed in 
the position formerly occupied by the instrument-panel 
camera. 
The yaw manual-proportional valve was replaced at the 
launch site after a simulated launch, since tests had 
revealed poor centering from left-yaw position. 
A third barostat was installed in the cabin and wired into 
the parachute circuitry to prevent automatic deployment 
of the drogue parachute and main parachutes at altitudes 
above 11 200 feet. 
~~ 
Completion date 
March 14, 1962 
March 30, 1962 
April 2, 1962 
April 7, 1962 
April 9, 1962 
April 12, 1962 
April 18, 1962 
April 19, 1962 
April 20, 1962 
May 3, 1962 
May4, 1962 
May 11, 1962 
May 19, 1962 
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TABLE V. - SPACECRAFT PREFLIGHT TESTS 
Activity 
Mechanical mate 
Simulated flight 1 (system) 
Electrical mate and aborts 
Special hydrogen peroxide tes ts  
Simulated flight 2 (joint FACT) 
Flight configuration and aborts 
Launch simulation 
Simulated flight 3 
Simulated flight 3 
Launch 
Completion date, 
1962 
~ 
April 28 
April 30 
May 4 
May 4 
May 5 
May 8 
May 10 
May 15 
May 18 
May 24 
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TABLE VI. - ATLANTIC MISSILE RANGE OPTICAL COVERAGE 
OF LAUNCH AND REENTRY PHASES 
Film type 
~~ 
Metric 
Engine e r ing sequential 
Engineering sequential 
Engineering sequential 
Engineering sequential 
Documentary 
Station 
Number of 
i tems 
committed 
15 
46 
1 
1 
1 
50 
Planned for reentry coverage. a 
34 
Number of 
i tems 
obtained 
15 
45 
0 
0 
0 
50 
Lost 
i tems 
0 
1 
a l  
a l  
1 a 
0 
Reason for loss 
Camera jammed 
upon starting 
Track not 
acquired 
Track not 
acquired 
Track not 
acquired 
. . ..-_. .  .. . - . . . . , ,, , , , 
Elapsed time 
from launch, 
hr:min 
03:33 
. 
04:37 
04 :44 
04:48 
04:49 
04:54 
a 
04:56 
04:59 
05:13 
TABLE VII. - CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF 
SIGNIFICANT RECOVERY EVENTS 
Elapsed time 
from landing, 
hr  :min 
. 
0o:oo 
00 : 03 
00:17 
Event, 
May 24, 1962 
An Air Rescue Service SC-54 aircraft  was  launched 
from Roosevelt Roads, h e r t o  Rico, and assigned 
a station on the downrange portion of the third 
orbital pass  recovery area,  as shown in figure 12. 
Deployment of this aircraft ,  which carr ied two 
pararescue personnel, was requested as a pre- 
cautionary measure after the mission was committec 
to  a third orbital pass. 
Recovery forces were informed that the retro- 
rockets had been ignited for a landing in Area H. 
Communications to and from the spacecraft were 
lost as a result of ionization blackout. 
Recovery forces were informed that the new calcu- 
lated landing position (CALREP) was  19'24' N, 
63'53' W. An Air Rescue Service SA-16 amphibian 
aircraft  was  launched from Roosevelt Roads to 
proceed to the calculated landing position. 
Ionization blackout ended. 
A P2V search aircraft  made UHF/DF contact on 
243 mc with the spacecraft and later reported this 
contact to Mercury Control at 05:02. 
The spacecraft landed. 
The new calculated landing position (19'24' N, 
63'53' W) was established as the best  estimate of 
the spacecraft landing position. 
recovery forces from Area H were proceeding to- 
ward the landing position. 
In the meantime, 
The destroyer U. S. S. Farragut was proceeding to 
the calculated landing position. 
'Actual landing time 04:55:57 g. e. t. 
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Elapsed time 
from launch, 
hr  :min 
05:14 
05:35 
05:49 
05:55 
05:55 
06:05 
06:15 
TABLE VII.. 
SIGNIFICANT 
Elapsed time 
from landing, 
hr  :min 
00:18 
~L - 
00:39 
00:53 
00:59 
00:59 
01:09 
01:19 
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF 
XECOVERY EVENTS - Continued 
Event, 
May 24, 1962 
All search a i rc raf t  were executing the search plan, 
and positive UHF/DF contact was established with 
the spacecraft. 
A P2V search aircraf t  reported visual contact with 
the spacecraft and that the astronaut was alongside 
in a liferaft (fig. 13). 
An Air Rescue Service SC-54 in the landing area 
prepared to deploy pararescue personnel with sur-  
vival equipment and a spacecraft auxiliary flotation 
collar. 
The pararescue team was deployed. 
HSS-2 twin-turbine helicopters were launched from 
the U. S. S. Intrepid with an estimated time of 
arr ival  (ETA) at the spacecraft of 07:43 (02:47 after 
spacecraft landing). These helicopters had the cap- 
ability of personnel retrieval and return to  the 
Intrepid. 
The SA-16 arrived on scene. 
A spacecraft auxiliary flotation collar was deployed 
from the SC-54. The initial task for pararescue 
personnel was  to contact the astronaut and determine 
his condition. Since the astronaut required no as- 
sistance, they then proceeded to attach the collar to 
the spacecraft to  insure a longer flotation lifetime. 
The radio equipment that was initially dropped 
failed to operate properly, and therefore voice com- 
munications with the recovery forces were not estab- 
lished at this time. Additional radio equipment was 
deployed just prior to  the time the helicopters ar- 
rived on the scene and was not activated. 
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hr :min 
06:30 
-. . 
06:36 
06:54 
07:07 
07 :4 5 
07:55 
__- . 
Elapsed time 
from launch, 
.~ 
TABLE VII. - CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF 
SIGNIFICANT RECOVERY EVENTS - Continued 
Elapsed time 
from landing, 
hr :min 
01:34 
01:40 
01:58 
02:ll 
02:49 
02 : 59 
Event, 
May 24, 1962 
The SA-16 deployed from Roosevelt Roads reported 
surface conditions in the landing a rea  satisfactory 
for a safe landing and subsequent takeoff. 
A situation report from the mission coordinator 
(downrange recovery commander) indicated the 
following : 
(a) At 01:33, the astronaut appeared normal, 
and waved to the aircraft .  
(b) Pararescue team had been deployed. 
( c )  Plans were to utilize HSS-2 helicopters for 
astronaut retrieval rather than the SA-16. 
helicopters were deployed with a doctor from the 
Mercury program aboard. The ETA of the U.S.S. 
Farragut at the spacecraft landing point was 03:19 
and ETA of the U. S.S. Pierce was 06:34. The 
U. S .  S. Pierce w a s  equipped to  retrieve the space- 
craf t  and the U. s. s. Farragut w a s  prepared to 
stand by to provide emergency assistance if required 
These 
The P2V search aircraft  reported that the flotation 
collar was  attached to the spacecraft and was  in- 
flat ed. 
The astronaut and pararescue team were in the 
water. 
the astronaut, but the astronaut appeared to be in 
good condition. 
There was no direct communication with 
The helicopter arrived over the spacecraft. 
The astronaut was  retrieved by an HSS-2 helicopter 
(fig. 14). The doctor reported the condition of the 
astronaut as good. 
-. ~ ~ _ _ _ ~  ~ 
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Elapsed time 
from launch, 
h r  : min 
07:57 
08:20 
08:35 
09:lO 
11:07 
15:35 
30:45 
TABLE VII. - CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF 
SIGNIFICANT RECOVERY EVENTS - Concluded 
Elapsed time 
from landing, 
hr:min 
03:Ol 
03:24 
03:39 
04 : 14 
06:ll 
10:39 
25:49 
Event, 
May 24, 1962 
A second HSS-2 retrieved the pararescue team. 
Astronaut Carpenter reported, "Feel fine. '' 
Destroyer U. S. S. Farragut was 18 miles from the 
spacecraft. 
Helicopters returned to the U. S. S. Intrepid accom- 
panied by the SA-16 and search aircraft .  
The U. S. S. Farragut arrived in the landing a rea  
and maintained visual contact with the spacecraft. 
The astronaut was delivered to Mercury medical 
personnel aboard the U. S. S. Intrepid for medical 
examination and debriefing. 
The U. S. Pierce recovered the spacecraft and 
secured it aboard. A "shepherds crook" was used 
to attach a lifting-line to the spacecraft, which was 
then hoisted aboard. Photographs of the spacecraft 
prior to and during retrieval a r e  shown in figures 15 
and 16. 
The astronaut arr ived at Grand Turk Island for 
further debriefing. 
The spacecraft arrived at Cape Canaveral. 
U. S. S. Pierce delivered the spacecraft to Roosevelt 
Roads, and it was then airlifted to Cape Canaveral. ) 
(The 
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Figure 14. - Astronaut retrieval by HSS-2. 
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I Figure 15.- Spacecraft prior to pickup. 
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Figure 16. - Spacecraft being hoisted aboard recovery ship. 
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The technical results of the MA-7 accompanied by an analysis of the flight data 
are presented. The performance analyses are grouped into the following major 
areas: spacecraft performance, aeromedical analysis, astronaut flight activities, 
astronaut flight report, launch vehicle performance, trajectory and mission events, 
and Mercury Network performance. The spacecraft performance section of this 
report includes all the major spacecraft systems. In addition, postflight inspection 
and scientific experiments a r e  discussed. The aeromedical and astronaut sections 
deal with the astronaut's well-being, his activities, and his own personal narrative 
of the flight. The section which presents the launch vehicle performance is a very 
brief synopsis of Atlas systems operation. The Trajectory and Mission Events 
section consists largely of a graphical presentation of major trajectory parameters 
and mission event times. The Mercury Network is analyzed in the areas of trajec- 
tory, telemetry, command system, and communications. 
SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 
The spacecraft as an entity performed adequately. Some system anomalies 
were experienced, and analyses of these anomalies a r e  discussed in the following 
paragraphs. Also discussed, from an overall mission viewpoint, a r e  the space- 
craft systems' general performance. Flight data and measurements a r e  generally 
not shown, other than to clarify an analysis or present measurements of particular 
interest. A compilation of unpublished recorded flight data, without analysis, is 
available for  technical referencing. The reader is directed to reference 1 for a 
more detailed systems description than is contained herein. 
Spacecraft Control System 
With the single exception of' the pitch horizon scanner, spacecraft control system 
components functioned normally throughout the flight. 
is discussed in detail in the paragraphs which follow, and the analysis takes into 
account the astronaut's comments concerning orbit attitude and attitudes prior to 
retrograde. 
The horizon scanner problem 
System description. - The spacecraft control system is designed to provide 
attitude and rate control of the spacecraft and is capable of operation in the following 
modes: 
1. Automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS), with secondary choices 
of orientation, orbit, and auxiliary damping modes 
2. Fly-by-wire (FBW) 
3. Manual proportional (MP) 
4. Rate stabilization control system (RSCS) 
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Modes 1 and 2 employ the automatic reaction control system (RCS) thrusters,  
while modes 3 and 4 use the manual RCS thrusters.  Each RCS has its own fuel supply 
and is independent of the other. Combinations of modes 1 and 3, 2 and 3, or  2 and 4 
may be used simultaneously. The amplifier-calibrator (amp cal) employed standard 
A-8 logic circuitry and did not have the single-pulse insurance feature in orbit mode 
that was employed in spacecraft 13 (MA-6). This insurance feature prevented more 
than one actuation of a given thrus te r  when the amp cal effected operation of that 
thruster. The data from the MA-7 flight do not show any double actuations of 
thrusters  in the orbit mode, and therefore the lack of this insurance feature did not 
affect the control system performance. 
A MANEUVER switch was placed in ser ies  with the 0.05g switch fuse to remove 
torquing of the direction-gyro gimbals. This arrangement effectively disables the 
yaw reference slaving system and pitch orbital precession (4 "/min) as the astronaut's 
discretion. This allows the astronaut to perform spacecraft maneuvers without 
introducing e r r o r s  in his attitude displays. 
Flight control analysis. - Systems operation was normal during the flight, with 
the exception of a pitch horizon scanner malfunction which is evident from the data 
as having been present before spacecraft separation from the launch vehicle. The 
pitch horizon scanner output read +17" at 40 seconds after tower separation. At 
this time, the launch vehicle pitch gyro read approximately -0.5", revealing an 
18" e r r o r  in scanner output. At spacecraft separation the spacecraft pitch gyro 
was in e r r o r  by about 20". This e r r o r  is shown in figure 17. 
At various t imes during the orbital phase, the pitch horizon scanner output 
drifted without apparent spacecraft motion, as was found between 00:07:20 and 
00:08:30, when an apparent slaving rate of 20" per minute would be required to 
duplicate the scanner-gyro-reference shift. 
minute. 
comparable pitch horizon scanner output w a s  observed to be in e r r o r  by varying 
amounts between +50" and -20". 
The nominal gyro slaving rate is 8" per 
From known astronaut reference positions during the orbital period, the 
During the retrofire period, a trajectory computation based on radar tracking 
data yielded a mean pitch attitude of -36 .5" ,  whereas the maximum horizon scanner 
reading was -17" (fig. 18). This comparison and that which was made during the 
launch phase are the only independent sources which verify the scanner bias, and 
these a r e  in excellent agreement. 
The ASCS orbit mode performance appeared to be satisfactory, but cannot be 
evaluated in detail since continuous scanner slaving was employed. The ASCS orbit 
mode operation can be best analyzed when the gyros have been f ree  for an extended 
period of time, thereby eliminating the scanner slaving. 
The orientation mode displayed a divergent oscillation at 04:26:13 when the 
astronaut switched to ASCS in order to maintain an accurate retroattitude. This 
divergent oscillation was caused by the rate-gyro spin motors not having sufficient 
time to run up, since they were shut down during the previous 2 hours of manual- 
proportional-control system utilization. 
2 minutes. 
The nominal rate gyro run-up time is 
Control system utilization. - Spacecraft turnaround was accomplished manually 
by the astronaut, according to  the flight plan, by using FBW. ASCS control was 
initiated at 00:07:10. 
control systems and modes of operation, and the astronaut reported that these op- 
erations were satisfactory. 
By 00:56:50, maneuvering had been conducted by using all 
Manual control (FBW and MP) was used extensively during the flight. Approx- 
imately 17 minutes of the flight consisted of double authority control. The control 
system combinations utilized were FBW with M P  and ASCS with MP. It should be 
noted that the high thrusters  were actuated inadvertently a number of t imes by the 
astronaut while he was using FBW. The repeated use of the high thrusters, together 
with the use of double authority control, resulted in  the unfavorable fuel usage rate, 
which can be seen in figure 19. 
FBW was used to obtain and hold reentry attitude during retrofire. After retro- 
fire,  M P  was utilized until manual fuel depletion at 04:34:00. Thereafter, FBW was 
used until spacecraft oscillations began to  build up during reentry, at which time the 
auxiliary damping mode of ASCS was utilized until automatic fuel depletion at 04:49:58. 
Since the scanners were lost when the antenna canister w a s  jettisoned during 
the normal landing sequence, postflight inspection and analysis of these units were 
impossible. However, postflight tes ts  on the same type units have indicated three 
possible models of failure: (1) a capacitor anywhere in the circuit short circuited 
to ground; (2) a failure of the transistors (Q801 and/or Q802) in the flip-flop circuit 
and subsequent loss  of the reference output and the loss  of the pulse generating cir-  
cuit and time reference, and ( 3 )  a failure of a transistor in the dc amplifier and sub- 
sequent reduction of the data factor by a factor of 10. 
Twice during the flight the spacecraft gyros failed to  cage properly on the first 
attempt. However, in both cases,  a reattempt resulted in proper caging. The first 
instance occurred at 02:01:04. The astronaut waited for 40 seconds before recycling 
the gyro switch, and during this period, the pitch gyro output slowly increased f rom 
off-scale negative to nearly zero. After recycling, the gyro maintained the cage 
position of 0 " .  The astronaut waited 
for 9 seconds before recycling the gyro switch; and during this period, the yaw gyro 
output decreased from an excess of +70" to  +65". 
caged properly and decreased to zero in about 4 seconds. 
The second instance occurred at  04:40:14. 
After recycling, the yaw gyro 
Although caging of the gyros is possible at any angle, it is recommended that 
caging be conducted when spacecraft attitudes a r e  less  than 30". The reason for the 
recommended maximum attitude s tems from the fact that at the higher attitude angles, 
the pressure which the torquing cams can exert on the gyros is somewhat less  than 
that available at 0", and, therefore, the rate of response is lower than desired. 
This slower response at angles greater than 30" is not considered a problem since 
the caging operation is usually completed successfully after a second attempt. 
The spacecraft oscillations began to diverge after automatic fuel depletion and 
continued until manual drogue-parachute deployment. An analysis of the onboard 
data revealed that the natural frequency and damping ratios of the MA-7 spacecraft 
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during reentry were approximately the same as those experienced during the 
MA-6 mission under similar conditions. 
Reaction Control System 
The reaction control system (RCS) was basically the same as that used for the 
MA-6 mission, with the exception of modified l-pound and 6-pound thrust-chamber 
assemblies. The modification essentially involved replacing the stainless-steel 
fuel-distribution (Dutch weave) screens with platinum screens and a stainless-steel 
fuel-distribution plate, reducing the volume of the automatic heat bar r ie rs  and 
solenoids, and moving the fuel-metering orifice to the solenoid inlet. All changes 
were incorporated into the l-pound thruster assemblies, but only the platinum 
screens were added to the 6-pound thruster assemblies. 
Objectives of the thruster configuration change for  the MA-7 mission were to 
eliminate the possibility of blocking the fuel-metering orifices with particles of 
Dutch weave screens,  as is presumed to have occurred on the MA-6 mission, and 
also to reduce the total impulse per pulse of low-thruster operation in the ASCS 
orbit mode. Ground tes ts  conducted on this new configuration indicated an approx- 
imate reduction of 50 percent of total impulse per  thruster pulse. 
Heat sinks were attached to the automatic and manual roll-thruster assemblies 
in a manner similar to that employed on the MA-6 mission in order  to reduce pro- 
pellant feed- line temperature s. 
The astronaut's report that there were no malfunctions in the RCS is substan- 
tiated by the onboard recorded data. The high ra tes  of fuel consumption appear to 
be consistent with the frequency and duration s ta r t  of thruster activity. There is 
no evidence, either from flight data or from postflight inspection, of fuel leakage. 
Propellant feed-line temperatures were measured during the flight and maximum 
temperatures recorded a r e  listed in the following table: 
Thruster position r--- 
~ 
Automatic roll  (clockwise) 
Automatic roll  (counterclockwise) 
Manual roll (clockwise) 
Manual roll (counterclockwise) 
Automatic pitch (up) 
Automatic pitch (down) 
Automatic yaw (right) 
Automatic yaw (left) 
Temperature of 
feed line, 
"F 
104 
105 
108 
119 
128 
139 
142 
136 
___-_ . .. 
Approximate 
time, 
h r  :min 
03 :48 
01:55 
03:28 
03 :00 
03 :43 
03:27 
03 :34 
03 :41 
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An analysis of the data indicates that thruster impulse of the expected magnitude 
was delivered whenever a thruster solenoid was actuated. Angular velocity changes 
imparted to the spacecraft by automatic system thruster operations were nominal. 
A history of automatic and manual fuel usage is presented in table VIII. 
Postflight inspection of all thrust-chamber assemblies revealed that they were 
in excellent condition with evidence of a normal amount of salt water corrosion and 
heat discoloration. The resul ts  of the postflight RCS inspection a r e  presented in 
table IX. The only noticeable conditions were the heat markings on the pitch and 
yaw heat barr iers ,  which varied from 0.25 to 0.45 inch long. These markings were 
not evident on the 1-pound roll  heat bar r ie rs ;  however, a heavier discoloration and 
slight oxidation of the diffuser plates existed in the pitch and yaw 1-pound thrust 
chambers. Diffuser plates in the roll  chambers were light blue in color. 
The platinum screens in all chambers were found to be in excellent condition 
with no evidence of deterioration. 
All automatic system solenoids were inspected and tested for electrical actua- 
tion. 
fication voltage applied. The failure to operate is attributed solely to postflight 
salt-water corrosion, since these units operated satisfactorily during the flight. 
All other automatic system solenoids operated satisfactorily. Detailed inspection 
of the 1-pound and 6-pound solenoids revealed no apparent discrepancy, and the 
poppet tips were in  good condition in  all respects. No rust  was seen within the 
valves, but in a number of cases  the plating was cracked at the outlet port. 
The 24-pound pitch-down and yaw-right solenoids failed to operate with speci- 
Inspection of the 24-pound solenoids revealed rust  in varying degrees within 
the bore, mainly at  the metal inser t  and poppet bore lip. The inoperative valves 
had a heavy salt-like substance within the bore. Inlet screens were generally 
clean, and the few exceptions that were found revealed deposits of minute plastic 
and crystalline particles. 
Environmental Control System 
The environmental control system (ECS) is designed to provide a comfortable 
level of temperature and humidity in the pressure suit and to maintain appropriate 
suit and cabin pressures.  The composition of the suit environment is 100-percent 
oxygen, and the nominal pressure level is 5.1 psia. Control of this environment 
is accomplished by removing metabolic heat, carbon dioxide, and water. Replen- 
ishment of the atmosphere is provided from two tanks, each containing 4 pounds of 
gaseous oxygen stored at 7500 psig. In addition to the metabolic requirements of 
the astronaut, the ECS also removes heat from onboard electrical  equipment and 
supplies gas makeup for cabin overboard leakage. 
System description. - The ECS installed in spacecraft 18 represents the speci- 
fication system in all respects. It differs from the ECS on spacecraft 13 (MA-6) in 
two respects. First, the constant oxygen bleed, which bypassed the suit pressure 
regulator and supplied oxygen to the astronaut in  excess of metabolic needs, was 
55 
deleted. Deletion of this oxygen bleed resulted in oxygen being supplied to the astro- 
naut on demand. Secondly, the oxygen partial pressure was measured in the cabin 
circuit instead of in  the suit circuit. 
System performance. - Data for the following analysis were obtained from both 
the commutated data recorded on board and the onboard voice tape. The latter source 
was utilized for cabin and suit steam-exhaust temperatures, excess coolant-water 
warning-light actuations, and heat-exchanger coolant-control valve settings, none of 
which a r e  recorded. 
The only ECS measurement known to be inaccurate was the cabin oxygen partial 
pressure.  Difficulty with the oxygen partial-pressure sensor had been encountered 
during spacecraft preparations, and the final calibration was known to be only 
approximate. 
The flight data deviate from the system's design cr i ter ia  only in the performance 
of the cabin and suit-cooling systems. 
Higher than desired temperatures in the spacecraft cabin and pressure suit were 
experienced during the MA-7 flight, and these values a r e  plotted in figures 20 and 21, 
respectively. In the same figures, heat-exchanger steam-exhaust temperature and 
coolant-control valve settings a r e  also shown. The steam-exhaust temperature read- 
ings are used by the astronaut to monitor performance of the cooling systems and to 
make the decisions on where to set  the control valves manually. The lag inherent 
in these monitoring points with control valve manipulations resulted in some diffi- 
culty in determining the correct settings and was a major contributing factor to the 
high temperatures experienced.. Extensive postflight tes ts  have revealed that the 
coolant-control valve-setting problem can be minimized by relocating the monitoring 
point to the metal dome of the heat exchanger where the time lag between a valve 
setting and a corresponding change in dome temperature has consistently been less  
than 10 minutes during postflight tests.  
A possible contributor to the high suit temperature is the partial freezing of the 
heat exchanger when high rates  of water flow a r e  used. This freezing can result in 
obstruction of the evaporative surfaces and a slight increase in the evaporation pres-  
sure. The design conditions a r e  for evaporation at 0 .1  psia pressure and 35" F tem- 
perature. An increase of 0.1 ps i  in this design pressure would raise  the correspond- 
ing evaporation temperature to 53" F, which, in turn, would significantly reduce 
the system capability to condense and collect water. Flight data show that suit heat- 
exchanger exhaust temperature ranged between 65" F and 70" F, instead of the ex- 
pected 50" F, thus indicating that the evaporation temperature was probably near 
55" F and that partial freezing may have been experienced. As an example, figure 21 
shows that the suit coolant-control-valve setting was advanced to give a high coolant- 
water flow rate  at 03:27:00. 
comfortable suit temperature level until 04:15:00, at which time the temperature 
began to fluctuate. 
the suit temperature. It is suspected that freezing of the suit heat exchanger 
occurred because of a high coolant-water flow rate for this period of an hour, which 
resulted in a decreased cooling efficiency just pr ior  to and during the reentry phase. 
The corresponding temperature decrease resulted in a 
Ten minutes later, at 04:25:00, there was a sharp increase in 
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The possibility of freezing can be reduced by relocating the monitoring point as 
previously discus sed. 
Difficulty in achieving high air-flow rates  and good circulation of air in the 
cabin could have contributed to the high cabin-air temperature. Tests are being run 
on larger cabin-air cooling fans, but the results to date indicate that to obtain im- 
proved cooling requires too great an increase in power and water-flow requirements. 
The many changes in the cabin coolant-control-valve setting prevent an accurate 
analysis of the effects of sunlight and darkness on cabin temperatures. 
The MA-7 mission was  the first orbital flight from which approximate values for 
astronaut metabolic oxygen requirements could be calculated. Prelaunch oxygen con- 
sumption was  determined to be 0.0457 lb/hr o r  261 scc/min (measured at 14.7 psia 
and 70" F). During orbital flight, the astronaut metabolic consumption was  calcu- 
lated to be 0.0722 lb/hr (or 408 scc/min). These metabolic consumption rates  were 
calculated from the oxygen-pressure decay rates  of the primary oxygen tank after 
accounting for the flow rate to the cabin through the constant bleed orifice of the 
suit-pressure regulator valve. 
rate a re  500 scc/min. 
work of similar difficulty under lg. 
tions demonstrated that weightless oxygen-consumption rates a re  of a similar level 
as those which occurred under lg. 
The ECS design cr i ter ia  for the astronaut metabolic 
This rate is based upon oxygen usage data obtained during 
The astronaut activity under weighless condi- 
Launch phase: The ECS operated properly during the launch phase. 
and suit pressures maintained the proper differential of 5.5 to 6.0 psi above ambient 
pressure during ascent, and held at 5.8 and 5.9 psia, respectively. 
The cabin 
Orbital phase: The cabin and suit pressures decreased slowly during the orbital 
phase because of a cabin-air leakage rate of 1000 cc/min that was  established before 
flight. The pressure decay ceased at approximately 03:00:00, at which time the cabin 
pressure-control valve began supplying oxygen to compensate for the cabin leakage. 
The cabin pressure was  then maintained at 4.9 psia. The only problems encountered 
during the orbital phase were the high suit-inlet and cabin-air temperatures previ- 
ously described. 
Coolant quantity indicating system (CQIS) data, which were telemetered to the 
ground and recorded on the onboard tape, indicated a coolant-water usage of 
10.0 pounds when corrected for temperature change. 
a usage of 10.23 pounds. This agreement represents the most accurate CQIS mea- 
surements in flight to date. Coolant usage averaged about 2. l lb/hr over a period 
of 4 hours and 50 minutes, compared with a nominal flow rate of 1.6 lb/hr. 
Postflight inspection measured 
The secondary-oxygen-supply pressure increased slightly during the flight. 
increase can be attributed to the increase in supply bottle temperature, as measured 
during flight. Temperatures were identical for both the primary and secondary sup- 
plies and indicated 72" F at launch and 86" F at landing. The decay of the secondary 
oxygen supply experienced during the MA-6 mission did not recur during this flight. 
This 
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Reentry phase: The performance of the ECS during reentry was normal except 
for  the suit and cabin temperature problems previously discussed. The astronaut 
opened the inflow and outflow valves manually during descent at 04:51:18, and this 
action placed the system in the postlanding mode. The emergency oxygen rate 
commenced at this time. 
Communications System 
System description. - The spacecraft communications system aboard the MA-7 
spacecraft was identical to  that in spacecraft 13 (MA-6) with one minor exception. 
The power switch was modified to provide a mode whereby the astronaut could 
record voice on the onboard tape recorder without RF  transmission to the ground 
stations. 
normal warmup time because the transmitter w a s  maintained in a standby condition 
with the power switch in the record position. 
Switching to the transmitting mode could be accomplished without the 
Voice communications. - The UHF voice communications with the spacecraft 
were satisfactory. Reception of H F  voice in the spacecraft was satisfactory; how- 
ever, attempts on the part  of the astronaut to accomplish H F  voice transmissions 
were unsuccessful. The onboard tape recorder data showed that H F  voice t rans-  
missions from the spacecraft were attempted three t imes during the mission as 
follows: 
Time 
01:07:16 
01 :15:54 
03:21:00 
Spacecraft attitude 
Roll: 
Pitch: 
Yaw: 
Roll: 
Pitch: 
Yaw : 
Roll : 
Pitch: 
Yaw: 
+20° to off scale 
Off scale 
Undetermined 
-35" 
Off scale 
Undetermined 
-30" to off scale 
-10" to  off scale 
Undetermined 
Postflight tes ts  of all spacecraft H F  components, except the antenna which w a s  
severed as part  of the normal recovery procedure, did not reveal any failures. 
The poor reception of the spacecraft H F  transmission is attributed to spacecraft 
orientation, atmospheric condition, and the limited number of t imes utilized. 
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Radar beacons. - Performance of the C-band and S-band beacons was satisfactory, 
although slightly inferior to that of the MA-6 mission. Several stations reported 
some countdown on both beacons and amplitude modulation on the C-band beacon. 
The amplitude modulation was possibly caused by the modulation presented by the 
phase shifter (wobulator) and the drifting mode of the spacecraft, which resulted in 
a less  than optimum antenna orientation. In view of these problems, both beacons 
were rechecked after the mission and found to be essentially unchanged from their 
preflight status. 
Location aids. - Recovery forces  reported that the auxiliary beacon (Super SARAH) 
and UHF/DF signals were received. The Super SARAH beacon was received at a 
range of approximately 250 miles and the SARAH beacon and UHF/DF were received 
at a range of 50 miles from the spacecraft. The HF rescue beacon (SEASAVE) was 
apparently not received by the recovery stations, although the whip antenna used by 
this SEASAVE beacon was reported by the recovery forces to  be fully extended and 
normal in appearance. The SEASAVE beacon was tested after flight and found to be 
satisfactory. The reason why the SEASAVE beacon was  not received is unknown. 
Command receivers.  - The command receivers operated satisfactorily. Increas- 
ing the low-telemeter frequency by 500 kc eliminated the interference problem which 
was experienced during the MA-6 reentry blackout period (ref. 1). 
Electrical and Sequential Systems 
Electrical system. - The spacecraft electrical system was a specification space- 
craft system. 
sion and were as expected. The electrical system in spacecraft 18 differed from 
that in spacecraft 13 (MA-6) in the following respects. 
Voltage and current profiles were similar to those of the MA-6 mis- 
1. Inverter ac voltages were monitored on the ac voltmeter rather than by 
monitor lights. 
2. The maximum-altitude-sensor battery was  used as an auxiliary battery for 
the velocity sensor after retrofire command. 
3. The 24-volt isolated bus was monitored on the number 2 position of the dc 
voltmeter select switch (position was blank on spacecraft 13). 
4. A switch fuse w a s  added to the phase shifter circuit for ON-OFF control 
during the special radar  test. 
The 150 and 250 v-amp inverter temperatures, shown in figure 22, increased 
from 112" F and 128" F, respectively, at launch to 175" F and 186" F, respectively, 
by 04:OO:OO. The temperatures appeared to be stable after this time. The rate of 
temperature increase appeared to decrease after the inverter coolant-control valve 
was  advanced from the number 4 to the number 5 position at 03:00:38. The corre-  
sponding change in coolant-water flow is from 0. 50 lb/hr to 0.64 lb/hr. 
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It was found during postflight tests that a number of fuses had blown on this 
mission that had not blown on previous missions. The blown fuses a r e  attributed 
to sea water that entered the spacecraft after landing, since there were no indica- 
tions of any fuses, other than squib-firing fuses, blowing prior to landing. The 
following is a list of fuses that blew as a result of sea water producing shorting 
paths to ground within the spacecraft. 
1. Emergency hold control 
2. Low-frequency telemetry 
3. Instrumentation, dc number 6 
4. Telemetered sequence, 6-volt isolated 
5. Standby inverter 
6. Isolated-bus regulator 
7. Main inverter fans 
8. Automatic H 0 jettison 
9. 
2 2  
Phase shifter (switch fuse panel) 
10. High-frequency telemetry (switch fuse panel) 
As expected, squib-circuit fuses were blown as in previous flights. In the 
retrorocket ignition circuits, 5 of 6 fuses had blown, including the number 1 retro- 
rocket switch fuse which also had a hole in the ceramic portion along the side. 
Records of current during retrofire led to the deduction that approximately 7 amperes 
passed through this fuse for 6 o r  7 seconds before it blew. This is believed to be 
the source of smoke reported by the astronaut during retrofire,  since this type of 
fuse commonly produces smoke when blown in this manner. The deduction was  
confirmed by the astronaut during postflight tes ts ;  for  he observed two similar fuses 
blown, which produced a smoke having the same color and smell  as that encountered 
in flight at the time of retrofire. 
Postflight inspection revealed that two of the four diodes in the zener diode 
package were badly corroded. The corroded diodes were 14-volt zeners with 
their positive terminals connected through fuses to the main and isolated buses, 
respectively, and their negative terminals connected to the positive side of the 
other two 14-volt zeners, which have their negative terminals connected to space- 
craft ground. The zener diodes exhibit an electrolytic effect when powered under 
a sea-water environment. Electrolysis occurs between the case, which is at a 
14-volt positive potential when the diode electrically adjacent to the bus is conduct- 
ing, and the spacecraft structure, which is at ground or zero potential. 
phenomenon has been demonstrated in the electrical laboratory. 
This 
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Sequential system. - The sequential system of spacecraft 18 was similar to 
that employed for spacecraft 13, but the following modifications w e r e  incorporated: 
1. The spacecraft-separation bolt-fire relay was electrically actuated at space- 
craft separation. 
2. The landing-bag deployment monitoring circuit was changed. The limit 
switches were wired so  that the actuation of both w a s  required for telelight opera- 
tion and telemetry indications. 
3. The emergency retrosequence relay contacts were electrically bypassed s o  
that the spacecraft was capable of accepting simultaneous retrofire signals from 
the clock and ground command. 
4. The H F  transmitter/receiver was automatically turned on at tower separa- 
tion rather than at spacecraft separation. 
5. The 02-quantity light on the right-hand instrument panel was disconnected. 
6. The scanner slaving signal was changed from programed to continuous. 
7. A barostat w a s  added inside the cabin and wired so that the automatic r e -  
covery system was not armed until the cabin pressure was above 9.62 psia on 
descent . 
8. The emergency drogue-parachute-deployment switch was wired so that the 
periscope would extend and the snorkel-door blow-off squibs would ignite when the 
switch was actuated. 
The sequential system performed as expected throughout the mission with the 
following exceptions : 
1. Retrofire had to be accomplished manually because there w a s  no attitude 
permission from ASCS. Had there been attitude permission, the number 1 retro- 
rocket would have fired at approximately 04:33:05, since retrosequence w a s  ini- 
tiated at 04:32:35. Onboard data show that the manual retrofire circuit was  closed 
at 04:33:08 and that thrust  was  on at 04:33:08. 5. The pilot commented after the 
flight that retrofire occurred 1 to  2 seconds after he pushed the retrofire switch. 
Extensive postflight tes t s  of the retrosequence circuitry did not reveal any mal- 
function which could cause a delay in retrofire. It should be noted that no recorded 
data indicate when the pilot pushed the manual retrofire switch. The time is known 
to have been after 04:33:05, when automatic retrofire would have occurred had 
attitude permission been available, and before 04:33:08, when onboard data show 
that the manual circuit w a s  closed. The point in doubt is when, in rea l  time, the 
pilot did push the manual retrofire switch; and this moment can never be definitely 
determined with any degree of certainty. 
2. The main parachute was deployed manually by the astronaut, because auto- 
Postflight checks indicated that the matic deployment did not occur at 10 600 feet. 
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automatic system did function during the descent phase, although it was  some time 
after main parachute deployment. This system is discussed in  more detail in the 
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems section. 
3. The onboard tape recorder and other telemetry components apparently did 
not lose input power at  landing plus 10 minutes as planned. Upon initial power-up 
when the spacecraft was returned to Hangar S ,  a short  circuit was found between 
the two pre-impact buses, which supply power to telemetry, and the spacecraft 
main dc bus. After the spacecraft was dried in the altitude chamber, it was found 
that the short circuit no longer existed. The problem probably resulted from sea  
water entering one of the fuse blocks which contain the three buses or  from sea 
water entering one of the instrumentation packages. This sea water would have 
been removed when the spacecraft was dried in the altitude chamber, which ex- 
plains why the pre-impact buses remained powered. 
Instrumentation System 
The instrumentation system monitored spacecraft conditions, operational per- 
formance of spacecraft systems, and physical conditions and reactions of the astro- 
naut. Most parameters monitored were recorded either on the onboard tape o r  on 
the astronaut observer camera to provide a permanent record for subsequent study 
and interpretation. Significant parameters necessary for the astronaut to perform 
his tasks were displayed in the cabin, and parameters required by ground personnel 
for real-time analysis and evaluation were telemeterd to  the ground through two 
transmitters.  
System description. - The instrumentation system used in the spacecraft of the 
MA-7 mission w a s  basically the same as that used in the spacecraft of the MA-6 mis- 
sion. However, some changes were made to accommodate new experiments and to 
provide additional data; and some additions, deletions, and substitutions of equipment 
and parameters were made to improve the system and to reflect knowledge gained 
on previous missions. 
The research experiments requiring instrumentation were the zero-gravity 
liquid behavior experiment and the tethered inflatable balloon experiment. The zero- 
gravity experiment utilized a transparent sphere containing liquid, and the sphere 
was photographed with the astronaut-observer camera throughout the flight. A 
30-inch mylar balloon was deployed when the spacecraft was  in orbit. The balloon 
was tethered to the spacecraft with a nylon line which was  attached to a s t ra in  gage. 
The resulting tension exerted on the s t ra in  gage was measured and recorded on the 
onboard tape. 
A more comprehensive temperature survey w a s  incorporated in the spacecraft 
of the MA-7 mission. 
a low-level commutator. The data were not telemetered, but were recorded on an 
existing channel of the onboard tape recorder. 
The survey utilized temperature-sensing instrumentation and 
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Deletions in the spacecraft instrumentation system were the coolant-quantity 
indicator, 0 partial-pressure indicator, and the instrument-panel camera. In 
addition, telemetry high-frequency and low-frequency transmitter temperatures, 
the backup heat shield temperatures, c ross  strapping of the X-axis and Y-axis 
accelerations, and the command receiver signal strengths were also deleted. The 
telemetry transmitter temperatures and heat shield temperatures were replaced 
by the "Bfc nut temperatures on the clockwise and counterclockwise, automatic and 
manual, roll  thrusters.  Backup segments for the command-receiver signal strengths 
and the four thruster "B" nut temperatures were incorporated with the removal of 
the c ross  strapping, which also enabled the separation of the horizon-scanner pitch 
and roll  ignore by placing them on separate segments. Four segments were then 
left unassigned; one was used as a 3-volt reference and the other three were zero 
references. 
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Other changes to spacecraft 18 a r e  listed as follows: 
1. Suit and cabin steam-vent temperature pickups were installed in the steam- 
vent overboard ducts and monitored on a dual indicator. 
2. A modified integrating accelerometer was  installed which reduced the 
240-foot-per-second relay to 210 feet per second. 
3. A semi-automatic blood pressure measuring system (BPMS) with a manual 
start  button on the instrument panel w a s  installed. 
4. The oxygen partial-pressure transducer was relocated from the suit circuit 
to the cabin. 
5. The suit pressure indicator was calibrated from 4 to 6 psia only. 
6. The low-frequency-transmitter center frequency was raised 500 kc to elim- 
inate RF  interference experienced during the MA-6 flight. 
Prelaunch. - The fact that the oxygen partial-pressure transducer began to r i se  
in output the day before the f i rs t  scheduled launch indicated a drying out of the trans- 
ducer. A decision was  made to remove only the transducer and make calibrations 
by using another set of amplifiers. 
curve as the previous calibration, and a decision was made not to rely on the in- 
for mation received. 
The calibration curve did not follow the same 
Approximately 34 minutes prior to lift-off, three cycles of the BPMS resulted 
BPMS cycles near lift-off appeared normal, but the inter- 
A discussion of the problem is included 
in intermittent signals. 
mittent signals reoccurred during flight. 
in the Orbit section. 
Launch. - During a period of approximately 20 seconds, starting at T+90 seconds, 
extraneous signals appearing at  the electrocardiograph (ECG) electrodes drove the 
subcarrier oscillators (SCO) f rom band-edge to band-edge. These extraneous sig- 
nals were primarily attributed to rapid body movements of the pilot and possibly 
excessive perspiration during this period. 
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At lift-off, the telemetry signals were of good quality, with signal strengths of 
8000 microvolts for  the low-link telemetry and 10 000 microvolts for the high-link 
telemetry. A loss of signal for 1 second was evident at staging, which is normal 
and is caused by flame attenuation. At tower release,  the signal strengths increased 
from 500 microvolts to 700 microvolts on both links. At launch, the transmitter 
frequencies were -6.0 kc from the center frequency for  the low-link and -5.0 kc 
from the center frequency for the high-link. On the first orbital pass, the high-link 
was +7.0 kc from the center frequency, and no reading was made on the low-link. 
Center frequency readings were not made on the telemetry links during the second 
and third orbital passes. Both telemetry links were modulated for a total of 60 kc 
deviation throughout the MA-7 mission. 
Orbit. - While in orbit, the astronaut reported the zero-gravity experiment as 
having "Fluid gathered around the standpipe. The standpipe appears to be full and 
the fluid outside the standpipe is about halfway up. " Postflight photographs from the 
pilot-observer camera confirmed this. The mylar balloon was deployed in orbit, 
but the test  was unsuccessful from an overall standpoint. A more detailed discus- 
sion is presented in the Scientific Experiment section of this report. 
The temperature survey worked well throughout the flight; however, the low 
Postflight inspection clockwise automatic thruster gave no temperature reading. 
revealed a broken thermocouple. 
Telemetry data indicated an abrupt increase in the astronaut's body temperature 
1 hour after launch. The indicated temperature w a s  e r ra t ic  from that point until 
2- hours after launch at which time the readout stabilized and appeared normal. 
During the errat ic  period an R-calibration w a s  given with no change in body- 
temperature readout. In addition, the astronaut stated that he was  comfortable 
during the errat ic  period and that he did not believe the telemetered data. Post- 
flight analysis resulted in the conclusion that the body-temperature data were un- 
reliable during the errat ic  period. The data at all other t imes were concluded to 
be valid. Postflight tes t s  of the instrumentation failed to reveal any malfunction 
which could have caused the errat ic  temperature readings. 
1 
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Intermittency in the BPMS was again evident during flight. The system pres-  
surized when the astronaut activated the start button, but several  t imes during the 
flight the system did not show any pulses during bleed-down time. Twenty-four 
blood pressure cycles were obtained during the flight; but the data were very errat ic  
and were not reducible, with any degree of certainty, to the actual blood pressure 
of the astronaut. The intermittent signals and the unusual inflight data dictated the 
need for a postflight evaluation of the BPMS. The postflight systems check revealed 
that the intermittent signals were resulting from a broken cable in the microphone 
pickup. However, this malfunction could not affect the magnitude of the data trans- 
mitted since an intermittent short circuit sends either valid signals o r  none at all. 
Additional tes t s  were performed to determine the cause of the errat ic  inflight data. 
These tes t s  revealed that the BPMS had not been properly calibrated before the 
MA-? flight and that accurate interpretation of the data was not possible. 
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The astronaut reported that the rate indicator moved during Z-calibration. This 
movement is normal, since the Z-calibration changes the load on the transducer. 
The oxygen partial-pressure transducer appeared to operate normally during 
flight; however, post-calibration of the system was not possible because of the con- 
dition of the transducer. 
Reentry. - The manual fuel indicator read 6 percent during reentry, but the astro- 
naut reported that no more fuel was available. 
transducer reads pressure whether or not fuel is present. 
This condition can exist because the 
After blackout, telemetry signals were received by Cape Canaveral and aircraft. 
The low-frequency transmitter signal had dropouts and was  weak. 
corrosion of the transmitters from the salt water, a postflight check of the trans- 
mtters '  signal quality would not be informative. The spacecraft's excessive landing 
range caused the telemetry signal received by the aircraft to be of poor quality. 
Because of the 
Summary. - The pilot-observer camera film quality from the MA-" mission was  
poor because its submersion in both salt water and fresh water made an effective 
developing process impossible. The film was  sufficient, however, to confirm theo- 
retical estimates of the liquid behavior in the zero-g experiment. The onboard tape 
and the astronaut's hand-held camera film provided excellent flight data. The instru- 
mentation and data system provided satisfactory performance for the mission. 
Heat Protection System 
Heat shield. - The performance of the heat shield (fig. 23) during reentry w a s  
The center plug was lost, but a postflight investigation revealed that satisfactory. 
this loss occurred after major heating. The area under the plug showed no evidence 
of charring o r  excessive heating. Otherwise, the shield suffered only normal crack- 
ing and displayed the usual glass droplet streaks. The stagnation point appears to 
have been approximately in the center of the shield. 
Two temperature pickups were recorded. One was located in the center of the 
shield and the other 27 inches from the center. The maximum temperatures ex- 
perienced a r e  in agreement with predicted values. Maximum heat-shield tempera- 
tures for this and previous flights a r e  presented in figure 24. 
The heating appeared to be uniform over the shield, as shown by eight core 
samples taken at various locations in the shield. Visual char depth varied from 
0.3 to 0.35 inch. These measurements compare very closely with those obtained 
during the MA-5 and MA-6 missions. No reduction in overall thickness was  observed. 
The measured weight loss of the heat shield, adjusted to compensate for the 
missing center plug, was  13.1  pounds--slightly more than the expected loss of 
11 pounds, but still within the limits of measurement and calculation accuracy. 
value is greater than that resulting from previous flights; however, the possibility 
that previous shields were not completely dry when weighed might have contributed 
This 
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to their lower weight loss. This inconsistency in drying is especially probable for 
the spacecraft ablation shields of the MA-4 and MA-5 missions. Approximate cal- 
culations show that the slightly more shallow reentry for the MA-7 flight would not 
have resulted in a significant increase in the ablation loss  compared to a nominal 
reentry. 
Afterbody. - The shingles on the conical-cylindrical afterbody show no evidence 
of adverse heating effects. Temperatures measured on these shingles were analyzed, 
and results were consistent with data of previous orbital flights. 
White paint patch. - The greatest heating effects experienced by the white patch 
(shown in fig. 25, upper left of spacecraft) are when it is oriented toward the Sun; 
and since the spacecraft was never positioned in this manner for an extended period, 
only a trend in the data can be derived. Apparently the spacecraft was rolled several  
times, and thus the patch was placed toward the Sun for brief periods. During these 
periods, the oxidized shingle was approximately 40" F hotter than the white paint 
patch. 
The effect of differences in emissivity is apparent during exit and reentry. 
During exit the white patch was apparently 300" F cooler than the oxidizer shingle, 
and just after 0.05g during reentry the patch was approximately 200" F cooler than 
the oxidized shingle. Later, in the reentry when the primary heating phase was 
reached, the white patch temperature increased to approximately 200" F higher than 
the oxidized shingle. This behavior is explained by the effect of temperature on the 
emissivity of white paint and the oxidized shingle. At temperatures below approxi- 
mately 700" F the white paint has higher emissivities than the oxidized shingle, and 
above this temperature the oxidized shingle has higher emissivities. 
Green-glow effect. - The astronaut reported seeing a green glow around the re -  
covery section during reentry. 
vealed nothing abnormal in this area,  and the appearance w a s  about the same as 
those of previous spacecraft. The cause for the green glow is unknown. 
Postflight inspection of the beryllium shingles r e -  
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems 
Some anomalies occurred in the mechanical systems, although no serious o r  
dangerous conditions resulted. These anomalies, along with general systems de- 
scription and performance, a r e  discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Recovery sequence. - A control barostat was installed in the cabin and wired 
into the parachute circuitry to prevent premature deployment of the drogue and 
main parachutes. The control barostat was in ser ies  with the 21  000-foot drogue 
parachute and 10 600-foot main barostats, and was  supposed to a rm the recovery 
system during descent at a spacecraft altitude of 11 200 feet. Ambient pressure 
at approximately 11 200 feet is 9.62 psia, and the added barostat was  set  to this 
pressure.  However, the barostat sensed cabin pressure,  which appreciably lags 
ambient pressure,  and the resultant effective spacecraft altitude actually required 
to actuate the barostat switch was  approximately 8 250 feet. The recovery system 
as flown is shown in figure 26. 
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The planned recovery sequence called for a manual deployment of the drogue 
parachute at approximately 2 1  000 feet and an automatic deployment of the main 
parachute at approximately 10 600 feet. The astronaut manually deployed the 
drogue parachute at 25 450 feet when the spacecraft oscillations began to build up. 
In addition, he manually deployed the main parachute at 8 950 feet, since automatic 
deployment did not occur at 10 600 feet as planned. 
Parachutes. - The performance of the drogue and main parachutes upon deploy- 
ment was satisfactory. Since neither parachute was recovered, a detailed postflight 
visual inspection could not be made. Observation by the astronaut verified that both 
parachutes were deployed cleanly and were undamaged during descent. 
Pyrotechnics. - A postflight examination of the spacecraft and an analysis of the 
pertinent data indicate that all rockets and pyrotechnics apparently functioned nor - 
mally. During retrorocket firing, the astronaut felt that the deceleration was  some- 
what l e s s  than expected. Detailed trajectory analysis, however, indicates that the 
retrorocket perf o r  mance w a s  within spec if ication values . 
It cannot be determined whether certain pyrotechnics actually fired (such as 
redundant clamp ring bolts and tower-jettison rocket ignition), since the available 
information shows only that the resulting function was satisfactory. 
Explosive-actuated hatch. - The spacecraft explosive-actuated side hatch was 
unbolted after the spacecraft was placed on board the recovery ship. The side hatch 
was not used for astronaut egress,  and postflight visual examination revealed the 
hatch to be in excellent condition. 
Landing: shock attenuation svstem. - 
Landing bag: The system was unaltered from the MA-6 configuration, with 
the exception that the instrumentation limit switches were rewired for improved 
reliability. The landing-attenuation system performed normally, as evidenced by 
the astronaut's statements and from postflight examinations. The rescue personnel, 
who parachuted into the landing area,  examined the landing bag in the water and 
reported the bag to be in good condition. However, when the spacecraft was hoisted 
aboard ship, all of the s t raps  were found to be broken and the bag w a s  extensively 
damaged (fig. 27). This damage may have been caused by wave action while the 
spacecraft was  supported by the flotation collar prior to recovery. All restraining 
cables and the large pressure bulkhead appeared to be intact; however, a cable- 
restraining spring had been lost. 
Ablation shield and main pressure bulkhead: The ablation shield appeared in- 
tact, except for a lost center plug; the ablation-shield retaining studs and the bulk- 
head protective shield showed the usual minor damage. Although a small  air leak 
was found at a thermocouple lead through the main pressure bulkhead, the bulkhead 
did not experience any visible damage. Small a r eas  of protective honeycomb were 
slightly crushed and minor deformation of small  tubing w a s  experienced, as in pre-  
vious missions. 
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Flotation. - The astronaut reported that the spacecraft did not right itself after 
landing. He also stated that it was listing in the pitch-down, yaw-left quadrant at 
an angle estimated to be about 60" from vertical. Although no photographs a r e  
available of the spacecraft before the astronaut egressed, pictures taken after 
egress  show approximately a 45" to 50" list angle. However, it is not known how 
much water was in  the spacecraft cabin when these photographs were taken. The 
enter of gravity for  the MA-7 flotation configuration was at Z = 120.03 inches, 
which is a corrected calculation to include the loss of the ablation shield center 
plug and the measured ablation weight loss. The center of gravity was  offset f rom 
the axis of symmetry by 0.40 inch; these values a r e  in substantial agreement with 
those for the MA-6 flotation configuration, which were 119.78 and 0.37 inches, 
respectively. The list angle for previous missions has been reported as approxi- 
mately 15" to 25" from the vertical. According to the timing of audible events on 
the onboard tape, the astronaut apparently initiated his postlanding checklist immed- 
iately and had already begun to egress at 4 minutes after landing. Water stability 
data, obtained from tes t s  conducted by the Recovery Branch of the Flight Operations 
Division*, indicate that the center of gravity mentioned previously could have caused 
the spacecraft to take 3 or 4 minutes to stabilize in an upright position if the astro- 
naut had remained in the couch. The astronaut's movements, in preparation for 
egressing, may have nullified any restoring moment that existed during the stabil- 
ization period. The spacecraft erection time can be influenced by many unknown 
factors, including air trapped in the landing bag, insulation-blanket soaking, and 
the manner in which the reserve parachute is jettisoned. 
countable effects and the fact that they cannot be duplicated in a controlled flotation 
test, the actual list angle is indeterminate. Therefore, the conclusion must be 
drawn that, after taking into account the astronaut's immediate egress,  the higher 
center of gravity, and a number of possible minor factors, the spacecraft did not 
have sufficient time to erect  itself before the absence of the astronaut changed the 
equilibrium angle. This equilibrium angle, based on the unoccupied spacecraft's 
center of gravity, could well have been close to the astronaut's estimate and is in 
reasonable agreement with the postflight photograph. 
Considering these unac- 
Water in spacecraft - -_ cabin. - After spacecraft recovery, approximately 65 gallons 
of salt water were removedTrom the cabin and an estimated 10 gallons remained in 
inaccessible places. The astronaut reported that a few drops of water splashed on 
the tape recorder a t  the time of landing. These drops can probably be attributed to 
water coming in through the cabin pressure-relief valve. Astronaut comments and 
postflight examinations reveal that this valve w a s  not placed in the locked position. 
The surge of water which entered the recovery section of the spacecraft upon land- 
ing may have had enough velocity head to overcome briefly the valve's negative- 
pressure-relief setting (approximately 16 inches of water) and spray through onto 
the recorder. This valve is located almost directly over the tape recorder installa- 
tion, as shown in figure 28. 
The small  amount of water that could have come in through the cabin pressure- 
relief valve, however, wmld be negligible compared to the total amount found in 
the spacecraft cabin. Postflight tes ts  show the cabin leak rate  to be about 2670 cc 
of air per minute, which is an increase of 1670 over the prelaunch value of 1000 cc 
- 
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per  minute. A leak w a s  detected in the large pressure bulkhead around a thermo- 
couple connector; however, this leak is not large enough to account for much over 
15 percent of the total. 
the opening left by the removal of the small  pressure bulkhead, but did not believe 
that this amounted to much more than a few gallons. Although the spacecraft was 
listing, it was not listing enough for  the recovery section to be in the water. The 
water probably entered through the small  pressure bulkhead opening during the 
egress  and the period when the astronaut w a s  using the spacecraft for support to 
turn over the liferaft. This water could have entered through the shingles to the 
recovery section and would not necessarily have been noticed by the astronaut whose 
attention was otherwise occupied. 
The astronaut stated that he heard some water enter through 
Postflight Inspec tion 
Spacecraft 18 underwent the normal postflight conditioning procedure. A photo- 
graphic record was made of this process after the spacecraft was returned to 
Hangar S, at Cape Canaveral, Florida. A thorough visual inspection was made of 
the external and internal a reas  in the "as-received" condition (fig. 25) and all 
switch and control positions were noted. The spacecraft was  then taken to the 
pyrotechnic a rea  for external disassembly and inspection; and following this, it 
w a s  transported to the power a rea  for a postflight systems check. 
A desalting washdown, tank drainage, and flushing procedure, as applicable, 
were accomplished; and deterioration safeguards were taken in general. The im- 
mediate postflight inspection procedure included external disassembly of the heat 
shield and conical shingles in order  to inspect the pressure bulkhead and internal 
skin areas .  Samples of insulation were removed and stored for later analysis. 
A discussion of the individual spacecraft structural  systems and the results of a 
detailed inspection follows. 
Structure. - The spacecraft experienced no inflight damage. The conical-section 
shingles showed the usual bluish and orange tinge, and the cylindrical-section 
shingles displayed the usual dark yellow-grayish appearance, both of which were 
caused by aerodynamic heating. Several shingles were slightly dented and scratched, 
as in previous missions, presumably during the recovery operation. 
Ablation shield. - The external surface of the heat shield had the normal, evenly 
charred, glass-streaked appearance, and some circumferential separation of the 
edge laminations was evident. The ablation shield center plug was found to be 
missing, with evidence that the plug remained intact through the reentry heat pulse, 
as in the MA-5 mission. A number of cracks similar to those experienced in some 
previous missions were found in the ablation shield exterior; however, these cracks 
did not compromise mission safety. Considerable recovery-handling dents and cuts 
were noted. The weight loss  of the heat shield during the reentry phase amounted 
to approximately 13 pounds. A postflight photograph of the ablation shield is shown 
in figure 23. 
Landing bag. - The landing bag had been damaged quite extensively, and all 
landing bag s t raps  had been broken, primarily because of sea  action (fig. 27). 
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Recovery compartment. - The interior of the compartment was undamaged, and 
the appearance, except for stains from the recovery dye marker,  was  normal. The 
butterfly antenna atop the spacecraft was bent somewhat during postflight handling, 
and the whip antenna had been severed, as in previous missions, as part  of the stand- 
a rd  recovery procedure. 
Main pressure bulkhead. - Small a reas  of honeycomb were crushed slightly, and 
some minor deformation of small  tubing was noted. This minor damage was evidently 
caused by deflection of the fiberglass protective shield which was struck by the edge 
of the ablation shield during landing. The fiberglass protective shield was gouged in 
four places by heat-shield retaining studs during landing re-contact. The main pres-  
sure  bulkhead was intact, except for a small leak noted in the paragraph which 
follows. 
Spacecraft interior. - Nearly the entire interior of the spacecraft w a s  wet from 
sea water which entered the cabin after landing. About 4 inches of water remained 
in the astronaut's couch and battery compartments after draining of this sea water 
aboard ship. Some electrical connectors and internal spacecraft systems were 
heavily corroded; however, all systems responded well to postflight systems checks. 
The window was clear,  although the usual moisture was present between the two 
outer panes. A postflight pressure-leak test  yielded a leak rate of 2670 cc/min 
(as compared to about 1000 cc/min preflight) with an audible leak at the thermocouple- 
lead passage in the large pressure bulkhead. 
craft at recovery undoubtedly came from this source. 
Some of the water found in the space- 
Scientific Experiments 
Tethered inflatable balloon. - This experiment was designed to provide orbital 
observations of nearby objects of varying surface finishes and to measure the drag 
of an object of known aerodynamic characteristics in a region of f ree  molecular 
flow. Balloon drag could then be related to atmospheric density and thus provide 
a density profile over the altitude range encompassed during the Mercury orbital 
pass. The experiment was  also intended to obtain qualitative information on the 
capability of the astronaut to estimate separation distance between the spacecraft 
and an object of known size and shape in space. The visual portion of the experi- 
ment w a s  to evaluate the relative merit of various colors and surface finishes for 
optimum visibility at varying ranges in a space environment. Additional objec- 
tives of this test  include observations of the general stability qualities and damping 
characteristics of the tethered balloon. The appearance, brightness, and behavior 
of small diffuse reflecting discs were to be observed to provide a compariosn with 
other foreign particles in space where appropriate. 
Description of test:  The test  device consisted of a 30-inch diameter, inflatable 
balloon fabricated from a two-ply mylar, aluminum foil material, each ply being 
1 - mil in thickness. The balloon surface was divided into five equal-sized lunes of 2 
different colors and surface finish. These finishes were uncolored aluminum foil, 
yellow fluorescent Day-Glo, orange fluorescent Day-Glo, flat white finish, and a 
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phosphorescent coating (fig. 29). The balloon and inflating bottle were packaged in 
a cylindrical container located in the antenna canister under the destabilizer flap. 
The balloon and inflation bottle weighed approximately 0. 5 pound and the entire 
installation including instrumentation weighed approximately 5 pounds. 
The balloon was deployed in orbit at. 01:38:00 by firing an actuating squib. A 
small  compressed spring then ejected the balloon and an inflation bottle from the 
container, along with two balsa block l iners and the mylar discs. The balsa blocks 
were semi-cylindrical in shape and about 6 inches long and 3 inches wide. They 
were coated with Day-Glo orange and black and Day-Glo yellow and black, respec- 
tively. The mylar discs were coated with aluminum foil on one side and a diffuse 
reflecting material  on the other. The balloon was tethered to the spacecraft by a 
6-pound tes t  nylon line measuring 100 feet in length which was deployed from a 
spinning reel. When the balloon had been fully deployed, the line w a s  entirely 
stripped from the ree l  but remained attached to a small  strain gage mounted in 
the bottom of the balloon container. Continuous strain-gage measurements were 
to be recorded on board the spacecraft until the drag tes t  was completed. The 
balloon was then to be jettisoned and the rate and distance of separation between 
the spacecraft and balloon were to be estimated by the astronaut. However, the 
balloon did not inflate completely and did not jettison. Therefore, drag measure- 
ments and rate and distance of separation of the balloon from the spacecraft were 
not obtained. 
Test  results: At balloon deployment, the astronaut reported seeing the mylar 
discs spread out and quickly disappear. H i s  first impression was that the balloon 
had broken free from the spacecraft; however, the object he w a s  tracking w a s  one 
of the balsa blocks. He observed this block for about 20 seconds, at which time 
the partially inflated balloon came into view. These observations were verified 
by pictures taken by the astronaut. 
During the towed phase, the following results were obtained from astronaut 
observations, photographs, and the onboard data tape: 
1. 
near 0"-0"-0"  attitude. 
mentation, since the gyros w e r e  caged at the time. Attitude ra tes  were noted in 
all three axes during and after deployment, but the effect of these ra tes  cannot 
be conclusively deter mined. 
Pilot comments indicated that deployment occurred with the spacecraft 
These attitudes cannot be confirmed by onboard instru- 
2. The strain-gage instrumentation and the squib-firing system appeared to 
work well. Strain-gage calibrations also checked well with previous ground checks. 
3. The onboard tape indicated that in-and-out oscillations occurred following 
deployment and spacecraft attitude changes. These oscillations developed because 
of the inherent elasticity of the balloon and nylon line. 
aluminum-foil shock absorber was included in the ejected balloon (fig. 29). 
simulation tests showed that about 90 percent of the energy imparted to the balloon 
during deployment was absorbed by the shock absorber. 
However, an annealed 
Ground 
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4. Pilot comments and flight photographs showed that the balloon shape tended 
to be irregular and oblong, and appeared to be about 6 to 8 inches in c ross  section. 
5. The astronaut described the balloon motion as being completely random in 
nature. These random motions may have been caused by large changes in space- 
craft attitude which occurred after deployment. However, uneven aerodynamic 
loads which likely existed on the irregular balloon shape would also be expected to 
contribute to this random motion. Onboard comments by the astronaut did indicate, 
however, that during the portion of both the second and third orbital passes when 
dynamic pressure was increasing, balloon motions tended to become more stable. 
6. Approximately 35 minutes after balloon deployment, the astronaut initiated 
a ser ies  of control maneuvers to check the spacecraft control system. 
gage measurements indicated that fouling of the tethering line occurred during this 
period. This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that subsequent space- 
craft maneuvers were not registered on the strain-gage system. 
The strain- 
7. At approximately 03: 14:00, the astronaut attempted balloon jettison, but 
the balloon did not release from the spacecraft. However, the onboard strain-gage 
recording indicated a drop in gage output from the level it had held since probable 
fouling to the output level of the unloaded gage. This drop, which constituted a 
change of only 2 to 3 percent in gage output, does provide a positive indication 
that the jettison squib fired and that the tethering line w a s  severed. 
8. Only the Day-Glo orange and the uncoated aluminum foil were visible to 
the astronaut, and these a r e  the only colors that appear in the photographs. There- 
fore, an effective evaluation of the colors could not be made on this flight. 
Summary: Analysis of the experimental results indicates that the balloon de- 
ployment, jettison, and instrumentation systems functioned satisfactorily during 
flight. Since the balloon failed to inflate properly at deployment, no useful drag 
and visual observation data were obtained. 
attitude after balloon deployment, as well as the irregular shape of the partially 
inflated balloon, probably accounted for the random motion of the balloon observed 
during flight. Effective evaluation of the various colors was not possible since 
only par t  of the balloon was exposed. 
High ra tes  of change in spacecraft 
Zero-gravity liquid behavior. - This experiment was a joint effort of two NASA 
Centers, the Lewis Research Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center. 
sign and development of the experiment were based on information obtained in the 
Lewis Research Center drop-tower test  program. 
mary interest in the experiment involved a desire to control liquid ullage in the 
orbital-rendezvous fuel transfer and long-term propellant storage operations. 
Manned Spacecraft Center's interest stemmed from a desire to utilize this same 
phenomenon to eliminate the need for propulsion-stage ullage rockets and bladders 
in attitude control tankage of manned spacecraft. 
The de- 
Lewis Research Center's pr i -  
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Objectives: The main purpose of the zero-gravity experiment is two-fold: 
1. To determine the ability of the ullage control surface to maintain a stable 
liquid-vapor interface during acceleration disturbances experienced by a space- 
craft during propulsive and reentry maneuvers. 
2. To determine the steady-state interface configuration and to measure the 
time required for  the capillary control surface to position the interface at the 
start of zero gravity and after being disturbed by the ignition of the retrorockets. 
Description of the experiment: The apparatus consisted of a glass sphere 
3 
8 (fig. 30) approximately 3- inches in diameter containing a capillary tube, 2 inches 5 in length and 1- inches in  diameter. Three semicircular holes measuring 16 inch 
in diameter were cut into the base of the circumference of the capillary. The 
sphere was encased in an aluminum and a plexiglass half section and suspended by 
four plexiglass tabs cemented to  the glass sphere. The sphere contained 60 milli- 
l i t e rs  of fluid, which w a s  20 percent of the actual volume of the sphere. The fluid 
consisted of a mixture of distilled water, green dye, aerosol solution, and silicone, 
with a resultant surface tension of 32 dyne/cm. 
1 
4 
Discussion: The pilot-observer camera film used to photograph the experiment 
was subjected to salt-water contact for approximately 36 hours after landing and 
prior to i ts  reaching Rochester, New York, for developing. 
water made the film difficult to read for accurate data purposes. However, the 
film data are sufficient as a rough approximation and confirm the drop-tower test  
results. 
The effect of salt 
Spacecraft separation occurred at  00:05:12.2 after lift-off. The liquid in the 
sphere was first observed to move at 00:05:14, and the capillary appeared to be 
completely filled at 00:05:26. During the spacecraft turnaround maneuver, the 
liquid remained in the capillary. 
the meniscus can be seen in the capillary during the daylight portions of the flight. 
At no time did it appear that the capillary meniscus was lost because of attitude 
control operations. 
Reading the clock on the film is difficult, although 
Retrofire was conducted from approximately 4:33:10 to 4:33:32, with the capil- 
lary emptying at 4:33:13 under 0.35g acceleration. The liquid began to refill the 
capillary at 4:33:39 and this operation appeared to have been completed at 4:33:51. 
The capillary emptied at 4:45:53 during the reentry phase, which w a s  after the 
0.5g point. 
g loading that caused the collapse of the meniscus. 
The accuracy of the onboard accelerometer is not enough to obtain the 
Maximum angular acceleration of 0. Ollg in pitch, 0.0055g in yaw, and 0.0033g 
in roll  during utilization of the reaction control system was experienced during the 
flight. Although the meniscus appeared to move slightly under these angular accel- 
erations, the level of the meniscus to the standpipe appeared to  remain unchanged. 
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The astronaut visually observed the experiment at 3:19:43 hours, and he confirmed 
that the meniscus completely filled the standpipe and that no oscillations of the 
meniscus or bubbles in the liquid were evident. 
Results and conclusions: The results of the experiment fully confirm classical 
capillary-action theory and serve to complement the results of the Lewis Research 
Center drop-tower tests. 
The ability of the capillary to maintain a stable fluid position during angular 
accelerations imposed by the reaction control system indicates that this method of 
ullage control is valid within the loading range involved. The results obtained dur- 
ing this experiment will  be extrapolated to other liquids, particularly propellants, 
in accordance with the general laws governing each specific fluid: namely, the 
surface tension, fluid temperature, and the capillary tube diameter. Although the 
film data were of poor quality, due t o  salt-water effects, the results of the zero- 
gravity experiment have enhanced and extended the knowledge of liquid behavior in 
a weightless environment. 
Photographic studies. - 
~ - ~ ~ _ _  
Horizon definition: Dr. Maxwell Peterson at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology requested that photographs be taken of the daylight horizon through a 
dual blue and red filter. It was desired to obtain definition of the earth-horizon 
limb fo r  application to spacecraft navigation system design. Eastman SO130 film 
was  used for this purpose. This film was intended to provide a measure of the 
intensity of light scattering as a function of wavelength and altitude. The pilot 
exposed 26 frames of usable quality, with some losses during film change. One 
of these photographs is illustrated in figure 31. 
Meteorological: The Meteorological Satellite Laboratory of the U. S. Weather 
Bureau requested that the pilot take photographs using Tri-X and infrared sensitive 
film through a five-filter unit. The purpose of this experiment was to obtain in- 
formation on the best wavelengths for  meteorological satellite photography. The 
film and filter were taken aboard the spacecraft by the pilot, but time did not per-  
mit completion of the experiment. 
General color photography: Thirty feet of Eastman color negative film were 
provided for the pilot to take color films of the sunlit Earth with a 35" hand-held 
camera. 
Photographs of the launch vehicle and balloon were taken to verify the astro- 
naut's observations and provide information for simulation studies. Fourteen pic - 
tures  were taken of the partially inflated balloon, and fifteen pictures were taken 
of the launch vehicle. 
Photographs of African and North American land masses were requested by 
the Theoretical Division of Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). These photographs 
were requested to build up a catalog of photographs of various physiographic fea- 
tures of the earth to be used as reference material for studies of other planetary 
74 
surfaces and for detection of meteorite impact features on the Earth. The pilot 
took 13 frames showing the African land mass,  and these exposures were forwarded 
to GSFC. 
Photographs of cloud formations a r e  to be used by scientists of the U. S. Weather 
Bureau Meteorological Satellite Laboratory in studies of weather formations and 
for comparison with Ti ros  data. Ninety-sk photographs showing cloud formations 
were obtained, and these exposures were forwarded to the U. S. Weather Bureau. 
The color layers at the horizon at sunset may provide information as to the 
light transfusion characterist ics of the upper layer of the atmosphere. 
The Theoretical Physics Division of GSFC requested photographs for this pur- 
pose, and the pilot obtained 18 photographs of the sunset horizon. 
Theoretical calculations indicate that the Sun should appear flattened just before 
setting and just after rising. Photographs of the Sun at these t imes were requested 
by the Theoretical Physics Division of the GSFC. The pilot made two excellent 
photographs of the Sun at the horizon, and these were forwarded to GSFC for eval- 
uation. The results of this evaluation a r e  discussed in reference 2. 
Photographs were requested in order to derive information on the size, bright- 
ness, and speed of motion of the particles which Astronaut John H. Glenn, Jr. , r e -  
ported seeing during the MA-6 mission. The pilot exposed 19 frames in an attempt 
to photograph these particles, and an analysis of the photographs is presented in 
reference 2. 
Airglow layer observations. - During the third orbital pass  the pilot made a 
ser ies  of observations on a luminous band, visible around the horizon at night, 
which was  also reported by Astronaut Glenn. The most decisive observation was  
made with an airglow fil ter  supplied by GSFC. The filter transmits a narrow band 
of wavelengths, approximately 11 Angstrom units wide at the half-power point and 
centered st the wavelength of the strongest radiation of the night airglow (5577 Ang- 
strom). A detailed evaluation and discussion of the observations a r e  presented in 
reference 2. 
Ground-flare visibility experiment. - The major objectives of this experiment 
were: to determine the capability of the astronaut while in orbit, to observe a 
ground light of high intensity, and to evaluate visibility from the spacecraft at 
various ranges and slant angles through the atmosphere. This experiment was  
also intended to provide a quantitative measure of atmospheric attenuation of 
light. 
Description of the experiment: The experiment was conducted by using two 
items of equipment. The first of these i tems was a group of one-million-candlepower 
f lares  located near the Woomera tracking station. A total of ten flares was to be 
used, four during the first orbital pass  and three during each succeeding pass. 
1 Each flare had a burning time of approximately 1- minutes. These f lares  were 2 
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scheduled to be ignited in ser ies  approximately 60 seconds apart, with the first 
flare ignition occurring near the point of closest approach of the spacecraft to the 
station. The second item of equipment to be used in flight consisted of a photometer 
1 which was  4 inches in diameter, - inch thick, and 4.3 ounces in weight. 
tometer filter varied from 0.1 neutral density (20.4 percent light reduction) to 
3.8 neutral density (99.98 percent light reduction). 
The pho- 4 
Results: On the first orbital pass over Australia, four f lares  were ignited 
simultaneously. However, because of the extensive cloud cover (approximately 
8 - at 3000 feet), the f la res  were not visible to the astronaut. Therefore, the ex- 10 
periment was discontinued for the remainder of the mission and no results were 
obtained. 
AEROMEDICAL ANALYSIS 
The aeromedical studies of the MA-? mission continued the basic program 
outline in previous manned mission reports. 
groups: clinical examinations, physiological observations, and mission observa- 
tions. 
The studies a r e  separated into three 
1. Clinical examinations consist of standard medical procedures, including 
repeated examinations by physicians; routine and special laboratory tests;  X-rays; 
and special tests,  such as retinal photography and tests of the body's balancing 
mechanism. The preflight and postflight clinical examinations a r e  performed as 
close together in time as is permitted by recovery operations to detect any physi- 
cal  changes resulting from the space-flight experience. 
2. Physiological observations consist of data gathered by the sensor systems 
adapted to both the spacecraft and the pilot. Since the pilot's physiological r e -  
sponses cannot be completely separated from his environment, the discussion in 
the Environmental Control System section of this report  complements the aero- 
medical studies. 
3. Mission observations a r e  a report of the aeromedical experiments and 
other pertinent observations that relate to body functions in  the space environment. 
The preflight aeromedical studies were conducted in order  to ascertain the 
astronaut's state of health and his medical f i tness as related to his capability for 
orbital flight. 
aeromedical monitors with the astronaut's normal physiological responses. 
Following recovery, the biomedical data were analyzed and compared to the pre- 
flight data to disclose any effects which may have resulted from the flight. 
The accumulation of such data before the flight familiarized the 
76 
1 1 1 1  I 
I 
I 1 1 1  
Clinical Examinations 
Clinical observations were accomplished through several  medical examinations 
and before most of the preflight activities listed in table X. Previous annual physi- 
cal  examinations and the pilot's medical records were reviewed. 
Clinical history. - The aeromedical history of the MA-7 mission began on 
April 30, 1962, with the astronaut's arr ival  at Cape Canaveral for preflight prep- 
arations. A summary of his activities from this date until his return to Cape 
Canaveral following the flight is presented in table X. Throughout this period, 
his physical and mental health remained excellent. A special diet w a s  used for 
19 days before the flight. Re-scheduling of the launch date caused two starts on 
the low-residue diet before the f i n a l  diet began. The pilot maintained his physical 
condition through distance running and daily workouts on a trampoline. 
On the morning of the flight, the pilot was f ree  of medical complaints, men- 
tally composed, and ready for the mission. Breakfast consisted of filet mignon, 
poached eggs, strained orange juice, toast, and coffee. The events of the aero- 
medical countdown a r e  presented in table XI. 
of 1050 cc of water and sweetened ice tea. He voided three t imes before launch. 
The preflight fluid intake consisted 
After landing, the astronaut stated, "My status was very good, but I was tired. l 1  
The fatigue at landing is normal and attributable to the heat load associated with 
the elevated suit temperature and humidity, the activity required to car ry  out the 
flight plan, and the emotional s t r e s s  associated with a flight. Several postlanding 
events also contributed to his fatigue. After he entered the liferaft, he realized 
that it w a s  upside down. He left the liferaft, held to the spacecraft, righted the 
raft, and once again climbed aboard. His neck dam w a s  still stowed, and he de- 
ployed it with difficulty after his second entry into the raft. An undetermined, but 
moderate, quantity of water had entered his pressure suit. 
Astronaut Carpenter drank water and ate food from his survival kit during 
the 3-hour period awaiting helicopter pickup. 
Throughout the debriefing period he talked logically about his space-flight ex- 
periences and remained alert .  
Physical examinations. - Abbreviated physical examinations were accomplished 
pr ior  to most of the planned activities in the prelaunch period. No variations from 
previous examinations were revealed. Later the aeromedical debriefing team con- 
ducted comprehensive medical examinations in internal medicine, neurology, op- 
thalmology, aviation medicine, psychiatry, and radiology and made clinical labor- 
atory studies. 
modified caloric test  and the balance test  on successively more narrow rails), 
electrocardiogram, electroencephalogram, and audiogram. The astronaut w a s  in 
excellent health and showed no significant change from previous examinations. 
These examinations included the special labyrinthine studies (a 
On the night prior to flight, the pilot obtained approximately 3 hours of sound 
He was given the preflight examination by the sleep. No sedative was required. 
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same specialists in aviation medicine, internal medicine, and neuropsychiatry. He 
had an entirely normal mental status. 
The prelaunch and postlaunch physical findings a r e  shown in table MI. 
After a 3-hour period in the liferaft, the astronaut was examined in the helicopter. 
The physician reported as follows: "He pulled the tight rubber collar from his neck 
and cut a hole in his rubber pressure suit sock (left) to drain out sea  water. 
anxious to talk and to discuss his experiences, and cooperative and well controlled. 
He talked with the helicopter pilot, paced about a bit, and finally relaxed as one nor- 
mally would after an extended mental and physical exercise. " The physical examin- 
ation aboard the aircraf t  ca r r i e r  revealed that he was in good health. 
his arr ival  at Grand Turk Island, the internist member of the debriefing team stated, 
"He entered the dispensary with the air and the greeting of a man who had been away 
f rom his friends for a long time. He was alert ,  desiring to  tell of his adventure and 
seemed very fit. . . his appearance and movements suggested strength and excellent 
neuromuscular coordination. I' A brief medical examination was undertaken about an 
hour after the pilot's arrival.  The following morning, the comprehensive examina- 
tion was made by the same group of specialists who had examined him on May 17, 
1962. The postflight modified caloric test  on May 25 revealed an approximate 1.4" C 
r i se  in threshold temperature in the right ea r  and 1.8" C in the left. The rail tes ts  
of dynamic and static equilibrium showed a moderate postflight increase of the pilot's 
ability to stand with his eyes closed. The significance of these preflight and post- 
flight differences is unknown. The aeromedical debriefing was completed on the 
second morning following the flight. The results of these examinations a r e  presented 
in tables MI and MII. A mild asymptomatic urethrit is  was present during both pre-  
flight and postflight periods. Treatment was  withheld until after the flight. 
small postflight r ise  in hematocrit, coupled with a 6-pound weight loss,  suggests mild 
dehydration; however, this did not jeopardize the pilot's health. 
He was 
Concerning 
The 
Aside from moderate fatigue, based upon the long hours of work and a few hours 
of sleep, the astronaut remained in excellent health throughout the debriefing period. 
He returned to Cape Canaveral on May 27, 1962, ready to "do it again. " 
Physiological Data 
Physiological data sources for the MA-7 mission were the same as those re -  
ported in previous Mercury manned flights. Data from the Mercury-Atlas three- 
orbit centrifuge simulation, from preflight pad activities (when spacecraft power 
was available), and from the countdown all serve for comparison with flight data. 
The reports from the range medical monitors, the onboard continuous biosensor 
records, the voice transmissions, and the pilot-observer camera a r e  essential 
sources. Results of special inflight tes t s  and the debriefing provided additional 
information. 
Biosensor system. - The biosensor system consists of two sets  of electrocardio- 
graphic leads, ECG I (axillary) and ECG 11 (sternal); a rectal  temperature thermis- 
tor ;  a respiration rate thermistor; and the BPMS. 
78 
The only biosensor change from the MA-6 mission was the replacement of the 
manual BPMS with a semiautomatic system. The BPMS is a device for indirect 
measurement of arterial pressure that utilizes the same principle as in clinical 
sphygmomanometry. 
stethoscope of the clinical method replaced by a microphone positioned under the 
cuff. The microphone signal exits from the suit through the bioconnector and enters  
the amplifier in the blood-pressure unit. The BPMS amplifier consists of a shielded 
preamplifier and two high-gain amplifiers which determine the response character- 
istics. Each amplifier is designed to have greatly attenuated response outside the 
32 to 40 cps pass band by means of resistor-capacitor filtering circuits in each 
feedback loop. The amplifier output is gated so that there is no output signal unless 
a signal of sufficient amplitude is present; and this gating results in a marked reduc - 
tion in the output noise level for improved readability of the signal. 
is contained in the BPMS controller unit, which also includes the pressure transducer 
and its batteries, the voltage regulator, and associated mixing and limiting circuits. 
This system is actuated by manually depressing a switch on the spacecraft instru- 
ment panel which initiates the complete 118-second cycle. The cycle includes switch- 
ing the telemetry channel from ECG I1 to the BPMS, cuff pressurization and bleed 
down over a 30-second period, and return of the telemetry to ECG 11. The system 
contains a pressurized oxygen source, with regulator, for cuff inflation and an 
orifice which relieves the cuff pressure into the suit circuit. The blood-pressure 
transmitting and recording procedure w a s  the same as that in the MA-6 mission. 
In order to find the ar ter ia l  pressure,  the points of inception and cessation of the 
microphone signal on the cuff pressure signal, the systolic and diastolic pressures,  
must be identified. 
In the BPMS, a similar inflatable cuff is employed, with the 
The amplifier 
All sensors operated normally during the countdown except for intermittent 
signals from the BPMS, 34 minutes prior to lift-off. 
reoccurred several  t imes during the flight. 
during flight were also very errat ic ,  the conclusion w a s  that the data were not re -  
ducible to the actual blood pressure of the astronaut. 
problems and postflight tes t s  a r e  contained in the Instrumentation section of this 
report. 
These intermittent signals 
Since the blood-pressure data obtained 
A discussion of the BPMS 
During the flight, body movements and profuse perspiration caused a large 
number of ECG artifacts, and the record was  interpretable throughout. 
The telemetered body temperature data were errat ic  from approximately 1 hour 
1 
2 to 2- hours after launch. However, other medical data available indicated that the 
body temperature readout w a s  erroneous. The e r ra t ic  period is shown as a shaded 
a rea  in figure 32. The values at all other times a r e  considered valid. 
The respiration rate sensor provided useful preflight information, but inflight 
coverage was minimal. 
The pilot-observer camera film was of poor technical quality as a result of i ts  
postlanding immersion in sea  water, and was therefore of limited usefulness. One 
of the better quality f rames is reproduced in figure 30. 
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Preflight physiological data. - The preflight activities monitored for the 
MA-7 mission, together-with time durations, a r e  shown in the following table: 
Event 
Simulated launch, MA-6, January 17, 1962 
Simulated flight no. 2, April 30, 1962 
Simulated launch, MA-7, May 10, 1962 
Simulated flight no. 3, May 15, 1962 
Launch countdown, MA-?', May 24, 1962 
-. 
Duration 
5 hours 
4 hours 
3 hours 
4 hours 
3 hours 
12 minutes 
0 minutes 
15 minutes 
50 minutes 
1 minute 
I Total 1 20 hours 
.. 
In figure 33 a r e  shown the values of respiration rate,  heart rate,  blood pressure,  
body temperature, and suit-inlet temperature recorded during the MA-? launch 
countdown. Figure 34 is a sample of actual preflight data recorded during the 
countdown at T-68 minutes. Values for the same physiological functions obtained 
from simulated launches a r e  also plotted in figure 33 at points coincident with sig- 
nificant events. Heart and respiration minute ra tes  were obtained by counting 
for 30 seconds every 3 minutes until 10 minutes before lift-off, at which time 
counts were made for 30 seconds every minute. All values recorded a r e  within 
physiologically acceptable ranges. 
Examination of the ECG wave form from all preflight data revealed normal 
sinus arrhythmia (variation in rate),  occasional premature atrial contractions 
(early beats from normal excitation area) ,  and r a r e  premature ventricular con- 
tractions (early beats from an excitation a rea  lower in the cardiac musculature). 
These variations a r e  normal. A summary of blood-pressure data is shown in 
table XIV. 
During approximately 50 minutes in the transfer van on launch day, the astro- 
naut's heart rate varied from 56 to 70 beats per  minute, with a mean of 65. 
respiration rate varied from 8 to 20 cycles per minute, with a mean of 14. 
ECG reading was normal. Additional physiological values were not obtained. 
The 
The 
Flight physiological data. - Figure 32 shows the respiration rate,  heart rate, 
body temperature, and suit-inlet temperature during the flight, with values from 
the Mercury-Atlas, three-orbit centrifuge simulation presented and correlated 
with flight events. 
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Heart rate, respiration rate, and body temperature data a r e  summarized in the 
following table: 
Data 
sources 
All pre- 
flight data 
Countdown 
Flight 
Launch 
Orbital 
Entry 
Heart rate 
- 
No. of 
values 
408 
92 
7 
94 
115 
Mean 
57 
62 
87 
70 
84 
Range 
42-84 
50-84 
82-96 
60-94 
72-104 
Respiration 
No. of 
values 
3 54 
75 
5 
(a) 
(a) 
Range 
5-32 
6-26 
10-20 
(a) 
(a) 
Body tem 
No. of 
values 
128 
57 
4 
60 
15 
- 
Mean 
99.3 
97.8 
98 
99.9 
100.4 
erature 
Range 
98.3-101.5 
96.8-98.2 
98 
98-100.6 
100.2-100.5 
Not obtained. a 
The heart rate increased from 84 beats per minute to the maximum of 96 beats 
per minute between lift-off and T+30 seconds. This increase was not associated with 
maximum acceleration. The orbital phase of the mission resulted in a weightless 
period of 4 hours 30 minutes. The highest heart rate recorded during the entry 
phase was  104 beats per minute, which occurred immediately following the highly 
oscillatory period just after reentry. All heart rates were within accepted ranges. 
Examination of the ECG wave form recorded during the flight showed an en- 
tirely normal record except for the following variations: A single premature atrial 
contraction (PAC) occurred 13 seconds after SECO, followed by a beat showing 
suppression of the sinus pacemaker. A second PAC took place 1 minute 15 seconds 
before retrofire. At 04:48:19, 21 seconds prior to maximum reentry acceleration, 
a number of cardiac events occurred during a 43-second period. These events be- 
gan with a PAC, followed by an aberrant QRS, a compensatory pause, and then a 
normal beat. Twelve seconds later there was  a third PAC with aberrant conduction 
followed by a normal cycle. A fourth PAC occurred 5 seconds later with a less 
aberrant complex. An atrial fusion beat followed. After three normal beats, there 
were two sets of nodal beats. The first set  contained four nodal beats followed by 
three normal beats. The second set  contained five nodal beats. The remainder of 
the record was  entirely normal. During the period of maximum entry acceleration, 
the astronaut made a special effort to continue talking. The increased respiratory 
effort associated with continued speech could have produced these changes. These 
irregularities did not compromise effective performance. Figure 34 illustrates the 
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appearance of physiological data from the onboard tape after 1 minute of weightless- 
ness. Figure 35 shows the physiological data with the premature atrial contraction 
at 04:32:06 mission elapsed time. 
The preceding data summary shows a 2.6" F overall increase in  body tempera- 
ture. This increase is physiologically tolerable and is believed to  have resulted in 
par t  f rom an increased suit-inlet temperature. The trend of gradually increasing 
body temperature has been observed in previous manned flights. The summary 
does not include telemetered body temperature readings taken from approximately 
1 hour to 22 hours after launch. The readings were e r ra t ic  during this period and 
considered to be unreliable. It should be noted that the astronaut stated during this 
errat ic  period that he was comfortable and could not believe the telemetry data. 
This onboard assessment was helpful in determining the significance of the readings. 
1 
Mission Observations 
The MA-7 mission differed from the MA-6 mission in the following respects: 
1. Bite-size food cubes carr ied in a non-rigid container were included, in- 
stead of semi-solid foods in collapsible tubes. 
2. The 5 .0  gram xylose tablet w a s  taken orally after 2 hours 36 minutes of 
exposure to zero g, rather than at the beginning of flight. 
3. Water w a s  consumed several times during the flight. 
4. Moderate overheating w a s  a factor during the flight, whereas postflight 
environmental heat s t r e s s  was  present in the MA-6 mission. 
5. Food and water were consumed during the 3-hour postflight survival ex- 
perience. 
Overall, the astronaut stated that he had anticipated greater physical s t r e s s  
during the flight than was experienced. 
and reminded him of his sensations while skin diving. 
new environment. To test  vestibular sensitivity, he performed rather violent 
head maneuvers on several  occasions while weightless. 
no disorientation or  vertigo. He also moved his head during roll  maneuvers and 
noted no Coriolis effect. Often he had no positional reference, but lack of such 
reference did not confuse him. 
Weightlessness was a pleasant experience 
He oriented rapidly to his 
These movements caused 
The pilot experienced a momentary illusion involving his position in relation 
to the special equipment storage kit. 
orbit attitude, he was surprised to see that the equipment kit was  vertical with 
respect to the horizon. During mission simulations in the procedures trainer,  
the equipment kit had always been parallel to the horizon. This illusion was very 
brief and caused the pilot no subsequent difficulty in the operation of the spacecraft. 
At one time when he was sitting upright in 
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. . .. . . 
Vision and hearing were normal. He readily estimated distances by the relative 
size of objects. Colors and brightness of objects were normal. Tactile approxima- 
tion, with his eyes closed, was unchanged from that experienced in the ground en- 
vironment. 
craft controls. 
He reported no tendency to overshoot or  undershoot in reaching space- 
He felt that bladder sensation was normal while he was weightless, although 
he is not certain that he urinated during the flight. He had no urge to defecate. 
The pilot did not feel t ired or sleepy during the flight. He stated that he was frus- 
trated by the s t r e s s  of time and his inability to control suit temperature. He re- 
ported that he was hot from the end of the first orbital pass until the middle of the 
third orbital pass. ECS readouts confirm this subjective evaluation. 
ienced no other heat s t ress .  
He exper- 
He used no medications at any time during the mission. 
During the flight, the pilot consumed solid food, water, and a xylose tablet with- 
out difficulty. Once the food was in his mouth, chewing and swallowing were normal. 
3 Taste and smell  were normal. 4 
a special coating, packed in a plastic bag, and stored in the equipment kit. Some of 
the food cubes had crumbled, and the pilot reported that the resulting particles were 
an aspiration hazard (the crumbing of food probably occurred prior to o r  during 
launch). The elevated cabin temperature caused the chocolate to melt. The amount 
of water consumed from the mission water supply was 1213 cc,  of which approxi- 
mately 60 percent w a s  consumed in flight, and the remainder was  drunk by the astro- 
naut after landing. 
of the indefinite time of urination. 
The solid food w a s  in the form of --inch cubes with 
The xylose experiment was  unsuccessful on this flight because 
Calibrated exercise was performed without difficulty at  03:59:29 ground elapsed 
time. 
was omitted. A bungee cord with a 16-pound pull through a distance of 6 inches was  
used as an exerciser.  Use of this exerciser caused an increase in heart rate of 
12 beats per minute, with a return to previous values within 1 minute. 
pressure readings taken at this time could not be interpreted. 
strated the ability of nominal exercise to elevate the pilot's heart rate. 
response to exercise was  evidence of a reactive cardiovascular system. 
Because of the overheated condition of the pilot, an ear l ier  scheduled exercise 
The blood- 
This response demon- 
This pulse 
Attempts to produce autokinesis (illusion of vision due to involuntary eye muscle 
movements) were made on two occasions. 
tes ts  were inconclusive. 
Autokinesis was not produced, but the 
Conclusions 
1. The postflight clinical examinations of Astronaut M. Scott Carpenter re -  
vealed no significant change from the preflight findings. 
2. Aspiration of the crumbled food presents a danger to the astronaut. 
3. The inflight pilot responses were within acceptable physiological ranges. 
No compromise of pilot performance w a s  noted. 
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4. The information from the two ECG leads provided invaluable correlation 
data for blood pressure  analysis. The evaluation of any ECG abnormality o r  artifact 
requires crosschecking of the two leads. 
5. The aberrant ECG tracing during entry was most probably the result of a 
respiratory maneuver and talking during maximum acceleration. 
6. An immediate postlanding pilot-status report  is necessary for intelligent 
use of medical personnel in the recovery forces.  
7. Sensory perceptions during the flight, as reported by the astronaut, were 
normal and equivalent to those under lg. 
8. Additional time for remote-site postflight examination and debriefing would 
be beneficial. 
ASTRONAUT FLIGHT ACTIVITIES 
Pilot activities during orbital flight consisted of observations, experiments, 
and flight maneuvers. The activities were planned to provide the maximum infor- 
mation in  the time available. The observations included pilot recorded comments, 
photographs, and in-flight studies of the earth 's  surface and atmosphere and celes- 
tial phenomena. Experiments in which the pilot actively participated consisted of 
measurements with a tethered balloon and tes ts  to evaluate the physiological func- 
tions of a man in a space environment. Flight maneuvers were devised to deter- 
mine the astronaut's ability to control the spacecraft under varying conditions of 
attitudes and to recover from a nonstandard attitude maneuver. The construction 
of the flight plan was based on an 08:OO a. m. e. s. t. launch, which determined the 
timing of tasks to be done during daylight and to be done at night. A nominal tra- 
jectory was assumed with regard to station passage and the apogee-perigee points, 
which also affected the timing of certain in-flight observations and experiments. 
The mission produced successful measurements of the altitude and thickness 
of the haze layer and proved its origin to be an expected airglow phenomenon. The 
extensive drifting flight in the third orbital pass to conserve fuel, the ingestion of 
water and bite-size food, and the horizon-definition photographs required for the 
design of the Apollo navigation and guidance system- -all provided additional usable 
results applicable to future space flight. Extensive cloud cover over Australia 
prevented the observation of f lares  or the lights from cities and Darwin airport. 
Partial inflation compromised the success of the tethered balloon experiment, and 
instrumentation problems in the blood-pressure system precluded complete re -  
sults of calibrated work at zero g. 
The scientific experiments specified in the flight plan a r e  discussed in detail 
in the Scientific Experiments section of this report. Spacecraft attitude control 
activities specified in the flight plan and the scientific equipment on board the 
spacecraft a r e  discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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Spacecraft Attitude Control and Flight Procedures 
The major portion of the pilot's performance in controlling the spacecraft 
attitudes could not be quantitatively analyzed because: 
1. The horizon scanners appear to have malfunctioned. 
2. There was a considerable period of time in which the spacecraft attitudes 
were either beyond the horizon scanner field of view and/or the gyros were in 
the caged position. 
3. The pilot deviated slightly from procedures rehearsed prior to and during 
the pilot preflight preparation period. 
The pilot's attitude control activities a r e  summarized in table XV. The func- 
tion and operation of the RCS a r e  discussed in the Spacecraft Control System sec- 
tion. The attitude control tasks a r e  discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Turnaround maneuver. - The purpose of accomplishing the turnaround maneuver, 
0 by using the FBW control mode, was to conserve fuel and still complete the turn- 
around within approximately the nominal time period required by the ASCS system. 
Approximately 1.60 pounds of H 0 w a s  used during the MA-7 FBW turnaround, 2 2  
whereas over 5 pounds of control fuel was used during the MA-6 ASCS turnaround. 
Generally, the turnaround maneuver w a s  accomplished satisfactorily except that 
the pilot was slow in assuming proper retroattitude (fig. 36). Since he had a "go" 
condition, he had no immediate need to assume the proper retroattitude quickly; 
and he therefore positioned the spacecraft to track and photograph the sustainer 
stage of the launch vehicle. 
Sustainer tracking. - This task was designed to determine the limits of the 
pilot-spacecraft combination in  tracking a moving object at varying separation dis- 
tances and to investigate the visual limitation associated with a receding object in 
space. The pilot, by using FBW mode, w a s  to aline the window reticle with the 
sustainer and pitch down slowly, staying on target, until he w a s  required to return 
to orbit attitude during contact with the Canary Islands. This maneuver would nor- 
mally allow approximately 2- minutes of tracking. Results of the mission show 
that the task of taking photographs extended for a period of longer duration than had 
been expected. Although the pilot did not perform the tracking maneuver as planned, 
he commented that precision tracking of objects with small  relative motions with 
respect to the spacecraft could best be done on FBW by using low thrusters  only or, 
possibly, the lowest deflections on manual proportional control. 
1 
2 
Gyro caging and uncaging procedure. - A procedure for alining the gyro indi- 
cators  t o  the window reference was formulated and rehearsed during the preflight 
preparation period. According to the procedure, the pilot was to use the window 
and not the periscope, because of the assumption that the periscope would not be 
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available for future Mercury flights. The pilot's ability to  realine the gyro indi- 
cators t o  the window reference cannot be determined precisely because of the pitch- 
horizon-scanner malfunction. However, the data indicate that the pilot generally 
followed the planned gyro realinement procedure on the first two occasions. There- 
after he simply maneuvered to a t rue vehicle attitude by using the periscope orbital 
attitude reference scribe mark, and caged and uncaged the gyros at this point. The 
method of alining the gyros by using the periscope was more economical in both time 
and fuel expenditure than by using the window. 
Yaw maneuvering. - The pilot accomplished two 180" yaw turnarounds and sev- 
eral 90" yaw maneuvers during flight. Since these maneuvers were accomplished 
only for  the purposes of photography and observation, and not as precision maneu- 
vers, no attempt was made to  analyze them quantitatively. The preferred method 
of yaw-attitude control on the daylight side was by reference to  ground terrain 
drift. At night this type of reference is available only when the Moon is sufficiently 
bright to illuminate the clouds. The preferred method of yaw determination avail- 
able at all t imes on the night side is by orientation to  known stars that lie close to 
the orbital plane. Star charts were provided for this purpose. The pilot reported 
difficulty in finding cues for  determining yaw. However, his general comments 
during debriefing indicated that moonlight o r  ground lights are necessary for the 
terrestr ia l  yaw check. 
An attempt was made to establish that star patterns can be recognized in both 
The pilot was able to iden- 
the day and night sectors of an orbit. Through knowledge of constellation patterns, 
the pilot was able to use the stars for yaw reference. 
tify successfully several constellations on the dark side of the Earth. Star naviga- 
tion was  not attempted during the day sectors. 
were noted during the f i rs t  orbital pass  a t  about 19 and 35 minutes after sunset, 
respectively. Scorpio was noted during the third orbital pass  at about 27 minutes 
after sunset. The brightest s ta r  in each of these constellations is approximately 
2. 5 magnitude. 
experiment. The pilot reported that the s t a r  navigation device was very useful. 
However, he did have difficulty in reading the charts because of their reflective 
surface and the cabin lighting arrangement. The pilot stated that he saw fewer 
s t a r s  than he had expected while in orbit because of the reduced light transmission 
characteristics of the window and internal lighting reflections. 
Constellations Corvus and Cassiopeia 
U r s a  Major (Big Dipper) was also identified prior to the haze-layer 
Drifting flight, inverted flight . - These maneuvers cannot be quantitatively 
analyzed because the gyros were caged and the horizon scanner outputs were usually 
questionable. During the flight, the pilot allowed the spacecraft to drift for a total 
of 1 hour 17 minutes, 1 hour 6 minutes of which was continuous drifting during the 
third orbital pass  to conserve fuel. The pilot reported that drifting flight was not 
disturbing and that he was not concerned when no external reference was available. 
He stated that the forward inverted attitude was desirable for orbital flight. 
Retrofire attitude control. - The pilot decided to control attitude during the 
retrorocket ignition event by using the FBW control mode, primarily because of an 
undetermined problem with the automatic stabilization control system (ASCS). 
-. .- .-...--.. --...-..a. . ... ..-.1 1 1 1 1 1  I . 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 .  I ,  I. 1,111 II 11.111 I 111 I I1 I I 1  I I I I IIIII.III-1111111 
Because of the apparent attitude control problem leading to  the deviation in impact 
point, a review of the pilot's activities prior to and during the retrofire period is 
presented. 
At approximately 11 minutes prior to retrosequence, the pilot discovered a 
source of the glowing particles reported during the MA-6 mission. 
photographing these particles delayed the accomplishment of equipment stowage 
and completion of the pre-retrofire checklists. At this time, the pilot was reminded 
to pull his mamual fuel handle out, thereby enabling the manual control system to 
serve as a backup to the automatic control system. At 5 minutes prior to retrofire, 
he determined that his gyro indications were wrong and quickly rechecked his FBW 
and M P  control modes. At 2 minutes prior to  retrofire, he again checked his auto- 
matic control system and decided to use the window and periscope in conjunction 
with FBW to control retrofire. At 30 seconds prior to retrofire, he again checked 
his ASCS orientation mode upon ground request. 
pitch and he quickly switched back to FBW and repositioned the spacecraft to retro- 
f i re  attitude by using external reference. Because the MP control mode was also 
enabled, he used double authority during this maneuver and the subsequent retro- 
f i re  maneuver. At 12 seconds prior to retrofire, he was told by the ground crew 
to maneuver to  bypass position and use manual override. The pilot had to  initiate 
retrofire manually which occurred approximately 3 seconds late, with respect to 
when it would have occurred with an automatic retrofire signal. 
Observing and 
This mode drove him down in 
Apparently, as a result of these control activities just prior to retrofire, the 
pilot began the period of retrofire with an indicated 25" e r r o r  in yaw which he grad- 
ually reduced during the course of the 22-second period of retrorocket firing 
(fig. 18). 
Fuel management. - The pilot frequently departed from recommended operational 
procedures concerning control mode switching, which resulted in a greater than 
normal fuel expenditure rate (fig. 19). The high rate of fuel usage can be attributed 
to the following: 
1. The pilot inadvertently used the high FBW thrusters. 
2. Double authority control was used on six occasions, including the retro- 
firing sequence, for a total of approximately 17 minutes. 
3. The ASCS oriented the spacecraft seven t imes (approximately 1.5 lb of 
fuel was used during each maneuver). On three of these seven occasions, the 
manfunctioning attitude reference system may possibly have caused inadvertent 
use of the orientation mode of control. 
ASCS "normal" with the gyros caged, and in one case the ground crew requested 
that he check his ASCS orientation mode just prior to retrosequence. About 
1 . 5  pounds of fuel was used each time the ASCS went into orientation mode. 
On three occasions the pilot switched to 
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Scientific Equipment 
The equipment aboard the spacecraft of the MA-7 mission and the pilot's com- 
ments regarding their  operation a r e  discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Hand-held camera. - (See fig. 37. ) A 35" Robot Recorder 36 w a s  provided. 
Its weight was reduced, a pistol-grip handle w a s  provided along with other modifi- 
cations to permit ease of operation, and a clip was provided for attachment to the 
chart holder during orbit. It was equipped with a standard back assembly and a 
30-foot film capacity magazine. 
lenses, one a 75mm, f3.5 lens, and the other a 45mm, f2.8 lens. Each lens s y s -  
tem was provided with an ultraviolet (UV-17) filter. The camera functioned well 
throughout the flight. Although the large capacity back reduced film changes to a 
minimum, changing fi lms was still necessary to accomplish specialized photography. 
The results a r e  contained in the Scientific Experiments section of this report. 
Additional equipment included two interchangeable 
Film. - The 30-foot magazine was  preloaded with Eastman Color Negative film 
(Eastman stock number 5250) and attached to the camera prior to insertion into the 
spacecraft. This film load represented a 250-exposure capability. The Massachu- 
setts  Institute of Technology provided a preloaded magazine containing a special 
film (Eastman stock number SO-130) to be used for the horizon-definition photo- 
graphs. 
experiment required a 36-exposure film load that w a s  alternately spliced from 
Tri-X and infrared film stocks. 
Super Hypan film to provide an alternate to the Eastman Color Negative film for 
photographing the particles. 
given in the Scientific Experiments section of this report. 
This film load provided approximately 70 exposures. The Weather Bureau 
Also included w a s  one 36-exposure roll  of Ansco 
The results obtained by the use of these films a re  
Filter mosaics. - (See fig. 38. ) Two filter mosaics were provided. These 
mosaics were mounted in holders designed to be inserted into the camera at the 
film plane. One was  to be used with the MIT film and the other with the Weather 
Bureau film. The MIT mosaic consisted of two equal sections of Wratten filter, 
numbers 29 and 47B. The Weather Bureau mosaic contained five equal sections 
of Wratten filter, numbers 0. 8 neutral density, 25, 47, 58, and 87. Of these, 
only the MIT mosaic was used and it performed satisfactorily. 
Photometer. - (See fig. 39. ) This device was the same type as that used during 
the MA-6 mission to view sunrise and sunset, to evaluate the pilot's capability to 
orient to the horizontal, and to serve as a high- and low-level light meter. This 
instrument was used by the pilot with satisfactory results. 
Binoculars. - (See fig. 40. ) The pilot was provided with a miniature pair of 
8 X 20 binoculars. Clips were provided to permit attachment to the chart holder 
during orbit. 
was difficult because of the viewing angle of the window. 
The pilot reported that utilization of the binoculars during flight 
Extinction photometer. - (See fig. 41. ) This device consisted of a calih-ated, 
circular,  varying density fi l ter  in a suitable mount. It was used on several occa- 
sions during the flight with satisfactory results. 
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Air glow filter. - (See fig. 42. ) This is the same device, with a modified mount, 
as that used on the MA-6 flight. It selectively passes light at the 5577A wave length. 
The device was used to view the airglow layer on the night side of the Earth. 
0 
Night adaption eye cover. - (See fig. 43. ) This device fitted the eye socket in 
such a-manner as to eliminate any direct light from reaching the eye. It was  pro- 
vided with a red lens to allow the pilot to use his left eye during the adaption period. 
The device functioned properly during the flight although complete dark adaption 
was prohibited by s t ray light within the spacecraft. 
Map booklet, star navigation device and inserts, and flight plan cards. - The 
pilot reported that the glare from the star navigation device made it difficult to use. 
The remainder of this equipment and its stowage were adequate. 
Equipment stowage. - All equipment had female Velcro applied to strategic points, 
whereas male Velcro was  applied to the stowage areas. Four equipment areas were 
provided within the spacecraft. During the launch, retrofire, and reentry phases, 
the equipment was  stowed in three locations. The equipment container located to 
the pilot's right, below the hatch, contained the 35" hand-held camera and asso- 
ciated accessories, the photometer, binoculars, and extinction photometer. The 
instrument-panel storage compartment located in the main instrument panel con- 
tained the exercise device, film, filter mosaics, airglow filter, and the night adap- 
tion eye cover. The chart holder, located below the periscope, contained the map 
booklet, star navigation device and inserts,  and the flight-plan cards.  During the 
orbital phase, the equipment was  stowed either in these locations or on the Velcro 
applied to the hatch for this purpose. The pilot reported no difficulties with stowage 
of any of the equipment. 
ASTRONAUT'S FLIGHT REPORT 
[A first-person account of the major events and personal observations during 
the MA-7 flight is presented by the pilot. Before and during powered flight, launch- 
vehicle noise and vibration were less than expected. As  in the MA-6 mission, the 
astronaut quickly adapted to weightless flight and remarked that it was more com- 
fortable and provided greater mobility than under normal gravity. Astronaut 
Carpenter also observed the space particles and the bright horizon band, previously 
reported by Astronaut John H. Glenn, J r . ,  and obtained new information on both 
phenomena. The final phases of the flight, including retrosequence, reentry, land- 
ing, and egress,  are covered in detai l4  
Launch Phase 
Insertion into the spacecraft was  accomplished without incident, except for a 
minor problem with the tiedown of the visor-seal-bottle hose to the helmet. The 
countdown went perfectly until the 45-minute weather hold. At T-10 minutes it 
was picked up again and proceeded perfectly once more until lift-off. During the 
prelaunch period I had no problems. The couch was comfortable, and I had no 
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pressure points. The length of the prelaunch period was not a problem. I believe 
I could have gone at least twice as long. Throughout this period, the launch vehicle 
was much more dormant than I had expected it to be. I did not hear the clatter that 
John Glenn had reported. Once I felt the engine gimbaling. I do not recall hearing 
the lox venting. 
When the ignition signal was given, everything became quiet. I had expected to 
feel the launch vehicle shake, some machinery start, the vernier engines light off, 
o r  to hear the lox valve make some noise, but I did not. Nothing happened until 
main engine ignition; then I began to feel the vibration. There was a little bit of 
shaking. Lift-off was unmistakable. 
About a minute and a half after lift-off, the sky changed in brightness rather 
suddenly. It was not black, but it was no longer a light blue. The noise and vibra- 
tion increased so little during maximum dynamic pressure that it would not be 
noticed unless you were looking for it. The booster engine cutoff (BECO) was very 
gentle. Three seconds later,  staging occurred. There was no mistaking staging. 
Two very definite noise cues could be heard: one was the decrease in noise level 
that accompanied the drop in acceleration; the other was associated with staging. 
At staging there was a change in the light outside the window, and I saw a wisp of 
smoke. 
At tower jettison, I felt a bigger jolt than at staging; and it was gone in a 
second. Out the window, the tower could be seen way off in the distance, heading 
straight for the horizon. It was rotating slowly, with smoke sti l l  trailing out of 
the three nozzles. Jus t  prior to BECO, I noticed a low-frequency oscillation in 
yaw. This oscillation picked up again after BECO and increased very gradually 
until sustainer engine cutoff (SECO). 
At SECO, the dropoff in acceleration was not disturbing. Two separate bangs 
could be heard: f irst ,  the clamp ring explosive bolts, and then the louder noise of 
the posigrade rockets. 
ness and absolute silence. 
The best cues to the end of powered flight were weightless- 
Orbital Flight Phase 
General flight observations. - I began the turnaround and wondered why I felt 
nothing. At this time, the angular accelerations of the spacecraft were not per-  
ceptible, and only the blackness of space could be seen through the window. The 
instruments provided the only reference. The turnaround proceeded just as in 
the trainer except that I was somewhat distracted initially by the new sensation 
of weightlessness. I followed the needles around and soon there was the horizon. 
Following the turnaround, I watched the expended launch vehicle through the 
window as it  fell behind me, tumbling slowly. It was bright and easily visible. 
I could see what looked like little ice crystals emanating from the sustainer engine 
nozzle. They seemed to extend for two o r  three times the length of the launch 
vehicle in a gradually broadening fan pattern. 
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After the initial sensation of weightlessness, it was exactly what I had expected 
from my brief experience with it in training. It was very pleasant, a great freedom, 
and I adapted to it quickly. Movement in the pressure suit was easier and the couch 
was more comfortable. 
Later, when I tried to eat the solid food provided for the flight, I found it 
crumbled in its plastic bag. Every time I opened the bag, some crumbs would come 
floating out; but once a bite-sized piece of food was in my mouth, there was no prob- 
lem. It was just like eating here on Earth. 
Orientation. - My only cues to  motion were the instruments and the views through 
the window and periscope. At t imes during the flight, the spacecraft angular ra tes  
were greater than 6" per  second, but aside from vision, I had no sense of movement. 
___- 
I was never disoriented. I always knew where the controls and other objects 
within the cabin were relative to  myself. I could reach anything I needed. I did not 
have one unusual experience. After looking out the window for some time, I noticed 
that when I turned my head to the right to look at  the special equipment storage kit, 
I would get the impression that it was oriented vertically, o r  90" from where I felt 
it should be. 
where I was always horizontal and lasted only temporarily. 
This impression was because of my training in the procedures trainer 
At times when the gyros were caged and nothing was visible out the window, I 
had no idea where the Earth was in relation to the spacecraft. However, it did not 
seem important to me. I knew at all times that I had only to wait and the Earth 
would again appear in the window. The periscope was particularly useful in this 
respect, because it had such a wide field of view. Even without it, however, the 
window would have been adequate. 
Unusual flight attitudes. - During the flight I had an opportunity to investigate a 
number of unusual flight attitudes. One of these was forward inverted flight. When 
I was pitched down close to -go", I think I could pick out the nadir point, that is, the 
ground directly below me, very easily without reference to the horizon. 
determine whether I was looking straight down or  off at an angle. During portions 
of the second and third orbits, I allowed the spacecraft to drift. Drifting flight was 
effortless and created no problems. 
I could 
Alining the gyros consumed fuel o r  time. The horizon provided a good roll and 
Yaw 
The periscope provided another good 
pitch reference as long as it was visible in the window. On the dark side of the Earth, 
the horizon o r  the airglow layer is visible a t  all t imes even before moonrise. 
reference was a problem. The best yaw reference was obtained by pitching down 
-50" to  -70" and looking through the window. 
yaw reference at nearly any attitude. 
also a valuable reference for alining the gyros since at zero pitch, the horizon could 
not be seen through the window. Yaw attitude is difficult to determine at night, and 
the periscope is of little help in determining yaw on the night side. The best refer- 
ence is a known star. 
The zero-pitch mark on the periscope was 
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Control system operation. - For normal maneuvering in orbit, FBW, low 
thrusters  only, was the best system. However, I believe for a tracking task, 
manual proportional control might be more desirable, although I did not actually 
t ry  it for this purpose. The FBW high thrusters  and the rate command and auxil- 
iary damping systems were not needed for the tasks  that I had to perform in orbit 
prior to preparing for retrofire. 
In orbit, the operation of the solenoids of both the high and low thrusters  of 
the FBW system could be heard. I could hear and feel the rate  command system, 
both the solenoids and the thrusters.  When using the MP mode, I did not hear the 
control linkages, but again I heard the thrusters.  Through the window, the exhaust 
from the pitch-down thrusters  could be seen. There w a s  no movement, just a 
little "V" of white steam in front of the window. It was visible even at  night. 
Balloon observations. - At balloon deployment, I saw the confetti as it was 
Finally, the balloon came into view; it looked to me as if it 
The balloon motion following deployment was completely random. 
jettisoned, but it disappeared rapidly. 
it fo r  the balloon. 
were a wrinkled sphere about 8 to 10 inches thick. It had small  protrusions com- 
ing out each side. 
I saw one of the balsa blocks and mistook 
Terrestr ia l  observations. - There was no difference between the appearance __-- 
and color of land, wa te ra reas ,  or  clouds from orbit and the view from a high- 
flying aircraft. The view looked to me exactly like the photographs from other 
Mercury flights. The South Atlantic had a cloud coverage of 90 percent, but all 
of western Africa was clear. I had a beautiful view of Lake Chad. Other par ts  
of Africa were green, and it was easy to tell that these a reas  were jungle. There 
were clouds over the Indian Ocean. Farther west in the Pacific, it was not heavily 
clouded, but the western half of Baja California, Mexico, was covered with clouds 
along its entire length. Over the United States on the 
second orbital pass,  I noticed a good amount of cloudiness, but after retrofire I 
could see the area around El  Centro, California, quite clearly. 
and had the impression that had there been a truck on it, I could have picked it 
out. I did not see Florida or the Cape Canaveral area.  
The eastern half was clear.  
I saw a dirt  road 
Celestial observations. - Because of the small  source of light around the time 
correlation clock, I was not fully dark adapted, nor was the cabin completely dark; 
therefore, I did not see  any more stars than I could have seen from the Earth. 
After having seen the star, Corvus, during the flight and later in the recovery 
airplane, I am convinced that a lot more stars can be seen from the ground than 
I could see through the spacecraft window. I could, nevertheless, readily see and 
identify the major constellations and use them for heading information. I could 
not see stars on the daylight side when the Earth was in the field of view of the 
window. However, I do remember seeing s t a r s  at the western horizon when the 
Sun was just up in the east but the terminator had not yet reached the western 
horizon. The sunrises and sunsets were the most beautiful and spectacular events 
of the flight. Unlike those on Earth, the sunrises and sunsets in orbit were all the 
same. The sharply defined bands of color at the horizon were brilliant. 
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I 
On the dark side of the Earth,  I saw the same bright band of light just above 
the horizon which John Glenn reported. 
number of ways, and I also observed it through a special "airglow" filter. 
description and analysis of my observations a r e  discussed in reference 2. 
I measured the width of this band in a 
A 
A number of t imes during the flight, I observed the particles reported by 
John Glenn. They appeared to be like snowflakes. I believe that they reflected 
sunlight and were not truly luminous. The particles traveled at different speeds, 
but they did not move away from the vehicle as rapidly as the confetti that was 
deployed upon balloon release.  At dawn on the third orbital pass  as I reached 
for the densiometer, I inadvertently hit the spacecraft hatch and a cloud of particles 
flew by the window. Since I was yawed to the right, the particles traveled across  
the front of the window from the right to the left. 
hatch and on other portions of the spacecraft walls,  and each time a cloud of par- 
ticles came past the window. The particles varied in size, brightness, and color. 
Some were gray and others were white. The largest were 4 to 5 t imes the size of 
I continued to knock on the 
1 the smaller ones. One that I saw was --inch long. 
and looked like a lathe turning. 
It w a s  shaped like a curlicue 2 
Retrograde and Reentry Phase 
Retrosequence. - I think that one reason that I w a s  unable to maintain my sched- 
ule a t r e t ro f i r e  was  because, just at dawn during the third orbital pass, I discovered 
the source of the space particles. I felt that I had time to investigate the particles 
and still prepare properly for retrofire,  but time slipped away. The Hawaii Cap Com 
w a s  trying very hard to get me to do the preretrograde checklist. After observing 
the particles, I was  busy trying to get alined in orbit attitude. Then I had to evalu- 
ate the problem in the automatic control system. I was unable to maintain my sched- 
ule and had to stow things haphazardly. 
Just  pr ior  to retrofire,  I had a problem in pitch attitude and lost all confidence 
in the automatic control system. 
preretrograde checklist which called for the manual fuel handle to be out as a back- 
up for the automatic control system. When I selected the FBW mode, I did not 
shut off the manual system. As a result, attitude control during retrofire w a s  
accomplished on both the FBW and the manual control modes. 
By this time, I had gone through the par t  of the 
At the time, I felt that my control of spacecraft attitude during retrofire was 
good. My reference was divided between the periscope, the window, and the 
attitude indicators. When the retroattitude of -34" w a s  properly indicated by the 
window and the periscope, the pitch attitude indicator read -10". I tr ied to hold 
this attitude on the instruments throughout retrofire,  but I cross-checked attitude 
in the window and the periscope. I have commented many times that on the trainer 
you cannd divide your attention between one attitude reference system and another 
and still do a good job in retrofire.  But that was the way I controlled attitude dur- 
ing re tmf i re  on this flight. 
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Although retrosequence came on time, the initiation of retrofire was slightly 
late. After receiving a countdown to retrofire from the California Cap Com, I 
waited 2 seconds and then punched the manual retrofire button. About 1 second 
after that I felt the first retrorocket fire. 
If the California Cap Com had not mentioned the retroattitude bypass switch, 
Later, the California Cap Com also mentioned an auxiliary damping r e -  
I would have forgotten it, and retrofire would have been delayed considerably 
longer. 
entry which I think I would have chosen in any case, but it was a good suggestion 
to have. 
I had expected a big "boot" from the retrorockets, but the deceleration was 
The ignition of the rockets was just audible. Retrofire just a very gentle nudge. 
gave me a sensation, not of being pushed back toward Hawaii as John Glenn had 
reported, but of being slowed down in three increments. By the time the retro- 
f i r e  was over, I felt that there had been just enough deceleration to bring the 
spacecraft to a stop; but of course, it had not stopped. 
Reentry. - Retropack jettison and the retraction of the periscope occurred on 
time. At this time, I noticed my appalling fuel state and realized that I had con- 
trolled retrofire on both the manual and FBW systems. I tr ied both the manual 
and the rate-command control modes and got no response. 
reading about 6 percent, but the fuel tank was empty. This left me with 15 percent 
of the automatic fuel to last  out the 10 minutes to 0.05g and to control the reentry. 
I used i t  sparingly, trying to keep the horizon in the window so that I would have 
a correct attitude reference. I stayed on FBW until 0.05g. At 0.05g I think I 
still had a reading of about 15 percent on the automatic fuel gage. I used the window 
€or attitude reference during reentry because of the difficulty I had experienced with 
the attitude displays pr ior  to retrofire. 
The fuel gage w a s  
I began to hear the hissing outside the spacecraft that John Glenn had described. 
The spacecraft was alined within 3 "  or 4" in pitch and yaw at the s tar t  of the reentry 
period. I feel that it would have reentered properly without any attitude control. 
The gradual increase of aerodynamic forces during the reentry appeared to be suf- 
ficient to aline the spacecraft properly. Very shortly after O.O5g, I began to pick 
up oscillations on the pitch and yaw rate needles. These oscillations seemed about 
the same as those experienced in some of the trainer runs. Because of this simi- 
larity, I decided that the spacecraft was  in good reentry latitude, and I selected 
the auxiliary damping control mode. 
I watched both the rate indicator and the window during this period, because I 
I could see a few flaming pieces falling off 
The 
was  beginning to see the reentry glow. 
the spacecraft. 
window did not light up to the extent that John Glenn reported. 
glow prior to peak acceleration. 
I also saw a long rectangular s t rap going off in the distance. 
I did not see a fiery 
I noticed one unexpected thing during the heat pulse. I was  looking for the 
orange glow and noticed instead a light green glow that seemed to be coming from 
the cylindrical section of the spacecraft. It made me feel that the t r im angle was 
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not right and that some of the surface of the recovery compartment might be over- 
heating. However, the fact that the rates were oscillating evenly strengthened my 
conviction that the spacecraft was at a good t r im angle. The green glow was 
brighter than the orange glow around the window. 
I heard the Cape Cap Com up to the blackout. He told me that blackout was 
I listened at first for  his command transmission, but it expected momentarily. 
did not get through; so  I just talked the rest of the way down. 
At peak acceleration, oscillations in rate were nearly imperceptible, since the 
auxiliary damping was going very well. The period of peak acceleration was much 
longer than I had expected. I noticed that I had to  breath a little more forcefully in 
order to say normal sentences. 
Landing 
At around 70 000 feet, I may have run out of automatic fuel. I do not remember 
My best indication of the oscillation amplitude was 
I could feel the change in deceleration as the spacecraft 
looking at the fuel gage, but the rates began to oscillate pretty badly, although the 
rate needles were still on scale. 
to watch the Sun c ross  the window and t ry  to  determine the angle through which the 
spacecraft was oscillating. 
went to  one side in yaw o r  pitch. I switched the drogue parachute fuse switch on at 
45 000 feet. At about 40 000 feet, spacecraft oscillations were increasing. At 
about 25 000 feet, I deployed the drogue parachute manually when the oscillations 
became severe. I could see  the drogue parachute pulsing and vibrating more than 
I had expected. It was visible against a cloudy sky. After the drogue parachute was 
deployed, I operated the snorkel manually. 
I switched the main parachute fuse switch on at 15 000 feet and waited for the 
main parachute to deploy. At about 9500 feet, I manually activated the main para- 
chute deployment switch without waiting for  automatic deployment. 
and was reefed for a little while. I could see the parachute working as the material 
was stretched taut and then as it undulated after the peak load. 
reefed and it was beautiful. I could see no damage whatsoever, and rate of descent 
was right on 30 feet per second. 
It came out 
The parachute dis- 
I was  convinced that the main parachute was good, selected the automatic posi- 
tion on the landing bag switch, and the bag went out immediately. 
postreentry and 10 000-foot checklists and got everything pretty well taken care  of. 
I went through the 
The landing was much less severe than I had expected. It was more noticeable 
by the noise than by the g-load, and I thought I had a heat-shield recontact problem 
of some kind. I was  somewhat dismayed to see water splashed on the face of the 
tape recorder box immediately after impact. My fears that there might be a leak 
in the spacecraft appeared to be confirmed by the fact that the spacecraft did not 
immediately right itself. 
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Egress  
The spacecraft listed halfway between pitch down and yaw left. I got the proper 
i tems disconnected and waited for the spacecraft to right itself. However, the list 
angle did not appreciably change, 
I knew that I was way beyond my intended landing point, because I had heard 
ear l ier  the Cape Cap Com transmitting blind that there would be about an hour for  
recovery. I decided to get out at that time and started to egress from the spacecraft. 
Egress  is a tough job. The space is tight, and the small  pressure bulkhead 
stuck slightly. I easily pushed out the canister, and I had the liferaft and the camera 
with me. I disconnected the hose after I had the canister nearly out. 
I forgot to seal  the suit and deploy the neck dam. I think one of the reasons was 
that it was so hot. I felt 
much hotter in orbit than after landing; and although it was humid, I still felt fine. 
After landing I read 105" on the cabin temperature gage. 
I climbed out through the small  pressure bulkhead with the liferaft attached to 
me. I placed the camera on top of the recovery compartment so that I could get it 
in case the spacecraft sank. I left the spacecraft, pulled the liferaft out after me, 
and inflated it, still holding onto the spacecraft. 
situation. Then I realized that the raft was  upside down! I climbed back onto the 
spacecraft, turned the liferaft over, and got back in. 
I climbed aboard and assessed the 
Recovery 
The sea was quite calm except for periodic swells, but it w a s  not choppy. The 
time on the ocean was  very pleasant. 
while I w a s  in the raft, but as far as temperature was  concerned I was comfortable. 
I drank a lot of water from my survival kit 
The first thing I saw in the water w a s  some seaweed. Than a black fish appeared, 
and he w a s  quite friendly. 
P2V, so I took out the signaling mi r ro r  from my survival kit. Since it was hazy, I 
had some difficulty in aiming the mir ror ,  which is done by centering the small bright 
spot produced by the sun in the center of the mirror .  However, I knew the planes had 
spotted me because they kept circling the area.  Another aid to the planes in locating 
me was the dye marker which was automatically ejected by the spacecraft. 
must have been a s t ream of dye in the water 10 miles long. 
Later, I heard some planes. The f i rs t  one I saw w a s  a 
There 
Soon there were a lot of airplanes around, but I just sat there minding my own 
business. Suddenly, I heard a voice calling from behind me. I turned around and 
there was someone swimming up to me. I did not even know that he had been para- 
chuted into the water. He inflated his raft, climbed in, and attached his raft to 
mine. 
to reach me. Later, another swimmer joined us. I broke out the food and asked 
them if they wanted any; but they had finished lunch recently, and they did not take 
He told me he had parachuted from 1100 feet and had to swim quite a way 
96 
More aircraft  kept circling over us. From time to time, one would drop a smoke 
bomb marker.  A 20-man liferaft was dropped, but the parachute failed to open and 
it hit the water with a tremendous impact. Attached to the raft was another package, 
containing the Stullken collar, a flotation device much like a life preserver  which can 
be wrapped around the spacecraft to keep it floating. It also hit with a terrific force 
which, as we learned later,  broke one of the C02 bottles used to inflate the collar. 
The divers started out to get the collar and it took them some time to bring it back. 
They finally got back, wrapped the collar around the spacecraft, and inflated it. 
When the HSS-2 helicopter appeared, it made a beautiful approach. One of the 
divers helped me put on the sling, and I picked up my camera which I had previously 
placed in the recovery compartment. I motioned to the helicopter pilot to take up the 
slack in the line and I let go of the spacecraft expecting to  be lifted up. Instead, I 
went down! The helicopter must have settled slightly, because I am sure that there 
w a s  a moment when nobody saw anything of me but a hand holding a camera clear of 
the water. 
A moment later, however, I began to rise.  It w a s  a lift of some 50 to 60 feet. 
I got into the helicopter with no difficulty and took off my gloves and boots. I poked 
a hole in the toe of my left sock and stuck my leg out the window to let the water 
drain out of the suit. When the helicopter landed aboard the car r ie r ,  I was in good 
shape. Although, I had already had a long day, I w a s  not excessively t ired and I 
was looking forward to describing my experiences to those at the debriefing site. 
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, I believe the MA-7 flight can be considered another successful step on 
the road to the development of a useful and reliable manned spacecraft system. The 
good performance of most of the spacecraft systems gave me confidence in the vehicle 
itself, while the spectacular novelty of the view from space challenged me to make 
the most of my opportunity and lured me into an unwise expenditure of fuel early in 
flight. 
able to demonstrate that there w a s  no problem associated with prolonged drifting 
flight, a procedure we shall have to make use of on the longer duration Mercury 
flights. I was  able to detect and overcome the one significant systems malfunction 
that might have affected the flight: the malfunction of the pitch horizon scanner 
circuit. I understand that many were concerned while waiting without word from 
me during reentry and after landing. However, from my position, there was no 
major cause for concern. The spacecraft was stable during the cri t ical  portions 
of reentry and the parachute worked perfectly. The recovery was effected expedi- 
tiously, despite the significant position e r r o r  at landing. The flight w a s  truly a 
wonderful experience. 
A s  a result, it became necessary to go to extended drifting flight, and I was  
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LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
All launch vehicle systems performed satisfactorily. The following items are 
noted for information. 
Hydraulics 
The launch vehicle hydraulic system operated satisfactorily throughout the 
MA-” powered flight phase. The sustainer hydraulic system maintained 3080 psi, 
as indicated by transducer H310P (see fig. 44 for  the location of this transducer). 
Sustainer hydraulic accumulator pressure, measured with transducer H52P, began 
decreasing at 00:03:10 and reached zero at SECO (see fig. 45). The cause of the 
indicated dropoff in the sustainer hydraulic accumulator pressure is discussed in 
the section that follows. 
Abort Sensing and Implementation System 
At T-3. 33 seconds the abort sensing and implementation system (ASIS) went to 
a ready condition, that is, all ASIS parameter monitors were enabled and both space- 
craft fail-detect relays were energized. The additional holddown time for propulsion 
system verification was 2.95 seconds. 
The ASIS performed satisfactorily during the flight. However, the sustainer 
hydraulic pressure switch no. 2 actuated to the abort position at 00:04:25. 1. This 
switch and the sustainer hydraulic accumulator pressure transducer (H52P) are 
connected to a common pressure-sensing line. The transducer indicated a gradual 
decrease in pressure from 2940 psia to zero between 00:03:10 and 00:05:12. Switch 
no. 2, which was preset to activate at 2015 100 psia, activated when the trans- 
ducer indicated a pressure of 1050 psia. The sustainer-control hydraulic-pressure 
transducer indicated that hydraulic pressure remained constant at a normal level 
throughout the flight; and as a result of this, the ASIS sustainer hydraulic pressure 
switch no. 1 did not activate until normal time after SECO. Both ASIS sustainer 
hydraulic pressure switches must be actuated to initiate abort command; therefore, 
this command was not given. Postflight tes ts  have indicated that the problem was 
caused by a lox leak which resulted in lox impingement on the sensing line tee, and 
caused freezing in the line and erroneous pressure sensing by both the no. 2 switch 
and the transducer, H52P. 
Airframe 
The performance of the airframe was satisfactory, and structural integrity 
was maintained through powered flight and spacecraft separation. 
activity in airframe external dynamic pressure,  measured at the spacecraft adapter, 
occurred in the vicinity of Mach 1 and at maximum dynamic pressure.  This activity 
decreased with the lessening of ambient pressure.  
The maximum 
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Noise during tower jettison and posigrade ignition was measured with a micro- 
phone located inside the spacecraft adapter. The behavior noted was similar to 
that of previous Mercury-Atlas flights. Spacecraft to lox dome clearance and 
spacecraft separation were normal as indicated by extensiometer measurement. 
Guidance 
The performance of the launch vehicle guidance system was satisfactory. The 
guidance system locked on the vehicle in both track and range at 00:73 seconds, 
approximately as planned, and lost lock at 05:38 (28. 1 seconds after SECO). 
In figures 46 to 48, the velocity and flight-path angle a r e  shown in the region 
of SECO. 
Impact Predictor Computer (IP 7090) data a r e  shown in figure 47 to illustrate the 
noise level during the time of the Ilgo--no-go" computation. The data from both the 
launch vehicle guidance system and the IP 7090 computer a r e  considered very good, 
except for three IP 7090 points immediately after SECO. 
points with such large e r r o r s  is not known. The points a r e  obviously in e r r o r  but a r e  
included in the figures, since these points were generated by the IP 7090 computer 
and received by the GFSC computers as shown in the figures. 
Launch vehicle guidance data are shown in figure 46, and the Range Safety 
The reason for these three 
The guidance system data indicated a cutoff condition which w a s  about 2 ft/sec 
high in velocity and about 0.0002" high in flight-path angle. These values a r e  well 
within the expected accuracy range for the system. 
shown as flight-path angle plotted against velocity. 
by the Flight Dynamics Officer in the Mercury Control Center for the orbital 
Itgo--no-go" decision. 
t'go" condition. 
In figure 48, these data a r e  
This is the type of display used 
Data from both the launch vehicle and IP 7090 indicated a 
The primary auxiliary sustainer cutoff (ASCO) signal based on the launch 
vehicle guidance system computations was sent to the launch vehicle simultaneously 
with SECO. However, the backup ASCO signal was  generated at the 7090 computer 
0.44 second before the guidance SECO discrete was  sent. 
the Mercury Control Center w a s  in the "normal" position, which prevented trans- 
mission of this improper ASCO signal. Had this signal been sent, a cutoff velocity 
e r r o r  of approximately 110 ft/sec, and possible marginal "go--no-go" insertion 
conditions, would have resulted. The cause for the early backup ASCO signal is 
attributed to the accuracy limits (tolerance band) within which the computer was 
to initiate the signal. 
were not narrow enough to insure that the backup signal would not be sent too 
early. 
The enable switch in 
The limits were established prior to the flight, but they 
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TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS 
Facility 
Cape Canaveral FPS-16 
Azusa MK I1 
General Electric - Burroughs 
-~ 
Sequence of Events 
Time, min:sec 
0 to 00:39 
00:39 to 01:13 
01:13 to 05:lO 
- - _ _ _  . - 
The times at which the major events of the MA-7 mission occurred a r e  given 
in table XVI. 
Flight Trajectory 
The ground track of the flight is shown in figure 49, and the altitude-longitude 
profile is shown in figure 50. 
The launch trajectory data, shown in figure 51, a r e  based on the real  time out- 
put of the Range Safety Impact Predicator Computer (which used Azusa MK I1 and 
Cape Canaveral FPS-16 radars)  and the General Electric-Burroughs guidance 
computer. The data from these tracking facilities were used during the time periods 
listed in the table which follows. 
The parameters shown for the "planned" launch trajectory in table XVII were 
computed by using the 1959, ARDC model atmosphere to maintain consistency with 
other published preflight trajectory documents. The density of the Cape Canaveral 
atmosphere is approximately 10 percent higher than that of ARDC model atmosphere 
in the region of maximum dynamic pressure (about a 37 000-foot altitude). As  a 
result, the maximum dynamic pressure expected would be about 10 percent higher 
than that shown as "planned. '' 
The orbital portion of the trajectory, shown in figure 52, was derived by start- 
ing with the spacecraft position and velocity vector obtained during the second 
orbital pass near Bermuda as determined by the GSFC computer using Mercury 
Network tracking data. By integrating backward along the flight trajectory to orbital 
insertion and forward to the start of re t rof i re  at the end of the third orbital pass  
the calculated orbit was  obtained. These integrated values were in excellent agree- 
ment with the guidance-system measured values a t  orbital insertion. The values 
were also in accord with the position and velocity vectors determined by the GSFC 
computer for orbital passes  near the Canary Islands (first orbital pass) and Muchea 
(second and third orbital passes), thus the validity of the integrated orbital portion 
of the flight trajectory was established. 
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The reentry portion of the trajectory, shown in figure 53, was obtained by start- 
ing with the spacecraft position and velocity vector near Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
as determined by the GSFC computer. By integrating backward along the flight to 
the end of retrofire and forward to landing, the reentry trajectory was obtained. 
This computed trajectory reflected the assumptions that the drogue parachute de- 
ployed at 04:50:54 and the main parachute deployed at 04:51:48.2, as indicated by 
onboard measurement of the t imes of these events. 
Par am et e r s 
-. - . 
Velocity, ft/sec . . . . . .  
Flight-path angle, deg . . 
Altitude, f t  . . . . . . . .  
Heading angle, deg . . . . .  
- .  
The spacecraft decelerations from the integrated reentry trajectory agree within 
reading accuracy with the decelerations measured by the onboard accelerometer. 
In addition, the time of 0.05g from the integrated reentry trajectory and from space- 
craft onboard measurements agree within 1 second. This agreement verifies the 
validity of the integrated reentry position of the trajectory. 
~ 
Values 
*2 
+0.002 
+400 
rtO.002 
The fact that the spacecraft landed approximately 250 nautical miles downrange 
of the nominal impact point and 15 nautical miles north of the nominal ground track 
can be attributed to improper spacecraft attitude, late retrofire, and a slightly 
lower (approximately 3 percent) than nominal retrorocket performance. 
Use of measured spacecraft attitudes, which were given by both scanner and 
gyro data in integrated trajectory calculations resulted in landing points approxi- 
mately 400 nautical miles downrange of the actual landing point. Therefore, these 
attitude data a r e  clearly erroneous. In order  to obtain a reasonably accurate esti-  
mate of the actual spacecraft attitudes and retrorocket performance which a r e  
uniquely related to the measured trajectory and, consequently, the actual landing 
point, an extensive trajectory analysis was conducted. 
actual radar tracking data immediately prior to and after retrofire;  the measured 
retrofire time; and a calculated spacecraft pre-retrograde weight. The following 
estimated accuracies of space-fixed position and velocity vectors were obtained 
from radar tracking immediately prior to and after retrofire. 
This study made use of: 
Results of the comparison of the preretrof i re  and postretrofire vectors yielded 
spacecraft attitudes of 36.5' rt 0.5" in pitch and 27' rt 0.5" in yaw and a retrorocket 
total impulse which is 3 rt 0. 5 percent lower than the nominal value of 38 943 lb/sec 
expected for this particular group of rocket motors. 
specification value of 38 880 lb/sec rt 5 percent. These values can be used to  generate 
This impulse is within the 
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the measured reentry trajectory and the actual landing point. The roll  attitude was 
neglected, since the roll  values of 520" result  in only l-nautical-mile variation in 
the landing point. 
The aerodynamic parameters  for the planned and integrated reentry trajectories 
were computed by using the MSC model atmosphere. This atmosphere is based on 
Discoverer Satellite program data above 50-nautical-mile altitudes, the 1959 ARDC 
model atmosphere between the 25- and 50-nautical-mile altitudes, and the Patrick 
Air Force Base atmosphere below 25-nautical-mile altitudes. 
In the trajectory figures, the preceding integrated values are labeled "actual. '' 
A comparison of the planned and actual trajectory parameters  is given in 
table XVII. The difference between these parameters  was a primary result of the 
actual cutoff velocity and flight-path angle at insertion being slightly higher than 
planned. 
MERCURY NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
The Mercury Network consists of the Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral; 
stations at the Atlantic Missile Range, Bermuda, and at thirteen other locations 
along the orbital ground track; and communications and computing centers at the 
Goddard Space Flight Center. For the MA-? mission the Atlantic Ocean Ship was 
located at 17'45' S. ,  39'24' E. The Indian Ocean Ship was not deployed because of 
modification commitments necessary for the support of later missions. 
Generally, Mercury Network performance w a s  excellent. The few minor mal- 
functions did not affect the flight monitoring and control of the mission. Acquisi- 
tion of data from tracking, telemetry, and air/ground voice systems was satisfactory 
in both quantity and quality for real-time monitoring and for postflight analysis. 
The relaying of air/ground voice to the Mercury Control Center from all voice 
s i tes  contributed substantially in enabling Mercury Control Center to maintain close 
real-time monitoring of the mission. 
Trajectory 
Details of tracking, data transmission, computing, and trajectory displays a re  
discussed in the paragraphs which follow. 
Tracking. - The radar tracking system provided satisfactory data from both 
C- and S-band systems for all requirements. The quantity and quality of the data 
were more than adequate. All s i tes  provided high quality data to the computer on 
all orbital passes where the spacecraft was above their horizon (figs. 54 and 55). 
Some si tes  reported amplitude modulation, lobing, and countdown of both radar 
beacons, and Bermuda reported local interference on the C-band radar. In spite 
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of these difficulties, the overall tracking was very good. At White Sands Missile 
Range, tracking was lost very shortly after the modulator was turned off, but this 
was undoubtedly caused by extreme range and low-elevation angle. 
"blackout" period on reentry, the S-band radars  tracked for a maximum of about 
1- minutes. The C-band radars  tracked well into the "blackout" condition with 
the San Salvador FPS-16 losing tracking 45 seconds before the end, at which time 
the elevation angle was about 1 degree and the range almost 400 miles. 
During the 
1 
2 
Data transmission. - The transmission of both high-speed and low-speed data 
was satisfactory throughout the mission. 
Computing and trajectory displays. - A modified computer program at the 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was utilized in support of the MA-7 mission. 
This program had the capability of receiving high-speed radar data from Bermuda 
and provided the Mercury Control Center with an additional source for determining 
satisfactory orbital insertion (go- -no-go). The computing and trajectory display 
facilities at Bermuda were retained and operated in parallel with the high speed 
radar  data transmitted to GSFC since this was the first opportunity to obtain oper- 
ational experience with the new system. The system performed satisfactorily, and 
no problems were encountered. With the introduction of high-speed data from 
Bermuda, the capability of transmitting raw FPS-16 radar data from the Atlantic 
Missile Range radars  to GSFC has been deleted. 
Confidence checks during the countdown indicated that the launch monitor sys- 
tem was in a 'tgor' condition. According to reports, however, high refractive in- 
dices were being measured through a fog bank in the local Cape Canaveral a r ea  by 
a test  aircraft. These indications caused some concern among the guidance per- 
sonnel who believed that this condition could create noisy data at cutoff similar to 
that experienced on the MA-4 mission. 
noise would probably be of a high-frequency nature and would therefore not cause 
any significant difficulty. Therefore, the guidance complex considered this a 
"go" condition. This was  the first Mercury flight in which the 6000-foot legs of 
the tracking antenna configuration were actively utilized for guidance. 
Further evaluation indicated that this 
The selected source for display at the MCC w a s  the output of the IP 7090 from 
lift-off until approximately 00:01:13 at which time the launch vehicle guidance sys- 
tem was selected and displayed throughout the powered flight. 
launch vehicle guidance system data was excellent up to SECO and during the 
I t  go--no-go-" computation. 
decision, and it was not necessary to select either the IP 7090 or  Bermuda data to 
verify the launch vehicle guidance system solution. 
in table XVIII. 
The quality of the 
No difficulty was experienced in making the "go--no-go" 
The cutoff conditions a r e  given 
The programed phase of the flight showed a minor deviation of plus 1.2" in 
flight -path angle and plus 1. 5 nautical miles in altitude at BECO. 
After staging, steering corrected these deviations in both flight-path angle and 
altitude. The yaw velocity e r r o r  was zero at cutoff. 
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Low-speed tracking data from the remote s i tes  were excellent, such that the 
orbit was well defined after Canary Island tracking was received. Subsequent track- 
ing resulted in  no change in the orbit and increased confidence in the values obtained. 
Table XM shows the tracking data obtained. 
The retrosequence time se t  in the spacecraft at launch was 04:32:25. At inser- 
tion, the computed retrosequence time was  04:32:39. This time was reduced to 
04:32:28 after updating the computed trajectory based on the Bermuda (BDA) data. 
During the remainder of the mission, the computed time varied only +1 second at 
about 04:32:28. This small  variance indicates that the orbit was fixed very early 
in the flight. 
The spacecraft clock was set  to 04:32:34 over Muchea during the third orbital 
pass. This setting included a -1 second clock e r r o r  and a +6 second correction 
because of a decrease in spacecraft weight which was caused by more fuel usage 
than had been accounted for in the computer programs. A countdown to retro- 
sequence at a ground elapsed time of 04:32:35 was given from Mercury Control 
Center (MCC). 
During the reentry, tracking data accurately established the landing location. 
Table XX shows the minor variations in landing latitude and longitude obtained 
from tracking data across  the United States. Cape Canaveral, Grand Bahama 
Island, and San Salvador FPS-16's tracked through blackout, reports of which in 
rea l  time at the MCC were extremely comforting in verifying the integrity of the 
spacecraft during reentry . 
The performance of the computing system and the tracking facilities was ex- 
cellent throughout the mission and no malfunctions occurred. It is felt that the 
performance of the BDA to GSFC high-speed data transmission system during this 
mission was such that the computing facilities and trajectory displays at Bermuda 
a r e  no longer necessary in support of the Mercury program. 
Telemetry 
The data provided by the telemetry system were generally adequate and of good 
quality. 
pass at every site. Coverage is shown graphically in figure 56 and in tabular form, 
with decommutator figures, ranges, and elevation angles in table XXI. Signal 
strengths were satisfactory, ranging up to  more than 400 microvolts. The usual 
ionization blackout of telemetry, expected to begin at approximately 04:43:10, did 
not begin until 04:43:56 because of the landing point overshoot. Grand Turk had 
acquired the signal briefly (6 seconds for the commutated channel, 29 seconds for 
the continuous channels) at approximately 04:48:44. If Grand Turk had acquired 
the signal at the end of the blackout, this would indicate an ionization time of 
04:48:00. Loss of signal at Grand Turk was apparently caused by the range and 
elevation angle. 
Coverage was excellent, and data were acquired throughout each orbital 
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No serious problems were  experienced in the instrumentation systems, other 
than apparent difficulties with onboard physiological instrumentation which is dis- 
cussed in the Instrumentation and Aeromedical Analysis sections of this report. 
Trend charts plotted from the telemetry summary messages showed fairly 
good consistency except for automatic and manual fuel quantity. The reason for 
the obvious scatter in the fuel quantity data is unknown, but it is in part caused by 
the fact that the full sensor range represents only 54 percent of full-scale indicator 
reading which reduces resolution by almost 2 to 1. 
Performance of the acquisition-aid system was  satisfactory, with the usual 
multipath e r r o r s  at elevation angles less  than 18". 
Command System 
The command system for the MA-7 mission operated in a satisfactory manner 
during the mission. A summary of the command handover exercises is shown in 
table XXII, and a summary of command transmissions is shown in table XXIII. 
Ground system. - All command sites had command coverage beginning at slant 
ranges equal to that of the MA-6 mission. 
quadhelix antennas had an average of approximately 35 percent better coverage above 
the 10-microvolt level than that of the 600-watt command sites. 
The 10-kw command sites using the 
A total of sixteen functions were transmitted from the command sites. All of 
the functions were received successfully with the exception of one telemetry "R" 
calibration from Muchea. This function was not received because the signal strength 
was below receiver threshold. In addition, the emergency voice via command car-  
r i e r  was  used by Muchea during the first orbital pass, and by Cape Canaveral dur- 
ing reentry. Muchea's transmission was  successful. Cape Canaveral's transmis- 
sion was  not successful because of ionization blackout and excessive slant range. 
More ground system malfunctions occurred than have previously been noted 
during mission time. The following malfunctions were experienced. 
1. The rotary joint on the quadhelix antenna located at Cape Canaveral burned 
out at T-135 minutes. The Atlantic Missi le  Range unipole antenna along with Grand 
Bahama Island was  used for the first orbital pass coverage. The unipole was  used 
with a change in the handover plan for the second and third orbital coverage. 
unipole coverage was less  than expected with an average of only 26-percent coverage 
above the 10-microvolt level. 
The 
2. The master FRW-2 at Bermuda was inoperative during the mission. 
attempt to repair the transmitter prior to the mission was unsuccessful because of 
numerous teflon ring failures in the power amplifier section of the transmitter. 
station satisfactorily supported the mission with the standby FRW-2 and the 
10-kw power amplifier. 
An 
The 
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1 f rom the master  to the standby FRW-2 transmitter occurred at 
Guaymas during the third orbital pass.  This failover was caused by an open fuse in  
the transmitter power supply. The standby transmitter operated satisfactorily. 
3. A failover 
4. Although the California command site was not used during the first orbital 
pass, a failover to  the standby transmitter occurred during this time. The cause 
was an open 310-volt fuse. The fuse was replaced and the mission was completed 
in a normal manner. 
Spacecraft system. - _  - Command receiver "A" operating from the 18-volt iso- 
lated bus had a threshold value of 3.6 microvolts and a saturation value of between 
20 to 40 microvolts. Commander receiver "B" operating from the 18-volt standby 
bus had a threshold value of 3.8 microvolts and a saturation value of between 40 to 
80 microvolts. 
The command system appeared to operate normally. The antenna pattern 
effects on the MA-? mission were as noticeable as on previous missions. 
Communications 
Air/ground voice. _ _ ~  - The performance of the primary air/ground voice system 
(UHF) was generally good throughout the mission, with the exception of the f i rs t  
1 to 2 minutes of launch, and the period from the onset of "blackout" during r e -  
entry to the end of the mission. During the early phase of powered flight the voice 
transmissions received from the vehicle were very noisy, although readable. The 
loss of signal after blackout was undoubtedly caused by horizon effect. The range 
to Grand Turk was over 400 miles and to the nearest relay aircraft  approximately 
200 miles. 
In spite of these ranges several  Cape Canaveral transmissions were received 
by the astronaut and one spacecraft transmission w a s  received by Cape Canaveral, 
all apparently through the two relay aircraft  flying at approximately 25 000 feet. 
Signal strengths were adequate to provide very good signal-to-noise ratios for 
(See 
essentially all times the spacecraft was  above the local visual horizon at  the net- 
work sites. UHF in-range t imes averaged about 6 minutes per orbital pass. 
fig. 57.) 
Since the UHF system provided adequate communications, the H F  system was  
seldom used. On the first orbital pass, the astronaut heard Canton calling, r e -  
sponded on UHF, then HF, but was not received until within UHF range. Two other 
instances of spacecraft H F  transmission not being received occurred during the 
flight. A discussion of the HF problem is presented in the Communication System 
section of this report. 
~ ____-~-  
'Failover - Failure of primary system, accompanied by automatic switching to 
standby system. 
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Emergency voice checks, which were made by using the command transmitters, 
resulted in loud and clear reception by the astronaut. 
Ground communications. - All the ground communication networks provided good 
support €or the mission. A few isolated instances of outages occurred, but commun- 
ications were accomplished by alternate circuits. Single-sideband H F  communica- 
tion from the Indian Ocean Ship direct to'Cape Canaveral o r  relayed via Ascension 
or Pretoria, was excellent and aided materially in mission monitoring. 
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TABLE VIII. - SPACECRAFT FUEL CONSUMPTION 
Time, 
hr  : min : sec 
oo:oo:oo 
00:08:00 
01:33:32 
03 : 07 :04 
04 : 33 :2 1 
04:44:44 
04 : 50 : 54 
Mission phase 
Launch 
Turnaround and 
damping 
First orbital 
pass 
Second orbital 
pass to re t ro-  
sequence 
Retr osequence 
to 0.05g 
0.05g to drogue 
parachute 
Drogue to main 
parachute 
- 
Automatic system 
Fuel 
used, 
lb 
0 
1. 6 
15. 8 
5 . 8  
5 . 4  
5 . 0  
al. 4 
Fuel 
remaining 
lb 
35.0  
33 .4  
1 7 . 6  
1 1 . 8  
6 . 4  
1 . 4  
0 
~. .- 
Manual system 
_ _ .  
Fuel 
used, 
lb 
0 
0 
8. 5 
5 . 1  
10 .3  
a 1 . 0  
-- 
. 
Fuel 
remaining, 
lb 
- 
24 .9  
24. 9 
16 .4  
11 .3  
1 . 0  
0 
-- 
- 
aFuel depletion occurred during this period. 
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TABLE M.- RESULTS OF POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION OF 
- 
Thruster 
Yaw right 
(1 -1b) 
Yaw left 
(l-lb) 
Pitch up 
(l-lb) 
Pitch down 
(l-lb) 
CCW automatic 
roll (6-lb) 
CCW automatic 
roll (l-lb) 
CW automatic 
roll (6-lb) 
CW automatic 
roll (1-lb) 
CCW manual 
(1- to 6-lb) 
CW manual 
(1- to 6-lb) 
SPACECRAFT 18 THRUST CHAMBERS 
Serial 
number 
136 
a 
133 
73 
135 
28 
28 
18 
18 
21  
28 
Inspection results 
Orifice spacer clean; rust  stains evident on the bottom 
side of orifice and diffuser plate. Platinum screens in 
good condition. 
Orifice spacer clean; diffuser plate clear. Platinum 
screens in good condition. 
Orifice spacer clean; rust  stains evident on both sides 
of diffuser plate and top side of first screen. Platinum 
screens in good condition. 
Orifice spacer clean; diffuser plate clear. Screens 
appeared in excellent condition. 
Heavy rust  stains on all parts; diffuser plate and ori- 
fice clear;  platinum screens in good condition. 
Rust stains evident on orifice spacer and diffuser plate; 
diffuser plate blue in color. 
isfactory condition. 
Platinum screens in sat- 
Very wet; orifice clean; diffuser plate blue in color; 
screens in very good condition. 
Orifice spacer clean; no rust;  diffuser plate lightly 
blued on top surface. Screens in excellent condition. 
Orifice and diffuser plate clean; light rust  stain on 
platinum screen. 
piece. 
Light corrosion on check valve nose 
Corrosion on check valve nose piece; salt-like substance 
found in valve and heat barr ier  screen. Orifice, dif- 
fuser plate, and platinum screens in good condition. 
aThe serial number refers to a thrust-chamber assembly, which may contain 
more than one thruster. 
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TABLE X. - GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE ASTRONAUT OF THE MA-7 MISSION 
Date, 
1962 
April 30 
May 2 
May 5 
May 7 
May 9 
May 10 
May 15 
May 17 
May 21 
May 23 
May 24 
May 25 
May 26 
May 27 
May 28 
. _ ~  - .
Activity 
- 
Arrived at Cape Canaveral 
Simulated flight, suited 
Procedures trainer, suited 
Began special diet, aeromedical feeding facility 
Procedures trainer, suited 
Procedures trainer, not suited 
Simulated launch, suited 
Simulated flight no. 3, suited 
Comprehensive medical examinations, Patrick Air Force Base hospital 
Preflight low-residue diet began for  third time 
MA-7 meetings 
Asleep at 8:OO p. m. 
Awakened 1:15 a. m. 
Began aeromedical countdown 
Launch 7:45 a. m. 
Recovery physicians examination 3:30 p. m. and 5:15 p. m. 
Brief examination, Grand Turk Island 11:OO p. m. 
Asleep 2:30 a. m. 
Awoke 9:15 a. m. for aeromedical debriefing 
Engineering debriefing 
Asleep 12:45 a.m. 
Awoke 6:45 a.m. 
Aeromedical and engineering debriefing 
Skin diving (3 hours) 
Asleep 2:30 a.m. 
Awoke 9:15 a.m.  
Arrived Patrick AFB 2:OO p. m. 
Departed from Cape Canaveral 2:15 p. m. 
- -  - .  _ _  -._ . ~~ --______ 
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TABLE XI. - MA-? AEROMEDICAL COUNTDOWN EVENTS 
[May 24, 19623 
Time, 
a.m. e.s . t .  
1:15 
1:46 
2:05 
2:41 
3 :04 
3:25 
3:40 
4:03 
4:36 
4:43 
?:45 
. .  
Activity 
~~ 
Awaken the pilot 
Breakfast 
Preflight physical examination 
Biosensor placement 
Don Mercury pressure suit 
Pressure suit and biosensor checkout 
Hangar S Aeromedical Facility to transfer van 
Transfer van to launch pad 
Ascend gantry 
Astronaut insertion into spacecraft 
Lift-off 
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TABLE XII. - PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT MEDICAL FINDINGS 
[Electrocardiograms on May 17 and May 24, 1962, aboard the recovery vessel were normal and unchanged in all respects 
May 17, 1962 
(Patrick Air Force 
Base) 
I Preflight I Postflight 
May 24, 1962 
2:05 a. m. ) 
May 24, 1962 
5:15 p. m. ) 
May 25 and 26, 1962 (Cape Canaveral, (Recovery Vessel (Grand Turk Island) 
I 
b120/78 LAS 1 1 ~ 7 8  LAS 
97.9 1 60 Temperature (oral), OF. . . . Pulse rate, beats/min . . . . 
I 
124/80 LAS Blood pressure,  mm Hg. . . . 
Respiration, breaths/min . . . 
Body weight (nude), lbc . . . . ' 
Extremity measurementsd, in. 1 
I 
Forearm, maximum. . . . 
I Forearm, minimum. . . . , 
Calf, maximum . . . . . . 
~ 
, Calf, minimum . . . . . . '  
Comments: 
I 
a126/84 RAS 
14 
1 151- 2 
Left Right 
9 G 
7 f4 
128 7 137 1
8 
Complete examina- 
tion was negative; 
skin clear except 
for 2 clusters of 
inclusion cysts at 
left axillary ECG 
site; chest X-ray 
normal. 
97.4 ' 97.6 
76-80 
6o I 
97.5 
-- 
Fit for flight; alert Modern erythema at Minimal erythema as 
with appropriate left chest ECG and ' at postflight sites; 
mental status. blood-pressure cuff examination un- 
site; normal mental changed from 
status; chest X-ray 
fogged - no inter- 
pretation. audiogram and 
May 17th findings, 
including ECG, EEC: 
I c he st-X-ray . 
aRight a rm,  sitting. 
bLeft a rm,  sitting. 
'All body weights on different scales. 
dExtremity measurements made by same individual on May 17 and 24 (preflight), and May 25 and 26, 1962. On May 17, 1962, 
measurements were made 6 and 10 inches below olecranon on forearms and 6 and 11 inches below patella on legs. All other 
measurements are maximums and minimums. 
TABLE XIII. - PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT LABORATORY ANALYSES 
Determination 
. . -~ 
Hemoglobin, g . . . . . . . . . .  
(Cyanmethemoglobin method) 
Hematocrit, percent . . . . . . .  
White blood cells, per mm . . . .  3 
Red blood cells, 
millions per mm . . . . . . . .  
Differential blood count, percent 
Lymphocytes . . . . . . . . . .  
Neutrophiles . . . . . . . . . .  
Monocytes . . . . . . . . . . .  
E osinophiles . . . . . . . . . .  
Basophiles . . . . . . . . . . .  
- 
Preflight 
-7 days 
15.0 
47 
12 700 
5.2 
25 
71 
2 
2 
0 
Peripheral blood 
.- 
Postflight 
-2 days 
13.8 
42 
11 600 
-- 
19 
79 
1 
1 
0 
May 25, 
1962 
(12:15 a. m. 
16.0 
50 
12 500 
5. 6 
27 
65 
3 
4 
1 
May 26, 
1962 
(12 m. ) 
14.8 
46 
11 900 
5.2 
37 
58 
2 
2 
1 
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TABLE MII. - PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT LABORATORY ANALYSES - Concluded 
Sample date, 
1962 
12:15 p. m., May 17 
1:40 p. m., May 22 
Inflight 
Final urination on 
water. Exact time 
unknown, but after 
egress from space 
craft. 
5:OO p. m., May 24 
6:05 a.m.b, May 25 
9:25 a.m., May 25 
2:35 p. m., May 25 
6:30 p. m., May 25 
12:30 a. m. ,  May 26 
2:20 a.m.,  May 26 
7:OO a.m., May 26 
>:45 a.m., May 26 
Volume, 
cc 
250 
- 
2 360 
155 
140 
140 
215 
305 
890 
310 
550 
310 
a Urine summary 
Specific 
gravitj 
1.024 
1.015 
1.003 
1.013 
1.016 
1.016 
1.024 
1.021 
1.005 
1.019 
1.009 
1.014 
PH 
5. c 
- 
6.0 
5. a 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
6.0 
5.0 
5.0 
Albumin 
Trace 
Negative 
Trace 
30 mg 
Trace 
Trace 
Trace 
Trace 
Negative 
Trace 
Ne gat ive 
Negative 
Microscopic examination 
20-30 WBC/hpf, occasional 
hyaline casts, occasional 
RBC/hpf, squamous epi- 
thelial cells 
Occasional WBC, occasiona 
epithelial cells, rare RBC 
20-25 WBC/hpf, no RBC, 
no casts 
Some clumps of WBC/lpf, 
20-25 WBC/hpf, no RBC, 
no casts 
15-20 WBC/hpf, no RBC, 
no casts 
10-15 WBC/hpf, no RBC, 
no casts 
3-5 WBC/hpf, no clumps in 
lpf,' no RBC, no casts 
15-20 WBC/lpf, few mucous 
threads, 1-3 WBC/hpf 
8-12 WBC/hpf, occasional 
small WBC clusters 
Large amount of amorphous 
na t e s  
10-15 WBC/hpf, small 
amount of mucous, occa- 
sional small cluster of WBC 
1-8 WBC/hpf, occasional 
;mall WBC cluster, small 
amount of mucous 
aAll samples are  negative for glucose, ketons, and bile. 
bThis sample was divided into three fractions at collection. Microscopic examin- 
ation was immediately done. Only the first fraction showed the presence of appreciable 
WBC/hpf. Samples 2 and 3 showed 2-3 WBC/hpf. No other formed bodies were noted. 
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TABLE XIV. - SUMMARY OF BLOOD-PRESSURE DATA 
Launch-pad tests 
MA-7 countdown 
Totals (preflight) 
Postflight physical 
examinations 
I I 
Systolic Diastolic Mean pulse I Standard 
Data sources of pressure, ; range, range, pressure, deviation, 20 
;Number i Mean blood 
values mm Hg ' Systolic ' Diastolic ' mm Hg mm Hg mm Hg 
I 
45 127/64 31 18 ~ 101-149 44-84 63 
13 11 6/63 ia 12 105-139 56-70 53 
106 125/71 24 14 98-155 44-106 54 
3 115/76 2 9 114-1 16 70-80 39 
98-128 I Preflight physical ia 119/73 14 15 
I I 
examinations 
58-84 46 
TABLE XV. - SUMMARY OF CONTROL SYSTEM USAGE 
Prelaunch 
Control I Time from launch 
00 : 12 :38 
, 
FBW 
ASCS 
FBW 
i ASCS 
MP 
! 
' ASCS 
FBW and 
MP 
ASCS 
FBW 
00:05:22 
00:07:10 
To 
00:05:22 
00:07:10 
00:12:55 
00:12:55 ! 00:16:31 
00: 17 :29 00:16:31 
00:17:29 
00: 17:48 
00:17:56 
00 :21:28 
00:30:52 
00 : 17 :48 
00:17:56 
nn.si . 9 ~  
UV.LII.LIU 
00:30:52 ' 
~ 
Gyro switch position 
Position 
Normal 
Free 
Normal 
i ! 
! 
~ 
j 
i 
00:12:38 { 00:14:46 
I 
00:14:46 i 00:30:53 
Maneuvering, flight activities 
Five second rate damping at spacecraft separation.' 
Turnaround maneuver. 
Photographed launch vehicle while the pilot 
maintained attitude for radar track. 
I 
I 
Used high FBW thrusters. 
Astronaut reported a window-instrument dis- 
agreement . 
MP control check. 
Dropped into orientation mode. 
I 
Dropped into orientation mode. Photographed 
horizon. 
Used high FBW thrusters. 00:39:12 Caged 00:30:53 00:32:10 
Normal 00:32:10 00:33:13 
I 
Caged 00:33:13 00:33:17 ' To aline window and gyro indicators. i 
I I I! Normal 00:33:17 00:33:48 l l  'L-: 
a See key at end of table. 
- - ---- -ESg 
TABLE XV. - SUMMARY OF CONTROL SYSTEM USAGE - Continued 
01:13:06 
I 
' Control Time from launch 
1 modea 1 From ' To 
01:14:09 
1 ASCS 
RSCS 
, ASCS 
, FBW 
ASCS 
I 
RSCS 
M P  
' FBW 
I 
i 
1/ 
RSCS 
00:39:12 00:39 :13 
00:39:13 00:39:14 
Gyro switch position 
Position I From 1 To I------ 
i 00:39:14 1 00~45~46 
00:45:46 00:48:33 
00:48:33 00:56:30 I Free I 00:56:19 
1 
I 
I 
00:56:30 00:56:53 i 
I 
00:56:53 00:58:20 
1 
I 
I 
i I 
Caged 1 00:33:48 
Normal 00:33:51 
Free 100:36:45 
Caged 1 00:38:35 
Normal 1 00:39:13 
I 
! 
i 
i 
00:33:51 
I 00:36:45 
00 :38 :35 
00:39:13 
00:56:19 
I 
Photographed sunset; yawed 90" left and right. 
Used high FBW thrusters. 
01:02:55 1 Dropped into orientation mode. Observed 1 occluded Venus; emergency voice check. 
' Re-checked RSCS. 
I 
i I ~ O0:58:2Oi 01:13:06 1 Caged I 01:02:55 '1 01:43:00 I I 
Maneuvering, flight activities 
Used airglow filter, horizon definition photography. 
Went to ASCS normal with gyros caged. 
Flare observation (-80" pitch, +80" yaw). Used 
high FBW thrusters. Started drifting flight at 
01:Ol:OO. Varied spacecraft rates slightly, by 
rocking arms  back and forth (0. lo/sec). Ate 
food at 01:08:52. Stopped drifting flight at 
01 : 12:30. 
CI 
4 CI aSee key at end of table. 
TABLE XV. - SUMMARY OF CONTROL SYSTEM USAGE - Continued 
Control 
modea 
FBW and 
M P  
FBW 
ASCS 
FBW 
ASCS 
FBW 
ASCS 
FBW 
M P  
Time from launch 
From 
01 : 1 4: 09 
01:24:50 
01 : 3 7:43 
01:37:47 
01:43: 01 
02:01:07 
02: 04: 20 
02 : 09 : 00 
02:28:53 
To 
11:24:50 
31:37:43 
01:37:47 
01 :43: 01 
02:Ol: 07 
02:04:20 
02:09:00 
02:28:53 
04: 26: 10 
Gyro switch position 
Position 
Normal 
Caged 
Free  
Caged 
Normal 
Caged 
Normal 
Free  
Caged 
From 
~~ 
I1 :43: 00 
32:01:03 
32:Ol: 23 
02:01:43 
02 : 02: 29 
02:14:12 
02:14:17 
02 : 3 0: 09 
02:38:01 
To 
32:01:03 
02:Ol: 23 
02: 01 : 43 
02: 02: 29 
02:14:12 
02: 14:17 
02: 3 0: 09 
02:38 : 01 
02:55:02 
Maneuvering, flight activities 
Yawed 180" to take photographs of sunrise. 
3bserved particles. 
Photographed clouds. 
Went to ASCS normal with gyros caged. 
Deployed the balloon at 01:38:00. 
Dropped into orientation mode. Observed and 
took photographs of balloon. 
Dropped into orientation mode. Observed sunset, 
Used high FBW thrusters. 
Checked stability of spacecraft. Extended maneu- 
ver beyond repeater stop limits with gyros normal 
and with balloon attached to spacecraft. Haze 
layer extincted. 
I 
Took xylose pill. Took photographs of sunrise, ' 
observed particles. 
I 
I 
: 
See key at end of table. a 
C ont r ol 
modea 
M P  
ASCS 
FBW and 
M P  
Auxiliary 
lamping 
TABLE XV. - SUMMARY OF CONTROL SYSTEM USAGE - Continued 
Time from launch 
From , To 
02:28:53 
04 :2 6: 10 
04 :2 6 :2 6 
04 :2 7 : 10 
04:26:10 
04 :2 6 : 26 
04 :27 : 10 
04 :27 : 5 1 
-- 
See key at end of table. a 
Gyro switch position 
Position 
Normal 
Caged 
Nor mal 
Caged 
Normal 
From 
02 : 55:02 
02 : 55 :24 
02 : 57:3 8 
03:11:39 
04 :2 5 :53 
To 
02:55:24 
02:57:38 
03:11:39 
04 :25 : 53 
04 :2 7 : 53 
Maneuvering, flight activities 
Drank water; yaw gyro at 250 repeater stop 
(03:06:00) ; wobulator check. 
Started drifting flight at 03:12:00; attempted to 
jettison balloon. Performed zero-g and auto- 
kinesis experiments; observed particles; photo- 
graphed the horizon; observed sunset; drank 
water; made photometer readings of the stars; 
performed calibration exercises. Observed 
occluded stars in haze layer. Held attitude on 
Moon at 04:12:30. Observed and photographed 
sunrise and particles. Dropped into orientation 
mode. Observed and took photographs of balloon. 
ASCS gyros run down (RSCS -ASCS switch in 
Rate Command position) dropped into orientation 
mode for 16 seconds. Reported ASCS problem. 
Used FBW high thrusters. 
Reported window and gyro indications not in 
agreement and rate of descent indication at 
10 to 12 ft/sec. 
TABLE XV. - SUMMARY OF CONTROL SYSTEM USAGE - Continued 
C ontr ol 
modea 
FBW and 
M P  
FBW 
ASCS 
FBW 
M P  
ASCS 
FBW and 
M P  
ASCS 
FBW 
Time from launch 
From 
04 :27 :5 1 
04:28:37 
04:29:41 
04:29:45 
04 :29 :57 
04:31:23 
04:32 :02 
04:32:43 
04 :32 :50 
To 
04 :28 :37 
04 :29:41 
04 :29 :4 5 
04:29:57 
04 :3 1 :23 
04:32:02 
04:32:43 
04 :32 : 50 
04:33:53 
Gyro switch position 
Posit ion 
Caged 
Normal 
Free 
Normal 
Caged 
Normal 
From 
04:27:53 
04 : 3 0 :33 
04 :32 :06 
04:34:09 
04 : 37 : 5 6 
04 :3 8 :00 
Caged ~ 04:40:14 
I , 
To 
04:30:33 
04:32:06 
04 : 34 : 0 9 
04 :37 :56 
04 : 3 8 :00 
04 :40 : 14 
Landing 
Maneuvering, flight activities 
Retrograde checklist 
Used high FBW thrusters 
Went to ASCS normal with gyros caged. Stowed 
equipment 
Astronaut decided to control retrofire by using 
FBW control mode. Checked FBW and M P  con- 
trol  modes. 
Rechecked ASCS control mode. 
Retroattitude command - 04:32:06 
Checked orientation mode per ground request. 
Disliked orientation attitudes. 
Pitched to a -15" gyro attitude and held during 
the retrofire period. Retroattitude switch in 
bypass. Yaw and roll gyro indications held at 
approximately +20" each axis. Retrofire time - 
04:33:21.03 (initiated manually by astronaut, 
retrofire 3 seconds late). 
Used high FBW thrusters. On 250" yaw repeater 
stop at 04:35:00. Out of manual fuel. Terrain 
observations. Off yaw repeater stop at 04:40:55. 
Inserted 4.5"/sec counterclockwise roll  at 
04 :44 :5 5. 
I 
C ontr ol 
modea 
I ,
Auxiliary 
Damping 
, WCS)  
L 
TABLE XV. - SUMMARY OF CONTROL SYSTEM USAGE - Concluded 
I 
- 
Time from launch ' Gyro switch position 
7
From To Position 
04 :45 :04 04 :5 1 :48 
From 17 Maneuvering, flight activities 
I 
Auxiliary damping counterclockwise roll to 
12"/sec. Auxiliary damping held rates to 3 de- 
gree until automatic fuel depletion at 04:50:00. 
Yaw rates pegged at lO"/sec at 04:50:21. Pitch 
rates pegged at lO"/sec at 04:50:31. Drogue 
parachute deployed at 04:50:54. Astronaut de- 
ployed drogue parachute manually at about 
25 000 f t  during third small-end-down spacecraft 
oscillation. Main parachute deployed manually 
04:51:48. Landing at approximately 04:56:00. 
Key: ASCS - Automatic stabilization and contol system. 
RSCS - Rate stabilization and control system. 
FBW - Fly-by-wire control system. 
MP 
a 
- Manual proportional control system. 
TABLE "I.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
04:33:10.3 
04:33:15.3 
04:33:20. 3 
. . . -. .. . 
Actual time, 
h r  :min:sec 
Diff e renc e, 
~. ~ . 
Planned time, 
hr  :m in: se c Event 
~ . .  
14. 7 
14.7 
14. 7 
.- - _ _  - - 
Booster -engine cutoff 
Tower release 
E scape -rocket ignition 
Sustaine r - engine cutoff 
(SECO) discrete 
Tail-off complete 
(BECO) 
~ .. 
Spacecraft separation 
- ~ _ _ .  - 
.. .. 
Retrofire sequence 
Retrorocket No. 1 (left) 
initiation 
Retrorocket No. 2 (bottom) 
Retrorocket No. 3 (right) 
Retro assembly jettison 
... . 
- ~. . 
3.05g relay 
Drogue parachute deployment 
Main parachute deployment 
Landing (ac c ele rom e t e r  
Main parachute jettison 
measurement) 
- 
Launchphase 
~. . 
00:02:10.1 
00:02:32.2 
00:02:32.2 
00:05:05.3 
00:05:06. 3 
Orbital Phase 
- . 
04:32:25.6 
04:32:55.6 
04:33:00. 6 
04:33:05.6 
04:33:55. 6 
- ~ 
_. - Reentry ~ phase 
04:43:55. 6 
04:50:00. 6 
04:50:37. 6 
04:55:22. 6 
04:55:22.6 
~ -____ 
- __ 
00:02:08. 6 
00:02:32.2 
00:02:32.2 
00:05:09. 9 
00:05:10. 2 
00:05:12.2 __ - 
-1.5 
0 
0 
4.9 
5.9 
- 
04:32:36. 5 -Li 10:9 
. .- 
04:34:10.8 1 15.2 
~. . 
04 :44 :44 
04 : 50 : 54 
04:51:48. 2 
04 :55 : 57 
04:56:04.8 
___.. - 
.. 
b 
48.4 (1. 0) 
53.4 
70. 6 
34.4 b(25. 6) 
42.2 b(33. 4) 
-. _-  
aPreflight calculated, based on nominal Atlas performance. 
bThe numbers in parentheses show the difference between the actual and the 
postflight-calculated reentry event t imes based on actual insertion parameters. 
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TABLE XVII . . COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL 
TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS 
_ _  
Range time. sec . . . . . . . . . . .  
Range time. min:sec . . . . . . . . .  
Geodetic latitude. deg North . . . . . .  
Longitude. deg West . . . . . . . . .  
Altitude. f t  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Altitude. nautical miles . . . . . . . .  
Range. nautical miles . . . . . . . .  
Space -f k e d  velocity. ft/sec . . . . . .  
Space-fixed flight-path angle. deg . . .  
Space-fixed heading angle. deg East 
of North . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
I I -  
. 
307.3 
05:07.3 
30.4606 
72.3605 
528 397 
86.96 
445.2 
25 736 
- . 0035 
77.5672 
Condition and quality 1 Planned I Actual I Difference 
Cutoff conditions (including tail-off) 
Range time. sec . . . . . . . . . . .  
Range time. min:sec . . . . . . . . .  
Geodetic latitude. deg North . . . . . .  
Longitude. deg West . . . . . . . . .  
Altitude. f t  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Altitude. nautical miles . . . . . . . .  
Range. nautical miles . . . . . . . .  
Space-fixed velocity. ft/sec . . . . . .  
Space-fixed flight-path angle. deg . . .  
Space-fixed heading angle. deg East 
of North . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Post -po sigrade 
- .. - ... 
305.3 
05:05.3 
30.4308 
72.5076 
528 367 
86.96 
437.4 
25 715 
- . 0006 
310.2 
05.10 . 2 
30.5035 
72.4111 
527 859 
86.87 
443.3 
25 717 
- . 0004 
77.4886 1 77.6008 
snit ion conditions 
Perigee altitude. statute miles . . . . .  
Perigee altitude. nautical miles . . . .  
Apogee altitude. statute miles . . . . .  
Apogee altitude. nautical miles . . . .  
Period. min:sec . . . . . . . . . . .  
Inclination angle. deg . . . . . . . . .  
100.1 
86.96 
166.2 
144.4 
88:32 
32.52 
. 
. 
312.2 
05:12.2 
30.5374 
72.2416 
527 894 
86.88 
452.3 
25 738 
- . 0031 
77.6915 
99.97 
86.87 
166.82 
144.96 
88:32 
32.55 
4.9 
0.0727 
.. 0965 
.508 
. 09 
5.9 
2.0 
. 0002 
. 1122 
4.9 
. 0768 
.. 1189 
-503 
.. 08 
7.1 
2.0 
. 0004 
. 1243 
. 13 
. 09 
.62 
.56 
0 
.03 
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l l !  I I III I I 
TABLE X V I I .  - COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL 
TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Concluded 
I Planned I Actmi 
~~ 
Condition and quality 
Maximum conditions 
Altitude, statute miles . . . . . . . .  
Altitude, nautical miles . . . . . . . .  
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec . . . . . .  
Earth-fixed velocity, ft/sec . . . . . .  
Exit acceleration, g . . . . . . . . .  
2 Exit dynamic pressure, lb/ft . . . . .  
Entry acceleration, g . . . . . . . . .  
Entry dynamic pressure, lb/ft . . . .  2 
~~ 
166.2  
144 .4  
25 737.0 
24 420 .0  
7. 7 
966 a 
b878 
7. 6 
450 
166.82 
144.96 
25 738.0 
24 422 .1  
7 . 8  
967 
7. 5 
429 
1 Difference 
Latitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Longitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Landing point 
21 "07" 
68 "OO'W 
Based on Cape Canaveral atmosphere. a 
bBased on 1959 ARDC model atmosphere. 
- 
. 6 2  
. 5 6  
1 . 0  
2 . 1  
. 1 0  
1 . 0  
-. 1 
- 2 1 . 0  
19'27" 
63'59'W 
C 
C 
- l"40'N 
4"Ol'W 
CffActualft landing coordinates shown in the table were those resulting from the 
trajectory integration. The retrieval point after landing was reported as 19"30'N 
and 64"15'W by the recovery ship. 
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TABLE XVIII. - ORBITAL INSERTION CONDITIONS AVAILABLE AT MERCURY CONTROL CENTER 
f ,----Ir I 
General Impact 
Electric plotter Insertion conditions 
Back from 
Bermuda Muchea 
Velocity with posigrades, fps 
(average of go- -no-go) . . . . . . .  
(average of go--no-go) . . . . . . .  
Insertion altitude, nautical miles . . . .  
Inclination angle, deg . . . . . . . . .  
Orbit capability . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Apogee, nautical miles . . . . . . . .  
Inertial flight path angle, deg 
25 750 25 740 25 739 25 736 
-0.0035 
87. o 
32.52 
14 5 
+o. 010 -0.114 
25 735 
-0.0314 
86.7 
32.5 
a7 
143 
-0.00051 
86.7 
32.5 l 
a Minimum number required for go--no-go decision in the Mercury Control Center. Actual orbit 
capability can exceed this value by a significant amount. 
TABLE xM.- RADAR TRACKING DATA 
. 
Station 
Bermuda 
Bermuda 
Canaries 
Muchea 
Woomera 
Guaymas 
White Sands 
Texas 
Eglin 
Eglin 
Cape Canaveral 
_ _  
- ..- 
Bermuda 
Bermuda 
Canaries 
Muchea 
Woomera 
Hawaii 
Hawaii 
California 
California 
~. 
. .~ 
Radar 
.. - - - .. - -. 
FPS-16 
Ver lor t 
Verlort 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
~ 
. .. - . - - 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
Verlort 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
-~ 
Total I- yd S t a n d a r d  deviations 
points Range, 
First orbital pass 
- ~ ~- . .  
74 
74 
68 
84 
79 
52 
29 
72 
82 
81 
61 
31.0 
62.8 
18. 5 
17.8 
4.5 
11.0 
4.9 
31.9 
10.0 
40.1 
7.6 
Second orbital pass 
76 
71 
61 
82 
74 
53 
52 
45 
45 
__ .- -~ 
10.1 
62.2 
12.0 
22.9 
2.5 
5.4 
16. 7 
10.1 
12.0 
___-.~ - 
Elevation, 
mils I . - -  Azimuth, mils  
. .. 
0.11 
1 .28  
1.18 
1.05 
.17 
1.44 
.23 
2.55 
.35 
1. 67 
.12 
__ 
. ~. . 
0. 16 
1.65 
2.31 
1.28 
.10 
.24 
1.33 
.30 
1.42 
0. 54 
2.15 
.67 
1.15 
.14 
1. 58 
.41 
2.20 
.24 
1. 78 
.56 
. 
_ -  . .  
0.57 
2.71 
1. 80 
1.34 
.22 
.21 
1. 23 
.40 
1. 56 
.. _. 
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. . . . .. . .. 
Station 
White Sands 
Texas 
Eglin 
Eglin 
66 
66 
64 
62 
64 
Cape Canaveral 
- 
8.2 
34.7 
8.8 
11.5 
21. 8 
- 
Bermuda 
Bermuda 
Muchea 
Hawaii 
Hawaii 
--- ~ _ _ _ _ _ _  
41 
61 
74 
20 
14 
California 
California 
White Sands 
I'exas 
Eglin 
Cape Canaveral 
3an Salvador 
21.7 
91. 6 
39.4 
10.0 
30. 8 
TABLE XM. - RADAR TRACKING DATA - Concluded 
Radar Total points 
Standard deviations 
Elevation, I mils I mils Azimuth, Range , Yd 
Second orbital pass - Concluded 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
FPS-16 
FPS-16 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
Verlort 
Verlort 
FPS-16 
FPS-16 
38 
70 
88 
89 
59 
17.7 
76.7 
7.0 
89.1 
6. 6 
61 
61 
Reentry 
11.6 
20.5 
.14 
2. 50 
.54 
1. 82 
.16 
0.30 
1. 84 
.74 
.19 
1.83 
.39 
2.44 
.29 
2.53 
.73 
0.50 
2.09 
.60 
.34 
1.71 
0. 84 
1.93 
.23 
2.37 
1.17 
.14 
. 2 1  
~- 
0. 66 
1. 64 
1.14 
2.19 
.32 
.43 
.36 
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TABLE XX. - LANDING POINT TRACKING DATA 
Station 
Assumed time of retrofire 
(assuming correct attitudes) 
Differential correction based on 
Point Arguello, Calif., tracking: 
30 calculations FPS-16 
20 calculations Verlort 
Differential correction based on 
White Sands, N. Mex., tracking: 
32 calculations 
Differential correction based on 
Corpus Christi, Tex., tracking: 
41 calculations 
Differential correction based on 
Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., tracking: 
02 calculations, FPS-16 
06 points, Verlort 
Differential correction based on 
a Cape Canaveral, Fla. , tracking: 
11 calculations FPS-16 
Cape IP-7090 integrated solution data, 
based on Cape Canaveral, Fla. : 
FPS-16 tracking 
Actual location reported by recovery 
ship 
North 
latitude 
21'04' 
19'14' 
19'21' 
19'24' 
(late report) 
19'24' 
19'27' 
19'30' 
West 
longitude 
67'59' 
63'34' 
63'47' 
63'53' 
63'53' 
v 
63'59' 
64'15' 
Approximate 
listance from 
ictual landing 
point, 
iautical miles 
-. 
235 NW 
45 SE 
30 SE 
20 SE 
20 SE 
Start of transmission from Cape Canaveral, Fla., was deliberately delayed to a 
obtain San Salvador data, so  more tracking was actually available from Cape 
Canave r al. 
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TABLE XXI. - TELEMETRY PERFORMANCE 
Telemetry Decommutator Slant range Elevation 
Acquisition, I Loss of signal,, Acquisition, /Loss of signal, Acquisition, Loss of signal, 
hr:min:sec 1 hr:min:sec nautical miles. nautical miles deg deg 
Cape Canaveral, Floridaa 0 00:07:46 0 00:07:35 0 1100 
Station 
Bermuda 00:03:01 00 : 10 :34 00:03:07 00:10:32 740 890 -1 -1 
Canary Islands 00:14:20 00:21:42 00 : 14 :44 00:21:38 800 950 0 -1 
Kano, Nigeria 00:21:09 00:28:37 00:21:26 00:28:33 880 950 0 -1 
Zanzibar, East Africa 00:29:57 00:38:21 00:30:09 00:38:00 915 1090 -1 -1 
Indian Ocean Ship 00:34:04 00:39:04 00:34:38 00:38:54 
1030 
1030 
905 
920 
Muchea, Australia 
Woomera, Australia 
Canton Islands 
Hawaii 
Point Arguello, California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Corpus Christi, Texas 
Eglin Air Force Base, 
Florida 
1020 
1000 
865 
780 
00:49:24 00:58:19 00:49:44 00:58:12 1030 
00:54 :06 01:03 00:54 :20 01:02:55 1100 
01:09:31 01:16:46 ( 4  01:16:46 930 
83) 
01:27:16 01:31:36 01 :27:44 01:31:36 785 
01:26:39 01:33:35 01:26:43 01:33:31 835 
01:29:18 01:36:53 01:29:34 01:36:31 885 
-1 
0 
0 
-1 
01:32:11 01 :37:44 (4 (c 1 780 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
Cape Canaveral, Floridaa 01:33:28 01:41:12 01:33:32 01 :41: 12 
Bermuda 01:36:44 01 :44: 14 01:36:59 01:44:12 
Canary Islands 01:47:35 01:54:16 01:48:08 01:53:57 
Kano, Nigeria 01:54:50 02:01:54 01:55:54 02:01:54 
Zanzibar, East Africa 
Indian Ocean Ship 
Muchea, Australia 
Woomera, Australia 
Canton Islands 
Hawaii 
02:04:07 
02:04:48 
02:23:00 
02:27:50 
02:43:10 
02:11:30 02:04:21 02:11:05 
02:13:39 02:05:01 02:13:29 
02:31:47 02:23:24 02:31:44 
02:36:07 02:28:06 02 : 3 5 : 54 
02:49 :44 02:43:25 02:49:44 
1050 0 0 
1030 -1 -1 
925 0 0 
1000 0 0 
835 -1 -1 
950 -1 -1 
560 0 +5 
820 1080 
840 940 
970 960 
910 1020 
940 1150 
-1 -1 
-1 -1 
-1 -1 
0 -1 
0 -1 
aIncludes data from Grand Bahama Island and Grand Turk Island transmitted via submarine cable. 
"Out of range. 
'Not applicable. 
W 
0 
Telemetry 
Acquisition, Loss of signal, 
hr:min:sec hr:min:sec 
02:58:44 03:05:04 
03 :00 : 13 03 :06: 57 
r---- Station Decommutator Slant range Elevation Acquisition, LOSS of signal, Acquisition, Loss of signal, Acquisition, Loss of signal, 
hr:min:sec hr:min:sec nautical miles nautical miles deg deg 
0 2 : 5 8 : 5 2 03:05:04 800 825 0 0 
03:06:52 855 830 -1 -1 03:00:36 
Point Arguello, California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Corpus Christi, Texas 
Eglin Air Force Base, 
Cape Canaveral, Floridaa 
, Florida 
I 
03:03:16 I 03:10:04 03 :03:24 03 : 10 :02 850 880 
I 
~ 
03:05:41 03:12:46 I (c) (c) i 790 910 
I 
-1 
I 03:07:04 03:16:13 I 03:07:08 
Kano, Nigeria ' I (b) 1 I ~ 
03:16:07 1 820 -1 
1 I 
I 
, Bermuda 03:lO:lO 03:17:26 ! 03:lO:ll 
1 Canary Islands ' 03:22:31 , 03:25:14 1 03:24:54 I 03:17:23 I 850 940 -1 - 1  03:25:01 1 I I 
Includes data f rom Grand Bahama Island and Grand Turk Island transmitted via submarine cable. a 
bout of range. 
Not applicable. C 
04:21:58 i 04:29:11 04:22:17 
04 :38:20 04:31:41 
I Hawaii 
j Point Arguello, California . 04:31:10 
Guaymas, Mexico 04 : 34 :02 04:40:03 04:34 :24 
810 -1 0 04:29:05 1 935 
04:38:20 1 940 790 -1 0 
04:39:58 i 820 720 -1 +1 I 
TABLE XXII. - COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY 
coverage: Cape Canaveral, 10 kW into unipole antenna; Grand Bahama Island 
sterling antenna; Bermuda, 9. 5 kW into quadhelix antenna; Hawaii and 
10 kW into quadhelix antenna; and Muchea and Guaymas, I 600 W into 
Station 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
(San Salvador) 
Bermuda 
Muchea, Australia 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
(Grand Bahama Island) 
Bermuda 
Muchea, Australia 
Hawaii 
Point Arguello, California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
~~ 
a Command car r ie r  
ON 
Launch 
~~ 
00 :04 :05 
(00 :04 :07) 
00:05:58 
(00 :05 :58) 
00:45:00 
(00:45 :OO) 
01:20:00 
(01 :20:00) 
01:33:00 
(0 1 :33 :O 5) 
01:36:30 
(01:36:36) 
01:37:58 
(01:37:58) 
02 : 15 :00 
(0 2 : 1 5 :OO) 
02:45:00 
(02:45:00) 
02:56:00 
(02:56:00) 
03 :04:00 
(03 :04:01) 
OFF 
00 :04 :05 
(00:04:07) 
00:06:02 
(00:06:02) 
00:12 :oo 
(00 : 12 :OO) 
00:59:00 
(00:59:00) 
01 :33 :00 
(01 :33:00) 
01:36:30 
(01 :36:36) 
01:38:00 
(01 :38:06) 
01:45:00 
(0 1 :4 5 :OO) 
02:32:00 
(02 :32 :OO) 
02 :56:00 
(02 : 56 :OO) 
03 :04 :00 
(03:04:00) 
03:06:00 
(03:05:59) 
+10 pv ca r r i e r  coverage 
above line of sight, 
percent 
100 
74 
67 
40 
47 
30 
100 
87 
49 
97 
91  
33 
a The t imes in parentheses a r e  actual; t imes not in parentheses are planned. 
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TABLE =I.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Concluded 
Orbital coverage: Cape Canaveral, 10 kW into unipole antenna; Grand Bahama Island, 
10 kW into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 9.5 kW into quadhelix antenna; Hawaii and 
California, 10 kW into quadhelix antenna; and Muchea and Guaymas, 600 W into c quadhelix antenna. 1 
Station 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
Bermuda 
Muchea, Australia 
Hawaii 
Point Arguello, California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
- ~___ 
a Command carrier 
ON 
03:06:00 
(03:06:00) 
03:10:30 
(03: 10:30) 
03 :54 :00 
(03 :54 :OO) 
04:15 :00 
(04 :15 :OO) 
04:30:00 
(04 :30:00) 
04 :38:00 
(04:38:09) 
04:40 : 00 
(04 :40 :OO) 
b(04:47:ll) 
~ ~ -_ .. 
OFF 
03 :10:30 
(03 :10:29) 
03 :l8:00 
(03 :19:00) 
04:05:00 
(04:05:00) 
04 :30:00 
(04:30 :OO) 
04 :3 8 :O 0 
(04 :38:00) 
04:40:00 
(04 :40 :01) 
04:43:11 
(04:43 :lo) 
(04 : 5 235) 
. 
+10 PV ca r r i e r  coverage 
above line of sight, 
percent 
- -  - ~ -- 
14 
81 
31 
82 
97 
55 
35 
0 
~ 
aThe times in parentheses are actual; times not in parentheses are planned. 
bTurned on in an at tempt to communicate with the spacecraft during reentry. 
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TABLE Xxm. - COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY 
CI 
w 
w 
- 1  ~~ I 
1 Signal transmission 
Signal strength 
at spacecraft, ' Duration of signal nautical miles Station Function Time of initiation, microvolts transmission, 
sec hr :min:sec 
Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
(San Salvador) 
Muchea, Australia 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
(Grand Bahama Island) 
Muchea, Australia 
Point Arguello, California 
ASCOa 
z Calb 
R CalC 
Z Cal 
R Cal 
Z Cal 
R Cal 
Z Cal 
R Cal 
R Cal 
R Cal 
R Cal 
R Cal 
R Cald 
Z Cal 
R Cal 
00:05:09.9 
00:53:49.5 
00:54:08 
01:29:31.8 
01:30:07 
01:37:00.5 
01:37:10.5 
02:27:04 
02:27:21 
02:27:38 
02:27:40 
02:27:42 
02:27:4 5 
02:27:47 
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Figure 17.- Spacecraft and launch-vehicle indicated attitudes during powered flight. 
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Figure 18.- Horizon scanner and gyro output during r e t r o f i r e  period f o r  MA-7. 
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Figure 19.- 50 fue l  usage. 
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Figure 20. - Variation of cabin-air temperature and cabin-heat-exchanger steam-exhaust 
temperature and associated coolant control valve settings with time. 
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Figure 21.- Variation of suit inlet temperature and suit-heat-exchanger steam-exhaust 
temperature and associated coolant control valve settings with time. 
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Figure 22.- Variation of l5O V-amp and 250 V-amp inverter temperatures and 
associated cooling control valve settings wtth time. 
Figure 23.- Post f l igh t  photograph of Spacecraft 18 ablat ion shield. 
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Figure 24.- Maximum ab la t ion  shield temperatures experienced on f l i gh t s .  
140 
Figure 23.- Postflight photograph of Spacecraft 18 prior to 
disassembly in Hangar S. 
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Figure 26. - Logic diagram for parachute deployment system. 
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Figure 27.- Spacecraft 18 depicting postflight damage to landing bag and suspension straps. 
S p a c e c r a f t  No. 18 
F l a p p e r  v a l v e  
O u t f l o w  v a l v e  
Figure 28.- Sketch showing location of valves in spacecraft 
small pressure bulkhead. 
145 
Figure 29.- Balloon experiment planned deployment configuration. 
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Figure 31.- MIT horizon-definition photograph. 
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Figure 32.- Flight: respiration rate, pulse rate, body temperature and suit inlet 
temperature during the MA-7 flight, with values from the Mercury-Atlas three- 
orbit centrifuge dynamic simulation. 
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(b) Flight elapsed time, 02:3O to biosensor disconnect, 04:52. 
Figure 32. - Concluded. 
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Figure 33.- Preflight: respiration rate, pulse rate, blood pressure, body 
temperature and suit inlet temperature for MA-7 countdown with values at 
selected events from the MA-6 simulated launch of January 17, 1962, and 
the MA-7 simulated launch of May 10, 1962. 
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Figure 33.- Concluded. 
Figure 34.- Sample of playback record from the onboard tape showing physiologic 
data after 1 minute of weightlessness. (Recorder speed 25 "/see.) 
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Figure 35.- Sample of physiological data from playback of the onboard tape at 
04:32:06 mission elapsed time, 1 minute 15 seconds before retrofire, illus- 
trating a premature atrial contraction. (Recorder speed 25 mm/sec. ) 
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Figure 36.- Turnaround maneuver: fly-by-wire control  mode, 
rate and a t t i t u d e  gyro indicator.  
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Figure 37.- 35mm hand-held camera. 
Figure 39. - Photometer. 
Figure 38. - MIT f i l t e r  mosaic. 
Figure 40. - Binoculars. 
~~~ ~ 
Figure 41. - Extinction photometer. Figure 42. - Airglow filter. 
Figure 43.- Night adaption eye cover. 
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Figure 44.- Atlas launch-vehicle hydraulic diagram. 
a 
d 
m 
I 
r 4,000 
I 
bD 
n 
TI 
m 3,000 - 
a, 
k 
ul 
a, 
2 
& 2,000 
2 
0 
.rl 
d 
k a 
1,000 
!a 
N 
ln 
X 
0 
150 200 250 300 350 
Time, sec 
Figure 43. - Pressure at transducer H32P. 
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(a) Space-f ixed velocity. 
Figure 46.- Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in the region of cutoff using 
General Electric-Burroughs guidance computer data. 
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(b) Space-fixed flight-path angle. 
Figure 46.- Concluded. 
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Figure 47. - Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in the region of cutoff using I.P. 7090 data. 
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(b) Space-fixed flight-path angle. 
Figure 47.- Concluded. 
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Figure 49.- Ground t rack  f o r  the MA-7 o r b i t a l  mission. 
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Figure 51.- Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-7 mission launch phase. 
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Figure 51. - Continued. 
( c )  Earth-f ixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 51. - Continued. 
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(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number. 
Figure 51.- Continued 
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Figure 51.- Concluded. 
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Figure 52.- Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-7 mission orbi ta l  phase. 
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F u m e  52. - Concluded. 
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Figure 53.- Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-7 mission reentry phase. 
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(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 53. - Continued. 
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Figure 53. - Continued. 
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(d )  Dynamic pressure and Mach number. 
Figure 33. - Continued. 
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Figure 53.- Concluded. 
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Figure 54.- C-band radar coverage. 
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Figure 54.- Concluded. 
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Figure 55.- S-band radar coverage. 
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Figure 55. - Concluded. 
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Figure 36. - Telemetry reception coverage. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The second United States manned orbital flight was an unqualified success with 
all primary mission objectives accomplished. The MA-7 spacecraft systems oper- 
ation and the pilot performance further indicate that flights of longer duration a r e  
feasible in the Mercury spacecraft. Missions of longer duration will, however, re- 
quire that control activity be reduced and that extended periods of drifting flight be 
included in the flight plan. 
The problems, malfunctions, and anomalies which did occur were not sufficient 
to compromise the mission. The single mission-critical malfunction that occurred 
involved a failure in the spacecraft pitch horizon scanner which is a component of 
the automatic stabilization and control system. Other areas of concern included 
cabin and suit temperatures, high rates of fuel usage, and uncertainties in the 
telemetered inflight blood-pressure data. 
Postflight inspection of the pitch horizon scanner was not possible since it was 
lost when the antenna canister was jettisoned during the normal landing sequence; 
however, the failure was apparently of a random nature in view of the fact that the 
scanner had been fully qualified on previous flights. Because of the malfunctioning 
scanner, which resulted in pitch e r r o r s  in the spacecraft attitude-gyro system, the 
pilot was required to assume manual control of the spacecraft during the retrofire 
period. Although manual control was adequate, spacecraft attitude was not within 
the range prescribed to permit automatic initiation of the retrofire signal. Subse- 
quent manual initiation of the signal occurred several  seconds later than scheduled, 
and this delayed signal, along with the non-optimum spacecraft attitude, contributed 
to the fact that the spacecraft landed approximately 250 nautical miles downrange 
and 15 nautical miles north of the nominal landing point. 
The cabin and suit temperatures were higher than desired, although not intol- 
erable. 
manual selection of a comfort control valve setting and the subsequent temperature 
change at the monitoring point. 
correct valve setting. 
monitoring point will reduce the time lag and minimize the effect it has on system 
c ontr 01. 
A major contributor to the problem is the time lag that exists between 
This lag resulted in difficulty in determining the 
Extensive postflight testing has shown that relocation of the 
The high rate of fuel usage resulted in early depletion of both automatic and 
manual fuel. Double authority control was inadvertently employed at t imes during 
the flight, and the fly-by-wire high-thrust units were accidently activated during 
certain maneuvers, both of which contributed to  the high usage rate of spacecraft 
fuel. In order to prevent inadvertent use of the high-thrust jets when the fly-by- 
wire mode of control is used, future Mercury spacecraft will contain a switch which 
will allow the pilot to  disable and reactivate the high-thrust units at his discretion. 
An automatic override will reactivate these thrusters  just prior to retrofire. Addi- 
tionally, a revision in fuel management and control training procedures has been 
instituted for the next mission. 
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The data transmitted from the blood-pressure measuring system were question- 
able during the flight, primarily because of the magnitude of the data and the inter- 
mittency with which they were received. The mission was continued since associated 
information indicated the continued well-being of the astronaut. 
signals were found to be a result of a broken cable in the microphone pickup; however, 
this did not affect the magnitude of the data received since an intermittent short 
circuit allows either transmission of valid signals or none at all. The blood-pressure 
measuring system was thoroughly checked during postflight tests, and the problem 
was determined to be incorrect preflight calibration. Because of this problem, it 
was concluded that the inflight blood-pressure data were not reducible to the actual 
blood pressure of the astronaut. 
The intermittent 
The success of the MA-? mission provided another significant milestone in the 
Mercury flight program. The knowledge gained will enhance and lend confidence to 
future Mercury missions possessing objectives of even greater ambition and more 
demanding ope rational implications. 
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